

From the Foreword (USA)

OSINT is an integral supporting element of IO and JIOC. Robert Steele has done more than any other person to promote the effective use of OSINT in support of policy, acquisition, operations, logistics, and all-source intelligence, and with this book he expands his original vision to show how a properly integrated approach to global collection, man-machine foreign language translation, and advanced analytics can enhance our success in various “IO-heavy” mission areas.

Congressman Rob Simmons (R-CT-02)

From the Technical Preface (Canada)

Information Peacekeeping is about new capacities of action that come from creating new meanings and understandings through the knowledge processes of an organization. The challenge of Information Peacekeeping is how to use the power of the cyberspace and leverage the grid - the infrastructure - and its content - the infostructure - to act with effect on the social, cultural, and political spaces of communities as well as within cognitive and belief systems of individuals. Information Peacekeeping enables an organization to leverage a belief system to create action at a distance – this effect is the equivalent of what is entanglement is in quantum physics.

Dr. Robert Garigue

From the Author of *Ambient Findability* (UK in the USA)

At the crossroads of ubiquitous computing and the Internet, a technology tsunami is transforming the global information landscape beyond recognition. In this emerging future present, Robert Steele understands that open source intelligence is the key to finding and making sense of the data that makes a difference. If you value peace and freedom, read *Information Operations* right now, before it's too late.

Peter Morville, best-selling author
Ambient Findability
Information Architecture for the World Wide Web

From Scotland Yard (United Kingdom)

For nearly two decades Robert Steele has challenged conventional thinking in traditionally-based secret intelligence communities. Always seeking to match innovation with public and financial integrity, Steele has many times gone head-to-head against the establishment with the uncompromising conviction for which he has become world-famous. The most valuable commodity in the world today is accurate, timely intelligence. Those with access to it will be the richest, the most powerful and the most influential. With a global cauldron of open source information available in so many languages, those with the ability to distil and refine the gold from the dross will become the Alchemists of our time. With both a full career in the secret world, and a second career in the open source intelligence (OSINT) world, Steele's unique combination of experience and evangelism has taught us that there is no Holy Grail of Intelligence—no secret golden chalice—and that the time has come to challenge conventional paradigms that have been the mainstay of intelligence collection and analysis. In this book Steele shows us a more mature and intelligent way of conducting the business of being informed; of making decisions; of changing how we approach war, peace, wealth, and democracy.

Steve Edwards, M.B.E.
Founder, Scotland Yard Open Source Intelligence Unit

From the Defense Intelligence & Security Service (The Netherlands)

Steele never fails to surprise me. In every book he publishes: new ideas, new viewpoints, defining new relations between existing phenomena giving new solutions, all well presented in a logical manner with clear boundaries, every aspect addressed. Although much focused on the US situation, the book is very useful for international OSINT shops and Intelligence Services, since a major part applies to international communities as well. In my opinion, a MUST read for everybody seriously involved in the business; it very clearly explains what the current situation is in the - mainly U.S. - intel/security community, the current challenges we all face, and what can be done and should be done. I certainly wish I could write a book like that.

Arno H.P. Reuser, Chief, Open Source Intelligence
Defense Intelligence & Security Service, The Netherlands.

From the United Nations Force Commander in the Congo

Peacekeeping is not easy. Effective peacekeeping depends above all else on reliable information. At the strategic level, information helps the Secretary General organise the correct mandate. At the operational level, information helps the Under Secretary General for Peace Keeping Operations and the Secretary General's Special Representative (SGSR) develop the correct force structure and inter-agency strategy. At the tactical level, historical and cultural information as well as inter-unit information sharing can do a great deal to avoid misunderstanding and further dialog. This book, the third in a series, is an important contribution. Information Peacekeeping is a very important concept. This book offers a practical approach to multi-national information sharing that will be helpful to all legitimate governments and their civil societies. This book is a practical manifestation—a technical solution—to the recommendations of the Brahimi Report.

MajGen Patrick Cammaert, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps
General Officer Commanding Eastern Division MONUC
In the Democratic Republic of Congo

From The Editor, *Intelligence & National Security*

Robert Steele knows as much about American intelligence and how to improve it as anyone. This latest book is a treasure trove of good ideas and should be mandatory reading for anyone interested in U.S. national security.

Dr. Loch Johnson, Regent's Professor
University of Georgia

From The Editor, *Foreign Policy*

Robert Steele has a unique ability to offer highly technical information in a way that is both provocative and interesting. This book is about mind-sets and open mindedness, about the urgency of ensuring that in making decisions our policy makers consider all information, in all languages, all the time, not just that information that is readily available, comfortable and politically convenient.

Moises Naim
Editor, *Foreign Policy*
Author, *ILLICIT* (Doubleday, 2005)

INFORMATION OPERATIONS: All Information, All Languages, All the Time

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

All Information, All Languages, All the Time

The New Semantics of War & Peace, Wealth & Democracy

Strategic Communication & Public Diplomacy;
Peacekeeping Intelligence & Information Peacekeeping;
Early Warning & Stabilization-Reconstruction Operations;
Homeland Defense & Civil Support;
National Education & National Research;
Acquisition & Logistics

Foreword by Congressman Rob Simmons (R-CT-02)

Technical Preface by Dr. Robert Garigue

Robert David Steele

MA, MPA, NWC, USMC, CIA, OSS

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Cover graphic: The view of Africa, Antarctica, the Indian and Atlantic Oceana from 23,000 miles out in space as the last Apollo flight coasted to the moon, December 1972. Original photo credit NASA 1989. Available in sticker form as item Apollo 17(E). Correspond with EarthSeals, POB 8000, Berkeley, CA 94707 USA. The purple square around the globe represents joint operations and multinational information-sharing.

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Honor Roll

I could not have survived the seventeen years of striving to educate reluctant governments, had it not been for my wife.

Mrs. Kathy Steele

I was ready to give up in 1997. In less than ten minutes he got it, directed its adoption by SOF, and gave me new life.

General Peter Schoomaker, USA

There is only one person at the national level that has championed Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) ably to date.

Dr. Joseph Markowitz

Now we have a new champion, the first-ever Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Open Source (ADDNI/OS), to whom we pledge our support.

Mr. Eliot Jardines

Across all Nations, across the seven tribes of intelligence, over 25,000 may claim to belong to this special group.

Golden Candle Society

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not recognize the role and reality of very special people, my people, who provided me with a sense of community and intelligence not now to be found within the U.S. "Intelligence Community."

Hackers

Publications Review Board

CIA's Publications Review Board has reviewed the manuscript for this book to assist the author in eliminating classified information, and poses no security objection to its publication. This review, however, should not be construed as an official release of information, confirmation of accuracy, or an endorsement of the author's views.¹

¹ The Publications Review Board completed its review in less than three weeks. The process works and I am very glad to have been able to avail myself of this professional means of ensuring that intelligence reform manuscripts are not inadvertently harmful to national security. *Sz.*

Acknowledgements

The past two books benefited from the insights I gained from thousands of people over the course of years, both professional U.S. intelligence colleagues, and foreign participants in the annual conference on global information. This book, however, can be said to be the result of my interaction with a small handful of individuals who prefer not to be named individually.

The most important insights came from the architects for the Joint Inter-Agency Collaboration Center (JICC) at the U.S. Special Operations Command. They taught me that secret intelligence specifically, and intelligence more generally, is a tiny sub-set of all that must be integrated and exploited in the larger Information Operations (IO) scene.

The next most important insights came from L-3 communications leaders. They taught me that Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is meaningless unless it is providing tangible real-time support into a Joint Intelligence Operations Command or Center (JIOC), and comes with a full range of man-machine foreign language translation and statistical analysis tools. With their help, we brought together a team that can do all this—the best is yet to come.

I have also been inspired by Dr. Stephen Cambone's call in January 2004 for universal coverage, 24/7, in all languages, at sub-state levels of granularity. I have been inspired as well by the integrity of those who have sought to create the Defense Open Source Program. I share with them dismay over the continuing selfish and pathological aspects of the varied bureaucracies that impede our progress. We are our own worst enemies.

Lastly, I thank the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, without whose help this book could not have been first devised as a monograph.

The mistakes are my own. In no way does this earnest Acknowledgement suggest endorsement of the book and its ideas by any named organization or individual. In no way do I seek to “hijack” IO, rather I embrace it and subordinate myself to a larger vision to which I try to contribute in the small manner for which I am uniquely qualified. *St.*

Author's Preface

This book is really two distinct offerings. The first, the body of the book, started as an unsolicited White Paper for the Director of National Intelligence and the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, then morphed into a sanitized monograph for the Strategic Studies Institute, and is now presented to the multi-national, multi-agency public for consideration.

My personal view is that the key points of the book are that:

- inter-agency sharing of non-secret information is much more important than precision delivery of secrets to the top guy;
- unclassified information on operations, logistics, beliefs, etc. is much more important than technical secret information; and
- there is a larger process called "Information Operations" (IO) that has been mis-defined in the US as offensive cyberwar and PSYOP on steroids, which in fact deals with
 - the full and constant integration of global coverage in all languages all the time (including historical and cultural knowledge at the neighborhood level);
 - the technologies of sharing, translating, and understanding; inclusive of online video gaming; and
 - the crafting of inter-agency BEHAVIOR and BUDGETS (means) in order to achieve useful ends.

In short, it's not about secret intelligence; it is about global awareness and ethical behavior done across all the instruments of national power, wisely. As Dr. Cambone demands, we need universal coverage, 24/7, at sub-state levels of granularity, but we also need to act on that information in a timely as well as ethical manner, utilizing all of our resources, not just our military, and harmoniously integrating our intelligence and operational activities with those of other legitimate governments and non-governmental organizations.

The second book is contained within the Annotated Bibliography. I confess to having some reservations about mixing the two, for unlike the main body of the book, which is sensible and well-grounded in non-controversial appreciations, the bibliography is subjective, and some comments will be considered to be controversial, perhaps even objectionable.

I came down in favor of putting the two together for the simple reason that it is my hope that every IO professional will read the body of the book for action, and the annotated bibliography for reflection.

Much of what we believe, much of what we have been taught, is, as it was fashionable to say in the 1970's, "socially-constructed reality." Our perceived reality is nowhere near the actual and perceived reality that billions of poor disenfranchised individuals face around the world. Our leadership, our public, our senior uniformed officers, our media, our schools, our religions, our labor unions, our families, are all largely oblivious to what I regard as a sucking chest wound in our national security: on the one hand, we do not have an earnest and objective appreciation for how others see us; and on the other, we do not have a well-rounded grasp of the damage we are doing, both domestically and internationally, with our policies and our behavior.

Here at home I am worried about the dumbing down of America, the obesity; the movement of over 70% of our light manufacturing and computer construction, including software programming, overseas; and the draconian neglect of our infrastructure including transportation, financial databases, medical capabilities, and basic social services and law enforcement.

I am worried about the end of cheap oil, the end of free water, pandemic disease, organized crime and immoral capitalism—the latter two deprive the U.S. Government each year of over \$500 billion a year in legitimate tax revenue that could be applied to social programs and international assistance. We are hollowing out as a Nation. We have failed to absorb our legal immigrants to the point that they are actually citizens, and we have failed to stop the flood of illegal immigration that weakens our Republic.

Overseas I see the Chinese and Iranians, but also the Brazilians, the Koreans, the Russians, the Venezuelans, and others, making moves that are both hostile (e.g. the Iranian sponsorship of terrorism including Khobar Towers) and practical (e.g. attacking our militarism by stressing our economy).

We lack a unified national security strategy, and we lack a unified national approach to being strong and sustainable into the future. I weep for the future of all children, including my three boys, as I contemplate how foolish and selfish we have been these past fifty years, with collective intelligence and democratic sanity all too distant from near-term achievement as things now stand.


To the extent that this bibliography and my earlier books can help alarm others, inspire others, engage others, then I will be well-pleased.

I have learned two things in my lifetime, and they drive all that I do:

1) There are not enough guns in the world to protect our way of life. We must do so with morality, charity, inspiration, wisdom, and sharing.

2) No one Nation, much less any one organization, can comprehend global reality by itself, regardless of the number of individuals or the magnitude of its budget. Understanding this Earth in all its complexities requires nothing less than a World Brain. This book is intended to help us in that direction.

God Bless America; God Bless all human beings who believe in the Golden Rule² regardless of their specific religious or cultural constructs; and may God protect this Whole Earth by enlightening us and enabling us to use the information that is within our reach, in order to create a heavenly community of nations and tribes within which each individual person can hope for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.³

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'RD Steele', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Robert David Steele (Vivas)
Son, Husband, Father, Marine, Patriot

² GOLDEN RULE: "Do unto others as you would have them do to you". Luke 6:31. Cf. <http://www.jcu.edu/philosophy/gensler/goldrule.htm>.

³ This term in the U.S. Constitution is best understood as the pursuit of actualization or fulfillment of one's potential to contribute, rather than mere joy or selfish pleasure.

Foreword

In the mid-1990s, it was my honor to command the 434th Military Intelligence Detachment (MID), a U.S. Army Reserve unit associated with Yale University and located in New Haven, Connecticut. With the active participation of CWO-4 Alan D. Tompkins and SSG Eliot A. Jardines (for many years an accomplished OSINT manager in the private sector and today the first-ever Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Open Source), our unit wrote the first handbook for Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) for the U.S. Army. In 1994, our unit was honored with the Golden Candle Award presented by Open Source Solutions in recognition of its “unusual dedication and persistence ... in preparing a primer, *Open Source Intelligence Resources for the Military Intelligence Officer*, which is of value to all joint and coalition personnel.” The following year the Reserve Officers Association gave the 434th MID its “Outstanding USAR Small Unit Award” for 1995-1996, due in no small part because of its contributions to OSINT.

In 1997 General Peter Schoomaker, USA then Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), was briefed on OSINT, understood its value, and ordered the creation of an OSINT support cell within the Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence Center (SOCJIC). Today that small unit, for a negligible amount of money, is responsible for satisfying 40% of the all-source intelligence requirements generated by all elements of USSOCOM.

In 2000, General William F. Kernan, USA, then serving as both the ranking flag officer of the Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and as the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), agreed to a suggestion by Brigadier General James Cox of Canada, then the Deputy J-2 at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), validated

by General Kernan's Deputy at the Atlantic Command, Admiral Sir James Perwone of the United Kingdom, and commissioned three study guides for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): the *NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook*, the *NATO Open Source Intelligence Reader*, and (NATO) *Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet*. All three of these documents remain valid and useful today.

In the years between 1994 and today, over 40 countries have developed some form of OSINT Center or Cell, most of them for military use. The United States, however, was slow to focus on OSINT across the board, and on 11 September 2001, we were attacked on our homeland by a terrorist group whose intentions had been amply documented in both secret and open sources.

What we have learned since 9/11 is that Information Operations (IO) is, as the title to this book suggests, the new semantics of war and peace, of wealth and democracy. Information is, as Alvin and Heidi Toffler have suggested, a substitute for violence (detering and resolving conflict), for wealth (creating wealth that stabilizes populations), and for capital, labor, time, and space.

In the Age of Information, IO, not force structure, is the center of gravity for achieving national security and national prosperity in an uncertain world.

USSOCOM, today responsible for the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), today responsible for IO and global information monitoring in support of our national and homeland defense, are both breaking new ground.

Under the inspired direction of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI), Dr. Stephen Cambone, both are leading the way with the development of Joint Intelligence Operations Centers or Commands (JIOC), capabilities that will be rapidly migrated to the other Combatant Commanders.

OSINT is an integral supporting element of IO and JIOC. Robert Steele has done more than any other person to promote the effective use of OSINT in support of policy, acquisition, operations, logistics, and all-source intelligence, and with this book he expands his original vision to show how a properly integrated approach to global collection, man-machine foreign language translation, and advanced analytics can enhance our success in various “IO-heavy” mission areas.

As I reflect on all that I have learned since being Staff Director to Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), then Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI); as an Army officer; and as a Congressman with responsibilities on both the House Armed Services Committee and as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the House Homeland Security Committee, I find myself seeing four areas where we can improve our Nation’s prospects for the future:

First, it is clear, as this book suggests and as Dr. Cambone has demanded, that we must be able to access all information in all languages, all the time. Secret intelligence is a fraction of what we need to know to defend America, collaborate with allies, and enhance the prosperity of all countries. It is no longer enough to have spies and diplomats—we are engaged in a 100-year six-front Global War, and nothing less than universal information coverage will meet our needs. Nor can we limit ourselves to online information. We must be able to access historical and cultural documents, and all off-line information.

Second, it is clear to me that information sharing rather than secrecy must be the most important mind-set to be fostered as we go forward. Information must be shared in secure reasonable ways across all boundaries. Multi-national, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, multi-domain information sharing—what the Swedes call M4IS—is the wave of the future.

Third, since 80% of what we need to know is controlled or accessible only to non-governmental organizations or private sector parties, most of whom have no wish to be associated with covert intelligence organizations, it is clear to me that the Nation needs to create a national Open Source Agency.

Fourth and finally, we must recognize that the traditional information technology approach, in which unlimited amounts of taxpayer dollars are applied to proprietary, unilateral, expensive systems operating in isolation from one another, is neither affordable nor sensible.

- External to the Republic, we must interact and share information with non-governmental organizations, universities, and foreign governments and their sub-state elements, all with limited budgets.
- Internal to the Republic, we must dramatically improve the ability of state and local governments to make sense of all of the information available to them, while also making it possible for them to interact with our federal government and other parties using the best available *affordable* digital technologies.

For these two reasons, open source software must join open source information as a foundation for global information sharing and IO.

I strongly support USDI's focus on creating JIOCs, and I hope that in partnership with the Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency (DARPA), the General Services Administration (GSA), and other pioneering elements of the U.S. Government and allied foreign governments, that we will take the next step, and sponsor regional Multi-national Information Operations Centers (MIOC) that focus initially on early warning and open source information sharing, but could perhaps evolve to support multilateral secret intelligence sharing and even multilateral clandestine and covert collection management.

The world is at war. It is a war between legitimate governments and destabilizing criminal and terrorist organizations. Our position is weakened by mistakes of our own making, including a sustained reluctance to address global issues such as poverty, disease, ecocide, vanishing water supplies, and reduced energy supplies.

While some speak of the singularity being near, of the enormous potential of technology—notably robotics, genetics, and nanotechnology—the reality is that technology may be invented but it will not be applied intelligently or ethically unless there is public intelligence and public accountability. At root, IO is democratically empowering. IO is potentially the greatest force for good that our Republic could nurture.

As we develop our IO capabilities, we must focus on the ethics of openness, not the manipulation of opinion. We must strive to deliver the tools for truth to all peoples everywhere, and nurture democratic elements from the bottom up as well as at the national level.

As someone who has spent over thirty-five years as a Military Intelligence Officer in the U.S. Army, on both Active and Reserve assignments, my years with the 434th MID were among the most exciting and productive in my career, due in no small part to our revolutionary work with OSINT and its new parent, IO.

Today, as I serve on two Committees led by Members of Congress who understand both the urgency of sustaining our Armed Forces and the urgency of securing our Homeland, I see IO as the foundation for revitalizing our national power and our national prosperity. I see IO as central to both our effectiveness overseas in projecting American values and protecting American interests, and I see IO as central to our homeland defense in as much as it helps to educate our citizens about global realities, and helps our citizens to communicate bottom-up dots through Community Intelligence Centers and networks.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS: All Information, All Languages, All the Time

This book is an invitation to think about a whole new dimension of national power. I urge the reader to take it to heart and to mind. God Bless America!

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Rob Simmons". The signature is stylized, with a large, looping "R" and "S".

Rob Simmons
Member of Congress
Second District, Connecticut
Colonel, USAR, RET

Technical Preface

This book is of seminal importance for all organizations. Let me put this in context for you; three revolutions are being expressed in this book. For me, as a computational epistemologist, the most important questions center on:

1) how computers create and destroy knowledge or can help identify factual knowledge and false knowledge;

2) how computers can create organizational efficacy by discovering or inferring new and valid usable knowledge, and

3) how new knowledge can identify causes of conflict and avoid wars by creating wealth or facilitating early peaceful preventive measures. This outstanding work and contribution is about how people in all organizations and communities can change their world through the intelligent development and sharing of knowledge.

In practical matter of fact, computers are critical to all our present knowledge processes. They structure knowledge as well as extend and amplify the sense-making capabilities of individuals, organizations, and communities.

Let us not undervalue the fact that all knowledge is also a reflection of the tools that were used to illuminate and elucidate it. The

microscope permitted us to explore biology and the telescope helped us to explore cosmology.

Today computers and software (which are *per se* still in their technological infancy) are just starting to enable us to explore and understand the cognitive worlds and belief systems that we have created for ourselves.

Constructing better knowledge is fundamental to the survival of humanity, as knowledge is the most critical tool that people use to deal with the problems faced by all communities at every level from neighborhood to global.

Computers are epistemological exploration machines. They are means and ways to investigate the life cycle of knowledge. Right now, these ways and means are still simple but eventually, computational systems will construct valid theories and discover new knowledge all by themselves.

Almost 10 years ago, I stated that the weapons of Information Warfare (IW) weapons would be a composite of Physical, Syntactical, or Semantic weapons of force.

The use of a Physical weapon will result in the permanent destruction of physical components and potentially a denial of service.

A Syntactical weapon will focus on attacking the operating logic of a system and introduce delays, permit unauthorized control and/or create unpredictable behaviors.

Finally, a Semantic weapon would focus its effects on destroying the trust and truth maintenance components of a closed and erroneous belief system.

For many years, IW has focused on attacking and defending electronic systems, not on the cognitive substance those systems represent and facilitate. Naturally, the debate on what is the true nature of information warfare has moved on over the course of the last 10 years. Now IW, characterized in that way, is a subset of a much broader debate with regard to what is the computational life cycle of knowledge.

There is still a long way to go in order to understand what is computational knowledge – how it is created, how it is used and transformed, and ultimately how one uses knowledge to displace or destroy other knowledge.

It is still in transition mode as seen by the growing role of the Internet, and the availability of accessing terabytes and petabytes of structured, semi-structured, and unstructured data and information.

However, it is a fundamental issue because new technical revolutions are emerging. The composition of the primary material itself is changing – data and information are being changed. From “dumb” and passive, they are becoming “smarter” and more “active” because of the rise of the new protocols. The present functionality of the Cyberspace is essentially based on TCP/IP but in the next phase of its evolution, programs will be leveraging all available XML-based and tagged content, inclusive of historical and geospatial attributes at the datum level.

These new XML protocols cause the context of data and information to be integrated directly into the content.

Through Syntax, the Semantics are now accessible. These new semantically-capable computational technologies will permit a completely new range of processing more akin to reasoning than calculating.

The use of semantic technologies that automatically create taxonomies and ontologies combined with declarative logic and

unsupervised concepts-learning will change both the nature of processing and exploitation of content. This has already started through the tagging of content and linking of concepts. In this new phase of cyber evolution of knowledge, data and information are computationally actionable.

In this context, the distinction between what is an application and what is content will be blurred. Enabled by semantic technologies, users of the Internet will be accessing enriched smart data and information via new types of searches engines, smart queries and new varieties of logical and linguistic reasoning.

Naturally, organizations that construct, manage, and use these new understandings have a responsibility to prove and demonstrate the pedigree and legitimacy of that knowledge.

We will see the rise and the emergence of semantic management practices in organizations that focus on creating value through the creation of new meanings, new understandings and new solutions.

These organizations will be able to ask some of the most important questions, such as:

- “What do I know, and what am I not aware of?”
- “What intentions are behind these events?”
- “Why do these people want to do this?”
- “What are the belief systems that explain these behaviors and events?”
- “How do people within these belief systems operate and cause these actions?”

- “What knowledge needs to be constructed to change a belief system?”

Semantic organizations will be the ones that can demonstrate how their knowledge was created as well as deliver on society’s expectancies of trust and truthfulness that are associated with any of their assertions.

It is from within this technological evolutionary process that a different complexity level and another revolution emerge. From an incomplete debate on Information Warfare (IW), we now have to evolve toward an understanding of what Information Peacekeeping (IP) has to propose as it is a new organizational capability that emerges from within this new technological reality.

Alvin and Heidi Toffler have spoken of information as a substitute for violence and as a means of creating wealth. IP is the actualization of those earlier thoughts. C.K Prahalad talks to the power of exchange and markets to address poverty. These authors talk to the power of information.

As such, Robert Steele has not written this book as an elaboration of the other side of information warfare. Information Peacekeeping is not a converse of Information Warfare, but rather its complement.

Information Peacemaking is a revolution within the meta-strategy of Information Operations. Information Peacekeeping is about new capacities of action that come from creating new meanings and understandings through the knowledge processes of an organization.

The challenge of Information Peacekeeping is how to use the power of the cyberspace and leverage the grid - the infrastructure - and its content - the infostructure - to act with effect on the social, cultural, and political spaces of communities as well as within cognitive and belief systems of individuals.

Information Peacekeeping enables an organization to leverage a belief system to create action at a distance – this effect is the equivalent of what entanglement is in quantum physics.

If Information Warfare is about destroying the infrastructure of knowledge and false belief systems then the prime objective of Information Peacekeeping is to help us understand the processes that create valid knowledge and more truthful and trustworthy belief systems. As such, it is a much more critical and difficult process.

All these processes need to be coordinated not just within the inter-agency boundaries of a single Nation, but across all Nations.

Therefore, the new and much larger role of Information Operations is to orchestrate the use of both the processes of destruction through Information Warfare and also the processes of the creation of new potentials and new understandings through Information Peacekeeping.

Also, because IO in an integrative meta-strategic framework, it extends beyond just one organization. IO is not just the domain of one group or simply a national government function. To be effective it has to be democratized into all fields of human activities.

IO needs to integrate medical, social, economic, geographic, political, cultural and religious data, information and events. IO will demand the reform of organizations along with a new set of shared accountabilities. The complexity of the problem begets the complexity of the organization that will try to manage it.

$IO = IP + IW$, as it is presented here, can and will deliver a new capacity. The Promise of IO is to correct false beliefs and transform faulty belief systems through a process of discovery and communication of factual new knowledge. Moreover, through this there can be new understandings as to how best to resolve the causes of conflict and war.

Information Warfare and Information Peacekeeping are powerful concepts that recast and reframe the present strategic analysis processes and the behaviors and budgets that follow from decisions supported by good analysis.

Robert Steele's book finally breaks through the present approaches to strategic analysis, and delivers a Strategic Imagination capability with an integrative and holistic analytical process.

The Information Operations analytical framework, as presented in this book, does more than just integrate the roles of Information Warfare and Information Peacekeeping into a total continuum of conflict management and conflict resolution. Robert Steele presents the road map we must follow to get to these higher levels of technical and organizational performance.

In the coming age of semantic organizations, where worldwide access will be considered a universal right, militaries and governments will have to operate at new levels of situational awareness to ensure a safer, productive, and sustainable quality of life for all communities.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert Garigue". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping "R" and a long, horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Robert Garigue, PhD
Toronto, Ottawa, Chicago

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INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of terrorism, radicalized religion, the proliferation and commoditization of weapons of mass destruction, and the increased informational and economic power of Arabia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, among others, has brought Information Operations (IO) to the forefront of the not yet unified national security strategy.¹

The Administration and Congress both recognize that Strategic Communication, Public Diplomacy, and inter-agency information-sharing and collaboration must be core competencies within a transformed national security arena. Robust inter-agency information sharing and collaboration practices will be most effective if there is a common understanding of the real world based on global foreign information acquisition and analysis.

This book offers a campaign plan for meeting the requirement established by the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) in January 2004: universal coverage, 24/7, in all languages, down to the

¹ Although reformists have called for a unified national security budget process, this is still not practiced. The diplomatic budget (Program 150) and the military budget (Program 50) are devised in isolation from one another, as are the Homeland Security and Justice budgets, while the information and economic budgets are scattered across multiple jurisdictions. Considerable savings, and a considerable enhancement of U.S. national security as well as national competitiveness, could be achieved if there were both a unified national security planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) that integrated both acquisition and operational campaign planning across diplomatic, information, military, and economic jurisdictions; and if “total information awareness” were centered on public information using Google and other openly-available systems, instead of on secret information and closed intelligence systems that lack access to 80% of the relevant information and cannot be exploited by 95% of the population.

tribal and neighborhood levels of granularity.² This proposed capability addresses the specific needs of the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and of the regional Combatant Commanders (COCOM) and their supporting elements including the Services.

It also provides for rapid inexpensive replication across all federal, state, and local elements associated with homeland security or national security, and for rapid inexpensive migration to coalition governments and non-governmental organizations that agree to enter into information sharing treaties or information sharing agreements with the Department of Defense (DoD).

The latter point merits stressing. At least eighty percent of the information that America and other legitimate governments must harness in order to be informed and make intelligent collective decisions is owned, controlled, or uniquely-accessed by non-governmental or private sector organizations that do not desire a relationship with a classified or even an overt element of any governmental intelligence community.

The major premise of this book is that sharing, not secrecy, is the future of national intelligence; and the corollary of that premise is that overt honorable relationships and the exchange of open source information rather than secret information, is the essence of where we need to go. The U.S. Government can facilitate, but not control, global information sharing and exploitation. This is the Zen of intelligence:

To gain control, one must give up control.

² Dr. Stephen Cambone articulated this requirement in a speech to the Security Affairs Support Association (SASA), the premier forum for senior executives in both government and industry who are engaged in intelligence support operations. See full text at <http://www.oss.net/extra/news/?id=2354> where additional commentary is provided, and also at http://www.oss.net/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=2369.

In the Age of Information, the primary source of National Power is information that has been converted into actionable intelligence or usable knowledge. According to Alvin and Heidi Toffler,

*Knowledge—in principle inexhaustible—is the ultimate substitute.*³

In their book *PowerShift* the Tofflers go on to discuss knowledge as a substitute for wealth, for natural resources, for energy, for violence,⁴ and even for time and for space. Knowledge—the vast majority of which is not classified—is the ultimate source of national power. It is for this reason that the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI), Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, is brilliantly “on point” when he demands as his primary objective for Defense information and intelligence:

*...universal coverage, 24/7, in all languages in near-real-time, at sub-state levels of granularity...*⁵

³ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *PowerShift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century* (Bantam Books, 1990), page 86. The Tofflers are investigative journalists and researchers at heart, and tend to do direct interviews and exploit raw information sources rather than secondary sources. They complement and are in total harmony with such other extraordinary current works as Thomas Stewart, *The Wealth of Knowledge: Intellectual Capital and the Twenty-First Century Organization* (Currency, 2001) and Barry Carter, *Infinite Wealth: A New World of Collaboration and Abundance in the Knowledge Era* (Butterworth Heinemann, 1999).

⁴ Their discussion of knowledge in relation to violence is contained in *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Little Brown & Company, 1993), where the chapter on “The Future of the Spy” provides the first major public discussion of “the rival store” that focuses on open sources of information in all languages. They also addressed this theme when speaking in 1993 to the second annual international conference on “National Security & National Competitiveness: Open Source Solutions,” in Washington, D.C. on 2 November 1993. The complete text of their remarks to this audience of over 800 predominantly U.S. military officers is available online at <http://tinyurl.com/dzwbz>.

⁵ *Supra* note 2. The quotes reflect his intent, this mix of words is abbreviated from a longer statement.

This transformative vision was articulated by the Defense Science Board in two seminal studies, *Strategic Communication* (July 2004), and *Transitions to and from Hostilities* (December 2004).⁶

The achievement of this righteous objective demands three separate transformative Information Operations (IO) campaigns, each integrated and extendible down to the state & local levels for Homeland Defense, and also transferable externally toward Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and other organizations controlling the 80% of the information that will never be readily available to classified agencies:⁷

Information-Sharing: the creation of joint inter-agency information-sharing and collaboration networks and centers whose capabilities can be replicated quickly and *inexpensively* by, among others, homeland security elements including states and counties, and also NGOs, universities, and coalition

⁶ Both reports are downloadable at the Defense Science Board web site, under Reports, at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports.htm>. The third DoD publication that underpins this book is Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Homeland Security Gordon England's *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* (June 2005), available online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/d20050630homeland.pdf>. Careful reading of all three reports will document two critical strategic and transformative themes common to all three reports: a) information-sharing, exploiting all sources in all languages all the time, is the central tenet of defense in the age of information; and b) non-governmental organizations external to the U.S., and county-level law enforcement and civil organizations at the lowest level of the U.S. domestic governance hierarchy, must be included in the defense information-sharing, at a cost they can afford (which is to say, at almost no cost to them) for access to "the network." This makes it clear that classified networks are not, repeat not, the answer to the larger challenge of global information monitoring and sharing.

⁷ The ideal approach to global information capture and exploitation is one in which diplomatic arrangements (the negotiation of information-sharing treaties with nations and information-sharing agreements with organizations) are implemented by the military using the civil affairs model, under J-3 operational control. Only when the information is "inside the wire" should it be subject to J-2 quality control and oversight.

partners.⁸ This capability ensures that what we already know, or what our allies already know, can be readily shared with all concerned—this includes the crafting of the Strategic Communication message; and the video gaming of real-world scenarios made possible by real-world real-time information feeds.

Global Monitoring: the establishment of a mission-oriented global information monitoring system that can master the full spectrum of available information in all languages⁹ and that is both tailored to defense needs and responsive to operational tempo (i.e. effective in near-real-time); and

Translation: the establishment of a man-machine foreign language translation network that can collect, process, and

⁸ One of the most important lessons learned from the Global War on Terror (GWOT) is that intelligence is the smallest part of the information-sharing challenge, although also the most difficult to break out of the stove-pipes. External open sources of information, operational traffic, logistics information, and acquisition capabilities and counter-measures information are all vital parts of the Information Operations (IO) mosaic. Novices argue about sharing classified information; mid-level experts argue about U.S. Government inter-agency information sharing; the real masters understand, as the Swedes have taught us, that the “endgame” in IO is about multi-national, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, multi-domain information-sharing (M4IS). As the Jolt cola commercial says, “Dare to want it all.” For a report on the 3rd Annual Peacekeeping Intelligence Conference in Stockholm, Sweden 4-5 December 2004, the first recorded mention of M4IS, see the trip report at <http://tinyurl.com/a4f4r>.

⁹ There are 33 core languages (Arabic, Aramaic, Berber, Catalan, Chinese, Danish, Dari, Dutch, English, Farsi, Finnish, French, German, Indonesian, Irish, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Kurdish, Kurmanji, Norwegian, Pashto, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Serbian, Spanish, Swedish, Tamil, Turkish, Urdu) within which Arabic has at least twelve nuanced variants (Andalusi Arabic (extinct, but important role in literary history); Egyptian Arabic (Egypt, considered the most widely understood and used “second dialect”); Gulf Arabic (Gulf coast from Kuwait to Oman, and minorities on the other side); Hassaniya (in Mauritania); Hijazi Arabic; Iraqi Arabic; Levantine Arabic (Syrian, Lebanese, Palestinian, and western Jordanian); Maghreb Arabic (Tunisian, Algerian, Moroccan, and western Libyan); Maltese; Najdi Arabic; Sudanese Arabic (with a dialect continuum into Chad); and Yemeni Arabic).

exploit foreign language information, both written and verbal, in real-time, at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.¹⁰

Therefore, this book outlines how we might integrate three IO elements:

- Strategic Communication (the message)
- Open Source Intelligence (the reality)
- Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC, the technology)¹¹

...in support of seven distinct “IO-heavy” operational missions:

¹⁰ Machine translation and online dictionaries are completely inadequate to this challenge at this time, as are the limited number of U.S. citizens eligible for clearances who rarely achieve fluency and more often than not stagnate at level 2 on a scale of 1 to 5 (native). It is possible, if we break away from the rigid obsession with using only U.S. citizens with clearances, to create a global network of machine translation, innovative tailored online dictionaries, and a very broad network of near-real-time human monitors, reporters, and translators who post material to the web as it becomes available, with translations and subject-matter annotations. The key here is to make the network multi-national rather than unilateral, to use tools, and not obsess on secrecy.

¹¹ The I in JIOC is for Intelligence, the C can stand for Center or Command, depending on how the COCOM wants to adapt the concept. Some like EUCOM appear to desire a command, with all the authorities inherent in command, while other COCOMs are more comfortable with it being a center, so they don't have to tackle the challenges associated with breaking down the stove pipe authorities that plague the COCOMs. USDI's intent appears to be the establishment of a functional intelligence construct similar to the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), or Ground Component Commander (GCC), who would have all the authority to conduct the fight for knowledge, to include the protect component of the fight for information. While some interpret the I as standing for Information, or Inter-Agency, USDI's intent appears to be for it to represent Intelligence, but in the broadest interpretation of the word, embracing all available information in all languages and at all levels of classification across all mission areas. As of this writing, \$27 million has been awarded to Blackbeard Technologies in St. Petersburg, Florida for preliminary work on the USSOCOM Joint Inter-Agency Collaboration Center (JOICC), and over \$80 million is being offered for a multi-year Information Operations Foreign Media Monitoring program that will be a fundamental part of the new Global Information construct being led by USSTRATCOM. Roughly \$2 billion a year is expected to be spent by DoD at Final Operating Capability (FOC) several years out.

- Information Operations
- Peacekeeping Intelligence (reactive)
- Information Peacekeeping (proactive, preventive)
- Early Warning (conflict deterrence, pro-active counter-terrorism)
- Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations
- Homeland Defense & Civil Support
- Acquisition & Logistics

...while also revitalizing national education & national research, in tandem the *foundation* of National Power in the Age of Information.

It is imperative that the Department of Defense (DoD) orchestrate the design, funding, and management of all three IO elements as one coherent whole. Addressing the “T” alone, or the “I” alone, is a prescription for failure. Consider this from management guru Peter Drucker:¹²

The next information revolution is well under way. But it is not happening where information scientists, information executives, and the information industry in general are looking for it. It is not a revolution in technology, machinery, techniques, software, or speed. It is a revolution in CONCEPTS. So far, for 50 years, the information revolution has centered on ... the “T” in IT. The next information revolution asks, What is the MEANING of information, and what is its PURPOSE? And this is leading rapidly to redefining the tasks to be done with the help of information, and with it, to redefining the institutions that do these tasks ... We can already discern and define the next ... task in developing an effective information systems for top management: the collection and organization of OUTSIDE-focused information.

Drucker’s prescience is further emphasized by a new book

¹² Peter Drucker, writing in *Forbes ASAP* on 24 August 1998, at page 46.

published in 2005, seven years later.¹³ Sense-making, not linear industrial-era number crunching or traditional secret intelligence “cut and pasting” is emerging as the foundation for national power and profit.

Below (Figure 1) is an advance view of our concluding illustration. This book will explain why this view is helpful to DoD IO.




Figure 1: Creating the World Brain for US Benefit

It is imperative that we follow the USSOCOM lead and recognize that finished secret intelligence is a fraction of the secret information available to us, and that all raw information—secret, unclassified,

¹³ Daniel H. Pink, *A WHOLE NEW MIND: Moving from the Information Age to the Conceptual Age* (Riverhead Books, 2005).

operational, logistic, must be brought together across distributed “pits” that are able to share all relevant information with one another.

It is also imperative that there be unity of effort between STRATCOM and SOCOM in particular, and among all defense elements, both U.S. and international, focused on open sources of information.

Modern IO is not about the old messages of PSYOP, but rather about empowering billions of people with both information tools and access to truthful information. It is about education, not manipulation. It is about sharing, not secrecy. It is about human understanding to create wealth and stabilize societies, not about the threat of violence and the delivery of precision munitions. IO substitutes information for violence.

OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

Information Operations

Although the classified world has been aware of the vulnerability of electronic communications and computing systems for decades, and some extraordinary intelligence operations were conducted in the latter part of the 21st Century, by the Year 2000 a succession of computer worms, notably the Morris worm, and the Y2K problem itself, had attracted the public's attention, as well as the attention of adversaries who were previously unaware of their vulnerability. Doors started slamming shut around the world as the U.S. lost access to previously "wide-open" systems. We responded, as America is wont to do, by throwing money at the problem.

Information Operations (IO) became synonymous with a mix of critical infrastructure protection and a mad dash to penetrate any and all computer systems without regard to any cost-benefit analysis. We also failed to invest in Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TPED), burdening our all-source analysts with increased volumes of captured secret information, while providing them with virtually no tools for making sense of that information, nor access to open information.¹⁴

¹⁴ The Report of the Independent Commission on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (2000) includes the following statement in the Foreword: "The Commission

Neither the U.S. Intelligence Community, nor the operational commanders ostensibly responsible for “requirements,” actually produced any coherent requirements. IO was “collection-centric” and lacking in a focus on requirements definition, collection management, post-processing, sense-making, or even actionable intelligence. The system was on auto-pilot, going over a cliff.

We went over the cliff on 9-11-2001. Despite books on *American Jihad* and *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America*,¹⁵ despite a prior car bomb attack on the World Trade Center (and the capture of an entire apartment’s documents that the FBI failed to translate), despite the FBI’s timely capture of a key 9-11 participant with his laptop (which FBI lawyers would not allow to be examined), we failed to prevent 9-11. The only airplane that failed to hit its target was taken down by heroic U.S. citizens acting on public “intelligence” obtained by cell phone. This is a key observation: informed citizens acting on open source information can make a difference.

validates the charge that the Intelligence Community is “collection centric,” thinking first of developing and operating sophisticated technical collection systems such as reconnaissance satellites, and only as an afterthought preparing to properly task the systems and to process, exploit, and disseminate the collected products.” The report goes on to provide a brutal detailed indictment of decades of neglect for “sense-making” tools. View at <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/nima/commission/toc.htm>.

¹⁵ Steve Emerson, *American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us* (Free Press, 2002), and Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America* (Forum, 1999). Although *American Jihad* was published in the immediate aftermath of 2001, Steve Emerson had been briefing this message since 1994, when he produced a one-hour special documentary for Public Broadcasting Corporation (PBS) that displayed covert videos of imams on U.S. soil calling for the murder of Americans. Bodansky, then a senior staff director on the Republican Task Force on Terrorism on Capitol Hill, was ignored on the Hill, and despite his book being a *New York Times* #1 Bestseller, was ignored across the bureaucracy as well. “Mind-set,” as so many have documented, is a very powerful filter, able to block very strong signals if they are inconsistent with one’s preconceived notions. As the book goes to press, there are credible reports surfacing that suggest that CIA and FBI were both running the blind sheik as an asset, and chose to accept the precursor mayhem as a reasonable cost, and to then cover up their antecedent misbehavior after 9-11 made clear the cost of their poor judgment.

9-11 put the champions of open source information (OSIF) and open source intelligence (OSINT) over the top. Although the *status quo* bureaucrats and their legislative allies defeated virtually all of the intelligence reform recommendations put forward by genuine reformists including the widows and orphans of 9-11,¹⁶ proponents for transformative OSINT, aided by an open-minded USDI and Congressman Rob Simmons (R-CT-02), were able to leverage the tiny little box on page 413 of the 9-11 Commission Report (recommending an Open Source Agency co-equal to and completely independent of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)),¹⁷ and related recommendations from two Defense Science Board reports, to achieve independent operating status within DoD.¹⁸

¹⁶ Michael A. Turner, "Intelligence Reform and the Politics of Entrenchment," in *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (V18 N3, Fall 2005), pp. 383-397, provides an objective and well-documented analysis of how vested interests prevailed and true intelligence reform, including the all-important changes in mind-set and culture, was blocked. This reference is not online. For a shorter commentary that distinguishes between reactionary, evolutionary, and revolutionary intelligence reform, see Robert David Steele Vivas, "Intelligence Affairs: Evolution, Revolution, or Reactionary Collapse?", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (forthcoming), at <http://tinyurl.com/8e6wx>. Additional references are at http://www.oss.net/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=1334.

¹⁷ As of July 2005 the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is said to be considering a Federally-Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) for OSINT. This may help CIA address its own internal needs, but it will not address the broader needs of DoD, or any other U.S. Government agency including Commerce, Education, the Environmental Protection Agency, Interior, and Justice, among others, nor will it be responsive to operational or tactical levels of command and staff operations, nor the needs of state and local law enforcement and disaster response teams. As this book goes to press Mr. Eliot Jardines, one of the original pioneers with Congressman Simmons and the author, has been named the Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Open Source (ADDNI/OS). We believe that as the ADDNI/OS, Mr. Jardines will be among the first to focus on the reality that OSINT is a separate discipline that can make important contributions to each of the classified disciplines, and that there is a need for an independent Open Source Agency.

¹⁸ As this goes to press the media is delving into reports that "Able Danger," a data mining and sense making endeavor within the U.S. Army's Intelligence and Security

The “content” aspects of IO are now in the ascendancy. IO content can be thought of in two parts: Strategic Communication (the message) and OSINT (the reality). The first cannot be effective without the second. It is not possible to craft the right message, nor to deliver that message to the right person at the right time in the right context, without first understanding “ground truth” at a sub-state level of granularity (tribes, villages, neighborhoods). OSINT is the horse seeing the path, Strategic Communication is the cart carrying the message. One before the other.

At the same time, it is not possible for DoD to be effective at either Strategic Communication or OSINT if each of the Combatant Commanders (COCOM) and each of the Services is executing contracts for either out-going messages or incoming reality, willy nilly with a variety of contractors and a variety of systems and products that never come together in any one place nor be fully inter-operable. Content needs standards and coherent management as much as any system.

It is especially important that the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), which has the IO message/reality mission, and the

Command (INSCOM), identified three of the 9-11 hijackers a year prior to 9-11, but that this information was not shared with the FBI because military lawyers and managers believed that they were not allowed to collect information on U.S. citizens or green-card holders. There were two important areas of ignorance among those making that decision, ignorance that persists today at the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and elsewhere: 1) visa holders are not U.S. citizens or green-card holders and are fair game; and 2) overt information is not proscribed by EO 12333. Commands are free to collect overt legally available public information on anyone, including U.S. citizens. Open source information can be converted into open source intelligence without violating any privacy or regulatory constraints, and it is therefore an essential foundation for domestic security operations. It can provide a basis for alerting appropriate authorities who can then exercise their legal powers to obtain subpoenas or begin surveillance under established legal mandates and protocols. DoD can and should be the lead on global overt information monitoring, including within the homeland. Where DoD needs to improve is in its mind-set and knowledge of the law. DoD must err on the side of excessive sharing, not on the side of inappropriate concealment of overt knowledge.

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which has the Global War on Terror (GWOT) mission (and also the Nation's finest operational OSINT capability),¹⁹ form an "IO Axis" that each of the COCOMs and the Services as well as the DoD intelligence agencies, can plug in to. Expenditures on IO/OSINT (including man-machine foreign language translation) by the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), to take three examples, must be managed by USDI or an operational field activity reporting to USDI, such that we optimize what we spend and how we exploit what we capture or buy.²⁰

Finally, there are two vital aspects of IO that USDI appears to be pursuing: DoD must serve a critical role as, first, the "hub" for inter-agency information-sharing within the US Government and down to the state and local authorities, and second, as a bridging network across multi-national multi-agency boundaries, enabling more intimate and respectful information-sharing operations with coalition partners and NGOs than ever before, generally via the COCOMs and their JIOCs.

In pursuit of this latter goal, it is imperative that DoD fund Multi-National Information Operations Centers (MIOC) that are managed and staffed by foreign nationals, with a modest U.S. presence on site. We cannot over-emphasize the urgency of empowering indigenous allies with MIOCs, if we are to successfully feed our own JIOCs.

¹⁹ USSOCOM is the only element of the U.S. Government that has been consistently innovative and transformative in OSINT support to both all-source intelligence and to operations and logistics. .

²⁰ Under USDI leadership, the Defense Open Source Council (DOSC) has completed its investigation and made recommendations that have been coordinated at the flag level across all Services and Agencies of DoD. A fine start, DoD never-the-less continues to lack a Combatant Commander for Intelligence, and could also benefit from redefining USDI to make it clear that USDI is responsible for all information as well as intelligence. It is essential that operational, logistics, acquisition, and other information be managed as a coherent whole, not in isolation from classified intelligence. Sharing and sense-making, not hoarding and secrecy, are the watchwords today.

In summary, modern IO, the new IO, has three parts:

- Strategic Communication (the message)
- Open Source Intelligence (the reality)
- Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (the technology)²¹

With this as a pre-amble, we will now review the various IO-heavy mission areas, and then conclude with comments on the importance of DoD IO to the revitalization of national education and national research. Following a review of the mission areas, we will briefly examine information challenges at each level of analysis (strategic, operational, tactical, and technical) and then engage the meat of this book, the strategic concepts for global IO, followed by a brief requirements statement for integrated IO.

The conclusion outlines over twenty specific recommendations including twelve related to the establishment of an Open Source Agency under the auspices of the Department of State, with international centers managed by the Department of Defense, and all of this completely outside the orbit of the U.S. Intelligence Community and its nominal leader, the Director of National Intelligence.

The appendix illustrates two analytic models for modern IO.

²¹ USSTRATCOM has a Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), with a responsibility for integrating IO across all military and operational areas. See note at <http://www.stratcom.mil/FactSheetshtml/Joint%20Info%20Operations%20Center.htm>. USSOCOM is taking the lead for USDI in building a Joint Inter-Agency Collaboration Center (JICC) that is intended to create a rapidly replicable set of technologies that can be migrated to the other COCOMs and—ideally—to DHS constituents and to the NGOs. The National Guard activities in various states do not appear to have a coherent concept of operations nor do they appear to have any larger concept for being connected to a DoD-DHS continuum of IO sources and services. The Guard is well-qualified to man information sharing facilities because they can hold both law enforcement commissions and military commissions, but they are not qualified to design or build all-source centers on behalf of the states.

Peacekeeping Intelligence

Peacekeeping Intelligence (PKI) is reactive, and always to be distinguished from Information Peacekeeping (IP), which is pro-active. PKI has been demeaned and ignored by United Nations (UN) leaders for decades. UN successes in the field, for example in the Congo in the 1960's, have occurred when Force Commanders or selected national elements have chosen to ignore UN bureaucratic prejudices against the practice of sensible all-source military intelligence.²²

In the year 2000, a dramatic change in UN attitudes began to occur.²³ No longer a dirty word, "intelligence" was increasingly

²² The seminal work in the field, the classic report on UN success "against all biases," is told by A. Walter Dorn and David J. H. Bell in "Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN Operations in the Congo, 1960-1964," in *International Peacekeeping* (2/1, 1995), reprinted as Chapter 15 in *PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future* (OSS, 2003). Today, MajGen Patrick Cammaert, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, is the General Officer Commanding Eastern Division MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As Military Advisor to the Secretary General, he became the foremost proponent of intelligence reform within the UN, as recommended by the Brahimi Report (see Note 23).

²³ Deputy Secretary General Louise Frechette, former Deputy Minister of Defence in Canada, assuming her new role in March 1998, was appalled at the lack of decision-support—another term for the intelligence cycle—within the Secretariat and Offices reporting directly to the Secretary General. She appears to be a compellingly effective but largely anonymous force in support of UN PKI. Completing the circle of sensible military professionals advising the Secretary General were MajGen Frank van Kappen, Marine Corps of the Royal Netherlands Navy (MC RN NL), who in his own words "failed" as Military Advisor to the Secretary General from 1995-1998 but in fact succeeded brilliantly in setting the stage for his successor, MajGen Patrick Cammaert, also MC RN NL. The Secretary General, Kofi Annan, commissioned a Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, led by Mr. Lakidar Brahimi of Algeria. The Brahimi

understood to be essential to the accomplishment of the UN's mission, at multiple levels,²⁴ and errors of the past recognized:

Strategic. At the strategic level, the UN traditionally goes wrong in two ways: failing to act soon enough, for lack of compelling early warning; and failing to provide the correct mandate for the peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission.²⁵ The mandate is the basis for both the timing and the composition of the operational force to be employed. Intelligence is now valued at this level.

Report is a revolutionary document, which recognizes that the ultimate tool necessary to help the United Nations succeed in saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war is intelligence—actionable information. While the Brahimi Report recommendations were resisted and not fully implemented, they paved the way for the findings of other reports, notably the Millenium Report and the report of the High-Level Panel on Threat, Change, and Challenge, *Creating a More Secure World, Our Shared Responsibility*. The Honorable LtGen Dr. Brent Scowcroft was the US representative to the latter panel. During this period an edited work, *PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future* (OSS, 2003) was published, and was soon on display in the lobby of 1 UN Plaza. Copies were widely distributed by MajGen Cammaert to Force Commanders and UN agency heads. Reporting to the 3rd annual PKI conference in Stockholm in December 2004, MajGen Cammaert said, "Intelligence is no longer a dirty word within the UN bureaucracy."

²⁴ "Peacekeeping Intelligence: Leadership Digest 1.0," a distillation of the book *PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future* (OSS, 2003) contains a complete discussion of PKI at the various levels and across collection, processing, analysis, and security. It can be found online at <http://tinyurl.com/cdd5h>. The book is available to individuals at Amazon. War colleges may buy the book at half-price from the publisher when ordering a minimum of 96 books (6 boxes).

²⁵ Rwanda, and now Sudan, remain examples of UN and Western failures to intervene, in part because available public intelligence has not been sufficient to compel public policy. For a heart-rending account on the failure of the UN mandate and the UN bureaucracy in Rwanda, see LtGen Romeo Dallaire (Canada), *SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Random House, 2003). For a learned discussion of both how easy it is to acquire early warning of genocide, and to take practical action to prevent it, see John G. Heidenrich, *How to Prevent Genocide* (Praeger, 2001), and also the web site www.genocidewatch.org, where Dr. Gregory Stanton is a foremost authority on the eight stages of genocide including the stages preceding genocide where early warning is achievable.

Operational. At the operational level, the UN has in the past sent the wrong mix of forces, generally lacking organic intelligence capabilities spanning the full range from aerial imagery and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to signals intelligence interception capabilities to a complete lack of human intelligence and counterintelligence personnel as well as qualified trusted translators. Intelligence is now impacting on this level.

Tactical. At the tactical level, the UN has often failed because the contributing nations' military elements are not trained, equipped, nor organized for operating in a failed state environment, and such law enforcement elements as might be included in the UN force structure tend to be both illiterate and incapable of driving a vehicle, much less operate a computer.²⁶ Every Force Commander is now demanding organic capabilities.

Technical. At the technical level, the military forces contributed to the UN peacekeeping mission will often fail because their traditional intelligence collection equipment is unsuited for urban areas; for distribution down to the squad level; or for focusing on targets that do not "emit," wear uniforms, or even carry visible arms, nor do they ride in conventional military vehicles with clear markings and known

²⁶ Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg (contributing editors), *POLICING THE NEW WORLD DISORDER: Peace Operations and Public Security* (NDU, 1988) is the source of the criticism of UN law enforcement cadres, and the definitive report on the "cop gap" in peacekeeping operations. The best available book on the recurring failures of both UN and Western interventions in failed states is William Shawcross, *DELIVER US FROM EVIL: Peacekeepers, Warlords, and a World of Endless Conflict* (Simon & Schuster, 2000). The best documented inventory of "gap" nations is Robert Young Pelton, *The World's Most Dangerous Places* (Harper, 2003). Although no longer published and now a collector's item, but visible in the author's lectures on the real world, *Map of World Conflict and Human Rights* from Leiden University and the Goals for Americas Foundation, remains an extraordinary depiction of all that ails the world, where most conflict is sub-state conflict, not inter-state conflict.

signatures. Force Commanders are buying hand-held video cameras and other devices out of their own personal funds, and sharing knowledge about unconventional intelligence sources and methods including open sources and methods.

In recognition of the urgent need for new original concepts, doctrines, sources, tools, and methods for the conduct of PKI, the Swedish Supreme Commander has directed the establishment of a Peacekeeping Intelligence Course to be offered each March-April in Sweden.

Each of the IO initiatives being sponsored by USDI has considerable potential in support of PKI. Supporting PKI, and UN Force Commanders in the field, will reduce demands for unilateral US force deployments, and also increase opportunities for transitions from hostilities toward stabilization & reconstruction operations.

It is helpful to conclude this section with a focus on three areas where the UN and the US have mutual interests and possibilities.

Maps. The single biggest deficiency in PKI is the almost total lack of 1:50,000 combat charts with contour lines for the 90% of the world where instability is endemic.²⁷ In the Congo, for example, where MajGen Cammaert is now the Force

²⁷ Col Mike Pheneger, USA, then J-2 for the U.S. Special Forces Command, and the author, then Special Assistant and also Deputy Director of the US Marine Corps Intelligence Center (today a Command), catalogued the 1:50,000 combat chart deficiencies in 1988. The author got maps added to the Foreign Intelligence Requirements and Capabilities Plan (FIRCAP) in 1992, but today, 13 years later, we still do not have 1:50,000 combat charts “on the shelf” because of a continued emphasis on digital products that will not operate with a bullet hole through their display screens. There are two bright spots: 1) we have Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) for most of the world via the shuttle mission, although it tends to look like Swiss-cheese due to multiple failures; and 2) at least one commercial vendor has NGA-level equipment and the ability to produce maps on a 24/7 basis, with a single 1:50,000 combat chart costing \$17,500. This is one problem that money *can* solve, beginning with each of sixteen most critical complex emergencies where multi-national forces are in harm’s way.

Commander, NGA has exactly seven out of the over 3,000 1:50,000 sheets needed for tactical military operations in that area. We have established that for under \$1M, East View Cartographic, the private sector counterpart to NGA, can produce the 191 most critical map sheets needed for peacekeeping operations in the Congo. There is a need for a robust USDI program to accelerate the commercial production of tactical military maps needed by the UN and also logically needed by US forces for follow-on stabilization and reconstruction missions. If it can be done in the private sector, it should not be done by NGA, which has more urgent sensitive demands on its capabilities.

UN Centres. Prior to departing his assignment as Military Advisor to the Secretary General, MajGen Patrick Cammaert established a need for Joint Military Analysis Centres (JMAC) in each conflicted region. The first is being established in Africa, where it is widely understood that a regional approach to intelligence is necessary.²⁸ Single country intelligence centers and intelligence campaign plans are ineffective. When attempting to interdict smuggled small arms, or mercenaries or unauthorized Private Military Corporations (PMCs),²⁹ or blood

²⁸ Cf. Cees Wiebes, *Intelligence in Bosnia, 1992-1995* (Lit Verlag NL, 2003); the author had full access to classified Dutch records and has documented an extraordinary range of errors across US, UK, EU, NATO, and PfP countries. Two fundamental lessons learned that come out are that no conflict can be understood nor controlled from within a single in-country intelligence centre—a regional approach is needed, especially in the interdiction of small arms and mercenaries as well as funds and blood diamonds; and that no one nation can really understand complex conflicts with ethnic and religious overtones—only a multinational approach with deep and continuous information sharing will produce the necessary insights and coordinated effects.

²⁹ We began calling for sub-state and non-state Orders of Battle (OOB) in 1994. Both governments and vendors have failed to rise to the challenge. PMCs now join terrorists, criminals, “random actors,” and radicalized religious groups as belligerents whose key personnel and capabilities must be tracked. Fortunately, it is now possible to create such OOB on the fly, and without recourse to the commercial databases that have minimal foreign content and focus primarily on business needs. A global network of “virtual” defense and law enforcement attaches is in place and highly responsive, and can produce tailored “on demand” OOB for a fraction of the cost of the “gold license”

diamonds, or trade in women and children, or illegal funds transfers, only a regional approach stands any chance of being effective. There is real potential in the USDI interest in creating replicable JIOCs, in that a planned overlay and planned interoperability between US JIOC and UN JMAC could have very positive outcomes in support of regional Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) objectives, particularly if combined with indigenous MIOCs.³⁰

OSINT. While the UN has now accepted the importance of intelligence or decision-support, the Member nations are not about to give it substantial classified intelligence support, and the reality is that most classified intelligence capabilities are relatively useless in failed state environments. The one area where the UN and DoD have absolute common cause is that of

fees that the commercial aggregators demand. Put bluntly: for \$1M a year, DoD can get a gold license to content that will be useful 10% of the time, or it can obtain between 40 and 100 unique tailored products that do not exist in the commercial databases. DoD should buy information “by the drink,” not on a gold license basis. Commercial and academic aggregators mislead their clients when selling their files. They are largely focused on English-language information that is of business value. They have not invested in historical, cultural, social, ideological, criminal, and environmental data, and are not competitive with true multilingual tailored sources that can meet our demands “by the drink.”

³⁰ We believe the COCOMs need to have their own budgets for IO/DIME integration, and that no less than \$10M per year is needed for each regional COCOM to be effective. CENTCOM should be sponsoring a major information sharing center based in Istanbul, with IO bases in Almaty (Kazakhstan), New Delhi, Stockholm, Beijing, and Moscow. EUCOM should have a center in Pretoria, with bases in Cairo, Dakar or Accra, Madrid, Rome, and Paris. NORTHCOM should have a center in Denver co-located with STRATCOM’s Global Information Center, with bases in Mexico City, Ottawa, Toronto, Rotterdam, and Havana. PACOM should have a center in Singapore, with bases in Kuala Lumpur, Hanoi, Kyoto, Sydney, and Manila as well as Jakarta. SOUTHCOM should have a center in Panama, with bases in Montevideo, Caracas, Bogotá, Trinidad, and Rio de Janeiro. All the centers and bases should be integrated into OSIS-X and be responsive to cross-COCOM requirements—for instance, information about Chinese activities in Africa from EUCOM to PACOM, and in Latin America from SOUTHCOM to PACOM, with two-way sharing being the norm rather than exception.

OSINT. As Hugo Smith put it so well in 1994, UN intelligence, by the very nature of UN operations, is best when it is overt, using methods that do not compromise the integrity or impartiality of the UN, when the information can be shared and become widely known.³¹ There is every reason for DoD to establish information-sharing agreements with the UN for each of the complex emergencies where military personnel are operating, and with other NGOs as appropriate.³² Indeed, in the OSINT arena, one can easily perceive the potential value of UN leadership in OSINT, with DoD subsidizing a mix of NGO and Google-like private sector initiatives.

³¹ Hugo Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping," *Survival* (26/3, Autumn 1994), reprinted as Chapter 14 in *PEACEKEEPING INTELLIGENCE: Emerging Concepts for the Future* (OSS, 2003).

³² The traditional relationship between NGOs and the US Intelligence Community, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, is completely unacceptable. The US focus is on sanitizing classified information of marginal value, or stone-walling the NGOs completely after first getting everything the NGOs have to offer. A much more productive approach is to jointly establish shared requirements, to share what each knows via overt means, and to gradually expand the circle of participants in an overt network so that more and more distinct entities are both contributing original information, and drawing upon the aggregate information, to which DoD can add considerable value by sponsoring OSIS-X and providing common open source software.

Information Peacekeeping

The concept of “information peacekeeping” or IP emerged in the late 1980’s when the author first tried to get a grip on global coverage and realized that no one nation, hence no one intelligence agency, could succeed on its own, and began devising concepts for an information continuum, burden-sharing, and “virtual (distributed) intelligence communities that fully engaged the private sector.”³³

In 1997, inspired by conversations within the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), and invited to submit a paper, the concept emerged in full

³³ The author is indebted to the CIA for an extraordinary two years as head of Project GEORGE (Smiley), exploring advanced information technology including artificial intelligence applications, in support of all-source intelligence collection and processing. Working out of the Office of Information Technology, the author was a founding member of the Advanced Information Processing and Analysis Steering Group (AIPASG) and participating in meetings of the Information Handling Committee (IHC). It was during this tour, 1986-1987, that the author realized that no one Nation, much less any one organization, could unilaterally master global coverage.

Alvin and Heidi Toffler understood the importance of this concept when it was presented to them in 1992, and spent five of twelve pages of their chapter on “The Future of the Spy” covering “The Rival Store” as created by OSINT, *supra* note 4. These ideas evolved further toward 1994, and were addressed in “Talking Points for the Director of Central Intelligence” dated 20 July 1993, subsequently published in Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on “National Security & National Competitiveness: Open Source Solutions” (Washington, D.C. 2-4 November 1993), “ACCESS: Theory and Practice of Intelligence in the Age of Information (26 October 1993); “Reinventing Intelligence: Holy Grail or Mission Impossible”, *Periscope* (Journal of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers), June 1994; and in a keynote speech to the Association for Global Strategic Information (AGSI) in Germany on “ACCESS: Theory and Practice of Competitor Intelligence” printed in the *Journal of AGSI* in July 1994. All are at www.oss.net and easily found using the Google Super Search feature.

form at the Virtual Diplomacy conference of April 1-2, 1997 in a paper entitled “VIRTUAL INTELLIGENCE: Conflict Avoidance and Resolution Through Information Peacekeeping.”³⁴ In this evolution of the idea, a negative evolution—the growing gap between elites with power and experts with knowledge—was offset by the slow but steady emergence of what is today called “collective intelligence” or “wisdom of the crowds.”³⁵

³⁴ At <http://www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/papers/virintell.html> and published with the same title two years later in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, at <http://tinyurl.com/8teqf>. Other later chapters and articles addressing the common theme of information strategy in relation to national security included “Information Peacekeeping: The Purest Form of War”, Chapter 7 in Lloyd J. Matthews (ed.), *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America be Defeated?* (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 1998), pp. 143-171; “INFORMATION PEACEKEEPING: The Purest Form of War,” in Douglas Dearth and Alan Campen, *CYBERWAR: Myths, Mysteries, and Realities* (AFCEA Press, June 1998)); “Eyes Wide Shut,” *WIRED Magazine* (August 1997); INTERVIEW “Intelligence Stratégique aux Etats-Unis: Mythe ou Réalité?” *Revue Française de Géoeconomie* (Spring 1997); “Open Sources and Cyberlaw,” *Fringeware* (#11, April 1997); “The Military Perspective on Information Warfare: Apocalypse Now,” *Enjeux Atlantiques* (#14, February 1997); “Creating a Smart Nation: Information Strategy, Virtual Intelligence, and Information Warfare,” in Alan D. Campen, Douglas H. Dearth, and R. Thomas Goodden (contributing editors), *CYBERWAR: Security, Strategy, and Conflict in the Information Age* (AFCEA, 1996); “Creating a Smart Nation: Strategy, Policy, Intelligence, and Information,” *Government Information Quarterly* (Summer 1996); and “Reinventing Intelligence: The Vision and the Strategy,” *International Defense & Technologies* (December 1995), bilingual in French and English; “Private Enterprise Intelligence: Its Potential Contribution to National Security,” paper presented to the Canadian Intelligence Community Conference on “Intelligence Analysis and Assessment,” 29 October 1994, reprinted in *Intelligence and National Security* (Special Issue, October 1995), and also in a book by the same name, 1996. It merits comment that information is the ultimate asymmetric warfare tool.

³⁵ A few works merit mention here: Vaclav Havel, *Disturbing the Peace: A Conversation with Karel Hvizdala* (Vintage, 1990); Pierre Levy, *COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE: Mankind’s Emerging World in Cyberspace* (Plenum, 1997); Howard Rheingold, *SMART MOBS: The Next Social Revolution—Transforming Cultures and Communities in the Age of Instant Access* (Perseus, 2002); Tom Atlee, *The Tao of Democracy: Using CO-INTELLIGENCE to Create a World That Works for All* (Writer’s Collective, 2003); James Surowiecki, *The Wisdom of the Crowds: Why the*

The paper concluded that the core competency for diplomats was the harnessing of distributed unclassified knowledge, “tools for truth,” in order to discover, discriminate, distil, and disseminate knowledge helpful to both protecting national security and nurturing national competitiveness.³⁶ The following general principles of information peacekeeping conclude the article published eight years ago, and remain relevant today to the design and implementation of modern IO:

- Information peacekeeping is the ultimate global presence.
- Information peacekeeping is the *first* policy option—both to ensure that the policymaker has a full knowledge of the situation, and to impact constructively on those we seek to influence.
- We need to develop an information peacekeeping “order of battle” with related tables of organization and equipment—much of this can be “virtual” and rely on private sector providers of information and information technology who are mobilized “just in time.”

Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies, and Nations (Doubleday, 2004). See also the Collective Intelligence Portal Page at www.oss.net for numerous relevant links.

³⁶ Despite repeated efforts from 1992-2004 by the author to persuade the Department of State of the urgency of its resuming its original responsibility for collecting, processing, translating, interpreting, and disseminating relevant foreign language information of importance to our foreign affairs, culminating in a speech at the State Department on 24 March 2004, “The New Craft of Intelligence: How State Should Lead,” (co-sponsored by the Secretary of State’s Open Forum and the World Affairs Council), at http://www.oss.net/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=2348, the author was informed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence that State desires to be a consumer of intelligence—including open source intelligence—and not a collector of any kind of information, including overt information. As this is being written (October 2005) Under Secretary of State Karen Hughes is contemplating the potential benefits to America of sponsoring the Open Source Agency as a diplomatic entity rather than allowing it to be an intelligence agency. We wish her well.

- Information peacekeeping is the operational dimension of a broader approach to national intelligence.
- The nature of global security and the ease of movement of transnational criminal and other rogue elements requires the virtual constant integration of law enforcement, military, and civilian agencies as well as all elements of national intelligence into a larger secure global *multinational* information architecture.
- Information is the ultimate *countervailing force* against the emerging threats, and the most cost-effective means of devising diplomatic and other responses intended to avoid or resolve conflicts.
- At least 80% of the information the policymaker needs to conduct information peacekeeping operations is not controlled by the government: “knowing who knows” and the creation of management, technical, security, and procurement architectures that permit harnessing the distributed intelligence of the entire world (not just U.S. citizens with clearances), is the emerging new source of national power.
- Because the decision-makers at all levels are inundated with contradictory information lacking methodical evaluation, a critical priority must be the transfer of the proven methods of classified intelligence analysis, to the world of unclassified information.
- Unclassified information is critical to converting policy minds and winning public hearts. The policymaker *can* succeed without classified information but the policymaker *cannot* succeed without a mastery of unclassified information.

- Multi-channel delivery of "truth" is the SIOP³⁷ of the information age.
- Information peacekeeping is an information-intensive process with both mass and niche audiences—information peacekeeping is not a low-cost alternative to traditional warfare, but it *is* less expensive.
- The information "center of gravity" will vary from conflict to conflict, from level to level,³⁸ and from dimension to dimension.³⁹ The greatest challenge for the policymaker will be to manage a national intelligence and information-sharing architecture that can rapidly identify the information center of gravity, prepare the information "battlefield", and deliver the appropriate (non-lethal) information "munitions."

³⁷ SIOP: Single Integrated Operational Plan. When we talk about putting the "I" back into DIME, we are also talking about finally achieving a unified national security and national competitiveness program in which Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is applied coherently to diplomatic, information, military, and economic sources of national power, and single integrated DIME campaign plans are executed coherently at the strategic, operational, tactical, and technical levels of performance. See the Epilogue for additional comments about the novel online game, "A Force More Powerful," that teaches non-violent resistance tactics.

³⁸ Strategic, operational, tactical, technical. The author is indebted to the clever Edward N. Luttwak, whose book *STRATEGY: The Logic of War and Peace* (Belknap, 1987) not only distinguished among the four levels of warfare, but also showed how capabilities that may be considered deficient at one level actually interact to enable capabilities available at another level—man-portable anti-tank guns channeling tanks for artillery, which in turn sets them up for aviation kills.

³⁹ Political-military; socio-economic; ideo-cultural; techno-demographic; natural-geographic. It is not possible to succeed at IO without understanding both the dimensions of revolution and the aspects of socio-psychological personality within a society. Cf. Robert David Steele, *Internal War: A Framework for the Prediction of Revolution* (Lehigh University, 1976). The matrix was first published in Robert David Steele, *ON INTELLIGENCE: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World* (AFCEA, 2000), page 153. The matrix is in the Appendix to this book, at page 181.

IO is ultimately about using information to deter and resolve conflict and as a means of creating wealth that stabilizes the now impoverished regions of the world. The same MIOCs that feed the JIOCs for military-oriented missions, can also feed them for DIME/Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and related preventive missions that stabilize and reconstruction through the creation of indigenous self-sustaining wealth.

Early Warning

We do not lack for sources and methods relevant to Early Warning, although we could certainly do vastly better simply by attending to all sources in all languages all the time. What we lack is imagination on the part of analysts who are largely young, white, bland, and never allowed to be intimate with foreigners⁴⁰; and a lack of attention on the part of policymakers. Kristan Wheaton, one of America's most talented defense attaches at the time he wrote the book, makes three points in *The Warning Solution: Intelligent Analysis in the Age of Information Overload*:⁴¹

⁴⁰ CIA security is in the stone-age. The obsession with protecting largely technical secrets has led to a long-standing policy of prejudice against individuals that actually have relatives overseas, or were born overseas or have spent too much time overseas. This is a combination of myopia and laziness. There is no reason why world-class individuals cannot be put into clandestine or analytic positions, and their access focused on what they need to know. CIA has simply not been willing to do the hard work of reasonable counter-intelligence and regular validation—witness Ames going for years, paying cash for a house and a Jaguar. Secrecy is making us stupid by blocking us from employing the right people, spending on open source information instead of redundant technical systems, and engaging in multi-lateral sharing. I was stunned to learn from a former CIA senior analyst, a very respected manager of analysts for a COCOM, that they were investigated by CIA and ultimately resigned from their job because they were consulting indigenous experts on the ground in the country they were responsible for monitoring and this was considered a threat to national security by CIA security officials. Evidently being uninformed is not a threat to national security. The mind simply boggles. NSA is not much better and DIA is beyond belief. We need to mix and match citizenship, clearances, language skills, and direct access, not continue to try to get everything in the same person—this is a prescription for failure. It's not about secrets—it is about knowing and explaining and predicting.

⁴¹ Kristan Wheaton, *The Warning Solution: Intelligent Analysis in the Age of Information Overload* (AFCEA International Press, 2001). Wheaton teaches today at

Policymaker Overload. Referring specifically to Kosovo, he points out that the U.S. European Command all-source analysts had all the warning they needed, but could not “break through” to the bosses because at the time, Kosovo was a \$1 billion problem, and the policymakers, including the Supreme Allied Commander, were pre-occupied with \$50 billion problems.

Iconoclasts Need Not Apply. Overloaded policymakers, and the all-source managers of analysts who serve them, do not like to be made uncomfortable by iconoclasts and mavericks. Not only does “the system” not search for such individuals, it actively shuts them out.

History & Culture Ignored. In specific relation to the Kosovo campaign and the early warning that was both achieved and not achieved, he stresses that it is human understanding of historical and cultural facts and biases, not current intelligence captured through technical means, which really puts the meat into Early Warning.

We do not lack for Early Warning *from* analysts, and we can improve that by a factor of 1000X if we get a grip on what the Swedes call M4IS: multi-national, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, multi-domain information-sharing. However, regardless of how much substantive Early Warning we have, our biggest problem remains a lack of Early *Attention* by policymakers. In addition to the ideas put forth by Kristan Wheaton, we have a book dedicated to the topic of organizational “attention deficit disorders,” *THE ATTENTION ECONOMY: Understanding the New Currency of Business*.⁴² They offer useful suggestions. First, they recommend that resources be allocated,

Mercyhurst College, where Robert Heibel, the founder, and Kristan Wheaton now, are the key personalities behind America’s first and foremost undergraduate program to teach Intelligence and Research Analysis. See the program at <http://www.mciis.org/>.

⁴² Thomas H. Davenport and John C. Beck, *THE ATTENTION ECONOMY: Understanding the New Currency of Business* (Harvard, 2001).

and management attention be structured, along the following lines (the elaboration is by this author):

Global Coverage for AWARENESS. In contrast to the current obsession with terrorism, which is no higher than number five or six on most professional threat lists,⁴³ and which has joined the “hard targets” of the past as the focus of loosely-coordinated effort among the classified agencies, the authors recommend, as USDI seeks to achieve, a global spider web, very lightly spun, to capture those weak signals, many of which will pertain to topics, for example, the emergence of bird flu in China, that are not normally sought by classified means. The recommendation of these authors’ tallies precisely with a report done for the Director of Central Intelligence, then Mr. George Tenet, called *The Challenge of Global Coverage*. Delivered in July 1997, that report recommended \$1.5 billion a year be spent (\$10 million for each of 150 combined “low priority” countries in the Third World, and specified non-conventional targets including disease, poverty, water scarcity, and terrorism). The report was promptly filed “with

⁴³ The Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility* (United Nations, 2004) benefited from the participation of The Honorable LtGen Dr. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret), former national security advisor to President George Bush. This panel concluded that the greatest threats to global peace and prosperity are, in this order:

- Economic and social threats including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation
- Inter-State conflict
- Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities
- Nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons
- Terrorism
- Transnational organized crime

Hence, terrorism is either fifth on this list or seventh if the first is counted as three. The report, 262 pages in length, can be seen at <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf>.

prejudice.”⁴⁴ Just as in the old DoD, where a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been quoted as saying “Real men don’t do Operations Other Than War,” the leadership of the U.S. Intelligence Community remains convinced that they are in the business of secrets for the President, and there is but lip service given to meeting the needs of all federal agencies at all levels, and no respect at all for the value of public intelligence.⁴⁵ The good news for all of us, as validated by such distinguished authors and practitioners as Dr. Michael Herman of Oxford,⁴⁶ is that Global Coverage can be largely accomplished through free and low-cost monitoring of open sources of information in all languages, all the time. Somebody has to do it, and that somebody is probably the private sector, under mandate from DoD, and with virtual global collaboration from coalition militaries in every country.

Surge local focus for ATTENTION. Classified assets simply do not surge. Classified imagery satellites are optimized for the hard targets and do not do well against jungle canopy or caves in mountains. Signals capabilities are terribly ineffective

⁴⁴ DCI George Tenet, who commissioned the report, was reported by one present to have said “We are in the business of secrets, speak no more of this report.” A copy of the unclassified version of the report can be viewed at <http://tinyurl.com/bzl4f>.

⁴⁵ The recent announcement of a \$100M allocation for a CIA OSINT capability approved by the DNI has been kindly described by some as “a 25 cent raise for FBIS” or “fresh paint for the old lawn chair.” In the context of a national intelligence budget of no less than \$50 billion a year, \$100M is lipstick on the runt pig. Nothing less than a new \$3B agency, with a diplomatic or civil affairs character rather than a secret intelligence mandate, will do—half for overseas monitoring, half for bottom-up citizen intelligence processing at the county level across America.

⁴⁶ Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge, 1996), points out that most strategic or long-term intelligence is best done using broad access to multilingual open sources, while covert means are best reserved for absolutely vital penetrations of short-term threats not amenable to open source collection. His second book, *Intelligence Services in the Information Age* (2001) adds additional graduate-level reflections to his seminal earlier book. On the American side, the single best book along these lines is by Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman, *BEST TRUTH: Intelligence in the Information Age* (Yale, 2000).

against Third World languages and fast-changing signatures. Clandestine assets tend to be clustered in the capital cities and focused on the cocktail party circuit. They also don't transfer well—in one case, two clandestine case officers sent to Somalia without language skills literally went nuts, according to an extensive review by *The Washington Post*. In contrast, private sector capabilities focused on open sources can surge very ably with all necessary language and local knowledge qualifications.⁴⁷ Commercial imagery on demand within 2 days, with 2-day repeat cycles, and 1-meter resolution. Broadcast monitoring, local area gray literature collection, mosque sermon monitoring, a photograph of an arm's dealer's front door with a cell phone camera, boots on the ground and verifying whether the new uranium mine really exists...no problem. Not only no problem, but available at a fraction of the cost of a classified asset. All you need is a budget and a mind-set that acknowledges that legal ethical open sources of information just might be your best option. It bears mention that open sources can be discreet—commercial enterprises and private investigators routinely sign and enforce non-disclosure agreements with severe penalties for infractions.

⁴⁷ The greatest deficiency of the existing open source information access capabilities within the U.S. Intelligence Community, apart from their mind-set, legal, and security obstacles, is their inability to scale globally, drill down locally, and do complex translations and multi-source analysis in near-real-time. A key common finding of several books addressing the challenges of globalization for business is that anything less than global coverage and near-real-time understanding is unsatisfactory. The same literature also advises against “build it first and then try to sell it,” and instead recommends constant vigilance and instant reaction. Here is a sample quote:

“Instead of fruitlessly trying to predict the future course of a competitive or market trend, customer behavior or demand, managers should be trying to find and deploy all the tools that will enable them, in some sense, to be ever-present, ever-vigilant, and ever-ready in the brave new marketplace in gestation, where information and knowledge are ceaselessly exchanged.”

This boils down to Global Coverage and Surge Response in combination. Quote from Regis McKenna, *REAL TIME: Preparing for the Age of the Never Satisfied Customer* (Harvard, 1997).

Domestic political focus for ACTION. Early Warning that is classified can be safely ignored—there are no political consequences for pretending the intelligence does not exist, or for manipulating and cherry-picking classified information. In contrast, well-structured, well-documented public intelligence, ideally with strong visuals, can have a “CNN effect” on policymakers, and force them to at least consider some form of action. Commercial or open source information is also shareable easily with Congress, close allies, near at hand coalition partners, and even distrustful countries and activist organizations.

The authors go on to cite relevance, community, engagement, and convenience as the four key factors in attracting and holding attention from individuals and to specify four "attention tracks" that each analyst or policymaker must manage: focusing one's own attention; attracting the right kind of attention to oneself; directing the attention of those under one's oversight; and maintaining the attention of one's customers and clients (and one could add, one's family).

Decision-maker inattention is not unique to government. The most gifted observer of the global business intelligence scene is an Israeli, Ben Gilad, who tells us:⁴⁸

One of the facts that amazed me the most over the past eight years while helping American and European firms improve their ability to read their markets, was how insulated top executives were from competitive reality. This is because they secure their competitive intelligence (market signals regarding

⁴⁸ Ben Gilad, *Business Blindspots: replacing myths, beliefs, and assumptions with market realities* (Infonortics, 1996), page 1 (emphasis added). Gilad is also the author of *EARLY WARNING: Using Competitive Intelligence to Anticipate Market Shifts, Control Risk, and Create Powerful Strategies* (American Management Association, 2004), but his earlier work remains his most trenchant—the latter is more about sources and methods.

change) at best through a close circle of “trusted” personal sources, or at worst through those one-page news summary clippings. Top managers’ information is invariably either biased, subjective, filtered, or late.

The same problems of poor performance characterize America’s scientific & technical (S&T) communities. The two top practitioners in America in the field of predictive analysis for S&T state in the preface of their masterwork on competitive technical intelligence (CTI):

The practice of applying intelligence principles to science and technology (S&T) in business is a new field... Unfortunately, at this time, information on the practice of CTI in business is diffuse and fragmented.⁴⁹

While there are some bright spots, such as the Academy of Competitive Intelligence organized by Jan Herring, former National Intelligence Officer for Science & Technology,⁵⁰ in partnership with Ben Gilad and Leonard Fuld, and there are a few exceptional practitioners here and there, notable Babette Bensoussan⁵¹ in Australia and Mats Bjore in Sweden,⁵² by and large business intelligence is in the basement—one and two-person shops cutting and pasting and without

⁴⁹ W. Bradford Ashton and Richard A. Klavans (contributing editors), *Keeping Abreast of Science and Technology: Technical Intelligence for Business* (Battelle, 1997), p. viii.

⁵⁰ <http://www.academyci.com/About/herring.html>.

⁵¹ Craig Fleisher and Babette Bensoussan, *Strategic and Competitive Analysis: Methods and Techniques for Analyzing Business Competition* (Prentice Hall, 2003).

⁵² As a Maj (today a LtCol in the Reserve), Bjore established the Swedish Long-Range Reconnaissance Unit for Cyberspace, otherwise known as the Swedish Military Open Source Intelligence Centre. He was subsequently nominated by the Royal War Academy, and received a personal decoration for this accomplishment. Together with Detective Steve Edwards in England, the creator of the Scotland Yard OSINT unit who was honored by the Queen of England, Bjore is perhaps the top OSINT performer in the world. He is CEO of InfoSphere AB (www.infosphere.se) and also a co-owner of Silobreaker, a UK-based OSINT access portal with tools.

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the budget or the tools or the mindset to do Early Warning or Predictive Analysis, or focused only in *internal* data mining, not external warning.

Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations

Congress had to legislatively mandate capabilities for Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict, as well as—in separate later legislation—jointness as defined by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Today DoD is more mature and more open-minded. It is DoD that has taken the lead in defining, through the Defense Science Board, a need to move smoothly into the business of Stabilization & Reconstruction.⁵³ It is DoD that sees clearly the need for joint inter-agency collaboration and information-sharing centers.

It is DoD—not the mandarins of classified intelligence—that sees the value of close open collaboration with NGOs using the civil affairs model for multi-lateral liaison, rather than the intelligence model of compartmented bi-lateral liaison. DoD has, in short, come of age.

We are moving, in simplistic terms, toward four forces after next.⁵⁴

⁵³ Defense Science Board, *Transition to and from Hostilities* (December 2004). Their recommendations are being implemented via DoD Directive 3000.cc dated 17 December 2004 (in draft).

⁵⁴ Numerous military professionals including the author have been making the distinction, since the mid-1990's, among the "four forces after next." The annual Army Strategy Conference has consistently brought forth useful contributions, including iconoclastic contributions. The 1998 conference was reported out by the author as "The Asymmetric Threat: Listening to the Debate," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn-Winter 1998-1999), at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1520.pdf.

- Big War/Information Operations (USSTRATCOM)
- Small War/Global War on Terror (USSOCOM)
- PeaceWar (Not Yet Assigned)
- Homeland Defense (U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM)

By way of introduction to this section, we would make two observations: first, that there are growing calls for a unified national security budget, in which diplomatic, military, and law enforcement investments and capabilities are orchestrated within a coherent strategy rather than in their current stove-piped isolation;⁵⁵ and second, that Singapore is leading the way in focusing their Ministry of Defence on all threats, whether man-made or not. Severe Acute Respiratory Symptoms (SARS) was a wake-up call for them. Such an “attack” could wipe out their population in a matter of weeks.

“Defense” today must be global, integrated, and prepared for all threats, both those that involve a heavy metal military, and those that require operations other than war (OOTW), including medical prevention, interception, and recovery.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF), the Center for Defense Information (CDI), and the Security Policy Working Group (SPWG), all generally left-leaning but largely sensible organizations, have come together in an attempt to move money from a heavy metal military toward “soft power” law enforcement and diplomatic or foreign assistance initiatives. See a release leading to the full report at <http://tinyurl.com/dhjwb>. Our personal view is that a Unified National Security Budget is a good idea in theory, but not until the Office of Management restores the “M” function. To be effective, a Unified National Security Budget requires 1) a complete appreciation for all global threats based on access to all open sources in all languages; 2) a national security strategy that understands that creating wealth overseas is the fastest way of stabilizing very large populations; and 3) a Vice President or a Secretary-General for National Security that has command and control over State, Justice, and Defense, together. Right now State does not want to lead, Justice is incapable of leading, and Defense is too busy to lead an inter-agency program.

⁵⁶ The UN Report, *supra* note 43, points out that biological security is a major concern.

In an earlier work, *THE NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE: Personal, Public, and Political*, the entire middle section, five chapters, was devoted to unconventional threats: global conditions including poverty and mass migrations that spawn terrorism; plagues, toxic bombs, resource wars, and water shortages; global genocide; and to these we would add today support for 44 dictators⁵⁷ and immoral capitalism, both of which undermine any Public Diplomacy or Strategic Communication message we might wish to deliver.

For the sake of emphasizing the importance of the Stabilization & Reconstruction (S&R) mission, which has yet to be assigned, but which USNORTHCOM is now bidding for,⁵⁸ let us simply do a quick once over on the “state of the world” as it impacts on U.S. national security in the form of increased threats from illegal immigration, energy supply interruptions, water shortages, the spread of pandemic disease, and crime or terrorism.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ The definitive work on why supporting 44 dictators makes our global stabilization program impossible to achieve, is that of Ambassador Mark Palmer, *Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). Ambassador Palmer recommends an Undersecretary for Democracy with two Assistant Secretaries: one for the dictators that agree to a five-year buy-out, and one for the ones that do not. We would add our own complementary recommendation: an Undersecretary of Defense for Peacekeeping, with two Assistant Secretaries: one for the failed states that agree to accept our help, and one for the ones that do not.

⁵⁸ The author believes that USNORTHCOM is on very solid and intelligent ground in bidding for both operational control of the National Guard, and for the S&R mission. The Guard is ideally-suited to be restructured to provide for direct support to homeland state and local agencies across the spectrum of disaster relief requirements, and it is also better suited for short-term S&R missions overseas, rather than prolonged occupations under hostile conditions. The Guard is also, by its culture, better suited to OOTW and “Peace Corps” missions that could be chopped to the regional COCOMs from USNORTHCOM as the training, equipping, and organizing authority.

⁵⁹ Dictators itemized in Mark Palmer, *Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025* (Rowman, 2003); plagues from State of the World Atlas (1997); water scarcity discussed by Marq de Villiers, *WATER: The Fate of Our Most Precious Resource* (Mariner, 2001); resource wars in Michael Klare, *RESOURCE*

• Complex Emergencies:	32 countries
• Dictators Supported:	44 countries
• Refuges/Displaced:	66 countries
• Starvation:	33 countries
• Plagues:	59 countries
• Ethnic Conflict:	18 countries
• Child Soldiers:	41 countries
• Corruption:	80 countries
• Censorship:	62 countries
• Water Scarcity:	widespread
• Resource Wars:	widespread

DoD's new-found focus on S&R is very wise. Not only are there not enough guns on the planet to enforce security⁶⁰ (peace is security without force; security is enforced peace),⁶¹ but it has been clearly established by numerous authorities that it is the combination of legitimacy⁶² and localized wealth creation that stabilizes and nurtures large populations. Corruption and censorship undermine wealth creation. Neither benign dictatorships nor a dramatic increase in foreign aid will

WARS: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Owl, 2002); all others from the *Map of World Conflict & Human Rights* (PIOOM, 2002).

⁶⁰ Cf. Jonathan Schell, *UNCONQUERABLE WORLD: Power, Non-Violence, and the Will of the People* (Owl, 2004).

⁶¹ This is a point made by Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and captured in a DVD by his name.

⁶² Max Manwaring (contributing editor), *The Search for Security : A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century* (Praeger, 2003). See also Max Manwaring (contributing editor), *Environmental Security and Global Stability: Problems and Responses : Problems and Responses* (Lexington, 2002); Max Manwaring and Anthony James Joes (contributing editors), *Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home : The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations* (Praeger, 2000), and Max Manwaring and John Fishel (contributing editors), *Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations* (Frank Cass, 1998).

do it. We need to nurture the three billion new capitalists, not fear them.⁶³ Information, not foreign assistance, is the key to this mission.

Stabilization & Reconstruction is a pre-condition and also a precipitant for indigenous wealth creation. It facilitates the control of corruption and crime, both of which are destabilizing in the extreme.

Seen as a whole, it is IO, across the various IO-heavy mission areas, which makes each mission area a successful contributor to the prevention and resolution of conflict, and the creation of wealth that reduces the prospects for conflict in the future.

⁶³ On the negative effects of corruption and immoral capitalism, see for instance, John Perkins, *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man* (Berrett-Kohler, 2004); and William Greider, *The Soul of Capitalism: Opening Paths to a Moral Economy* (Simon & Schuster, 2003). On the need to nurture 3 billion new capitalists, and to have a strategy for energy independence, among other key protective measures, see Clyde Prestowitz, *Three Billion New Capitalists: The Great Shift of Wealth and Power to the East* (Basic Books, 2005). Within the USA, there are numerous books on the manner in which the national security policy process is corrupted by special interests, including foreign interests. In combination, ground truth and morality are the two greatest weapons in America's arsenal. They are rusty and unused weapons. Putting the I back into DIME will make them shiny, bright, and useful again.

Homeland Defense & Civil Support

DoD has a clear mandate with respect to Homeland Defense and Civil Support.⁶⁴ It is a defense in depth. As stated on page 1 of the guiding document:

This active layered defense is global, seamlessly integrating U.S. capabilities in the forward regions of the world, the global commons of space and cyberspace, in the geographic approaches to US territory, and within the United States.

We would add two observations: first, that the single “constant” between DoD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is information and intelligence; and second, that is this age of improvised terrorism where sleepers already in the US use commercial vehicles and local supplies to attack homeland targets, the only thing moving, the only thing that can be intercepted and acted upon, is information.

Note the four capabilities for Homeland Defense and Civil Support as listed on pages 3 and 4:

- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capabilities
- Information-Sharing
- Interagency and Intergovernmental Coordination
- Joint Operational Capabilities for Homeland Defense

⁶⁴ The DoD overview document, signed out by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, is *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* (DoD, June 2005), at URL <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/d20050630homeland.pdf>.

Three of the four capabilities are exclusively focused on information and intelligence, and the fourth demands the fullest possible implementation of common inter-operable command & control, communications, and computing (C4I) systems.

Since DHS and its constituencies cannot afford the high-end systems that DoD has been funding for itself, and DoD cannot afford to pay for 50 to 5,000 C4I nodes across America, there is only one option: an open source software solution that allows everyone to tie in to a new Open Source Information System—External (OSIS-X),⁶⁵ and the melding of OSIS-X into an Application-Oriented Network (AON)⁶⁶ that

⁶⁵ The existing Open Source Information System (OSIS) is very well-managed within the legal and security constraints imposed by industrial-era intelligence mind-sets. It is incapable of rising to the challenge of global open source information sharing across both DHS and NGO boundaries. Only a commercial implementation will meet this need. It merits comment that FedEx is approved for the transmission of SECRET documents. OSIS-X will easily qualify for at least SECRET and probably TOP SECRET when using commercial encryption, audit trails and receipts, and by-name access controls. We respectfully note here that no official connection is implied between OSIS (created and managed by the government) and OSIS-X (to be created and managed by the private sector). We have chosen to use OSIS-X as a “shorthand” name because of the very broad appreciation, both within the US and overseas, of the concepts and protocols established by OSIS under Intelink leadership. We also believe, as illustrated in our pyramid, that Intelink-X is inevitable and essential if we are to achieve true multi-national, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, multi-domain information sharing at multiple levels of classification. Multilateral sharing, not bilateral sharing, will be the key characteristic of government intelligence as well as private sector intelligence in the 21st Century.

⁶⁶ All vendors will have no alternative but to rapidly adopt and offer to their clients CISCO’s AON, the latest advancement in secure controlled routing technology. AON is specifically targeted to customers whose applications have proliferated into siloed and fragmented environments and who must now integrate these applications and services to improve collaborative business processes. AON is the first and only network-embedded intelligent message routing system that provides ubiquitous, adaptable message-level communication, visibility, and security that enables applications and the network to work together as an integrated system without requiring new intermediary layers or changes to existing applications and can be delivered in a network-based solution that is pervasive throughout the IT infrastructure. Today it is available to federal clients from L-3 Communications, MANTECH, and SAIC.

permits the sharing of secret information on a by-name basis regardless of nationality 24/7.⁶⁷

Private sector capabilities are transforming themselves much faster than any government acquisition manager might be able to imagine. As this book goes to press, CISCO has brought out IPICS (Internet Protocol Interoperability and Collaboration System), which allows disparate radio signals previously not inter-operable, to be converted into digital packets and easily integrated via software; and BreakAway Ltd. has produced a “serious” game, Incident Commander, which teaches inter-agency collaboration and capabilities for emergency response.

There is a subtlety that requires strong scrutiny by both DoD and DHS information and intelligence managers. While DoD can and should be responsible for global monitoring in support of defense missions, we must be acutely conscious of the possibility (in our opinion) that 50% of the “dots” relevant to preventing the next 9-11 will be “bottom-up” dots collected at the county level by direct observation from citizens, public employees, and law enforcement professionals. Today those dots have no place to go. DHS needs to implement bottom-up JIOCs in each state, ideally within a USNORTHCOM construct manned by the Guard.

Although Congressional hearings have been held and will be held again on the need for a national domestic intelligence network,⁶⁸ DoD

⁶⁷ This can be as simple as a cell phone with an open source browser that includes a known return address and password sequence for authenticating the individual’s access.

⁶⁸ Congressman Rob Simmons (R-CT-02), is both a member of the House Armed Services Committee and also Chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the House Homeland Security Committee. He is the “owner” of OSINT issues within the House, having championed OSINT before it became fashionable. His most recent hearing focused exclusively on OSINT in support of homeland defense. We anticipate a strong Congressional interest in how DoD and DHS can collaborate in making global OSINT, and domestic OSINT, more readily useful to the defense of our citizens here at home.

should consider a pilot project with the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and three key states (New York, Texas, Virginia) in which DoD's man-machine foreign language processing capabilities are made available to all 911 operators, at the same time that a new number, 119, is established as a pathway for citizens to report via locationally-aware voice, image, or electronic message, any suspicious individuals, packages, or activities.

It is imperative that DoD expand its vision for IO to include a recommendation to the President that DHS receive a matching investment of \$1.5B a year for 50 state intelligence centers and networks, each funded at \$30M per year at Final Operational Capability (FOC). The National Guard is uniquely qualified to man those centers, since they can hold both military commissions with access to national foreign intelligence, and state law enforcement commissions with access to citizen information under strict privacy protection. They are, not, however, qualified to design or build these centers. A special DoD-DHS task force is recommended.⁶⁹

Homeland defense suffers from one major handicap that must be overcome, the same handicap that prevented the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from being effective in the months leading up to 9-11. Lawyers, including especially lawyers at USNORTHCOM, are both uninformed and consequently—understandably—timid when it comes to the facts of what can and cannot be collected and exploited when using open sources of information about U.S. citizens or foreigners within the

⁶⁹ DHS has the First Source and EAGLE acquisition projects. OMB has several task forces seeking “common solutions” for the entire federal community. The IC has its own solutions, including an unworkable expansion of OSIS out to the state and local authorities. DoD has its USDI investments. GSA has a collaborative tools network. DARPA has its own diverse investments, as does NASA, NOAA, and so on. Nowhere in the US Government does there appear to be a focus on the urgency of creating a truly national information-sharing system that is built on a foundation of affordable open source software, shareable open source information, and accessible open (electromagnetic) spectrum. USNORTHCOM is where it can all come together.

borders of the US.⁷⁰ It would be most helpful if DoD established, in partnership with the Department of Justice (DoJ) a legal working group with a 24/7 Help Desk able to save the Combatant Commanders, the National Guard, and others, from lawyers whose concealment of their own ignorance leads them to say “no” when they actually have no idea what the law allows.

Finally, although not related to Information per se, but related to Stabilization & Reconstruction and global perception management, an aspect of Strategic Communications, it merits comment that DoD’s responsibility for helping recover from natural disasters such as Hurricane KATRINA, as well as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) mass casualty attacks, should lead DoD to fund five new hospital ships and ten new medical regiments as well as home-based engineering, fire-fighting and military police capabilities.⁷¹ We will need them both at home and abroad. The

⁷⁰ Executive Order 12333 has long demanded the presumption that anyone within the US should be presumed to be a US citizen when inadvertently captured via classified collection means, but this does not apply to open sources and methods. One is also allowed to collect freely on individuals in the US when they are known to be in association with a foreign power or considered to be an agent of a foreign or terrorist organization considered a threat to national security. Able Danger findings a year prior to 9-11 appear to have been buried and not shared because of legal ignorance within INSCOM and a management desire to avoid making waves by revealing black data mining capabilities to the FBI.

⁷¹ U.S. hospital beds are full. There is no redundant capacity across the Nation, and especially so in the high-probability attack areas. At the same time, as DoD gets into peaceful preventive measures and stabilization missions, hospital ships (which can cook 7,500 hot meals a day and distill 75,000 gallons of fresh water from seawater per day, will be a critical resource that could be deployed to the West, Gulf, and East Coasts as well as the Great Lakes when needed. New medical regiments capable of fielding multiple Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH) are also needed. It would not be unreasonable to reconstitute the entire National Guard into regiments focused on intelligence, law enforcement, medical, and civil support engineering. As this goes to press, we continue to read about the lasting impacts of Hurricanes KATRINA and RITA. Now imagine if terrorists were to start a series of forest fires, to pollute water supplies across America, and to bring down key power and communications

National Guard is the logical entity to task with being ready to do both short-term stabilization & reconstruction missions overseas, and rapid-response as well as sustained civil support missions at home.

transmissions towers and transfer points, as well as key fuel pipelines that cross long stretches of land above ground. We are not ready!

National Education & National Research

The failure of education in the U.S., in which U.S. students are consistently falling behind Indian and Chinese students—as well as Nordic and many other nationalities, has been the subject of many books and commentaries, and will not be examined in detail here. However, it is vital to understand that one cannot have smart spies in the context of a dumb Nation, nor can one have effective OSINT or effective Strategic Communication (and Public Diplomacy) if these are perched on a hollow shell.

In addition to failing at science & technology, with a majority of our engineering and computer science graduate students now hailing from outside the USA rather than from within our own citizen base, we have the problem of insularity. Both David Boren (former Senator and Chairman of the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence, today the President of the University of Oklahoma) and David Gergen, then Senior Editor of *US News & World Report* and advisor to two Presidents, have called for the “internationalization of education.”⁷² Both fear that our children—and their parents—are so globally isolated from overseas realities as to foster an attitude of neglect among our political leaders. Indeed, prior to 9-11, Senators and Congressmen were known to brag before 9-11 that they did not possess a U.S. passport, and had no need of one because “nothing that happens overseas matters to my constituents.”

⁷² Cf. David Born and Edward Perkins (contributing editors), *Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century* (University of Oklahoma, 1999).

With the collapse of education comes the collapse of research and then development across all science & technology (S&T) domains. Lou Dobbs on CNN has focused on the out-sourcing of jobs from America. Now Tom Friedman of the *New York Times* is focusing on the fact that America is losing basic research and development work—the heart and soul of modern productivity and wealth creation, to China and India.⁷³

It is all connected. Our view, implicit throughout this book, but first articulated in 1992 and subsequently cited by Alvin and Heidi Toffler, is clear-cut: Information Operations (IO) and national intelligence writ large (i.e. truly national, embracing all elements of society, not only the spies and purveyors of secrecy) are potentially the “lifeboat” for rescuing America from its intellectual and moral decline.

Unlike the Viet-Nam era, when DoD was asked to help create the Great Society by absorbing Category IV individuals who were “brain challenged,” we are today in a completely different situation. DoD has an opportunity to recruit and nurture the best and the brightest, to achieve universal coverage, 24/7, in all languages, and to channel that unclassified “ground truth” back into society and particularly back into the classroom, as well as across the national S&T laboratories.

In combination, legal ethical Strategic Communication, OSINT, and joint inter-agency information-sharing commands or centers and tools, can revitalize the Republic. We must “think big” and “dare to want it all.”⁷⁴

See the Epilogue for comments on gaming and national education as well as research.

⁷³ Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* (Farar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).

⁷⁴ This latter “jingle” line is from the early advertisements for JOLT cola, with twice the caffeine and twice the sugar. Judging by the author’s oldest teenager, Mountain Dew is the equivalent beverage of choice for those that eschew more powerful drugs.

Acquisition & Logistics

In 1988, when the Marine Corps invited us to resign from the CIA and return to the Department of Defense as a civilian, with the mission of creating the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (today a Command) from scratch, it was, quite literally, a life-changing experience.

Under the direct leadership of Col Walter Breede, USMC, USNA '68, and with the strong support of Mr. John Guenther, SES and special assistant to the varied flag officers that circulated through the Command and Control, Communications, Computing, and Intelligence (C4I) Directorate at Headquarters Marine Corps, the author was given the latitude to make mistakes, to learn, and to try new ideas.

The author's biggest mistake was to fall prey to the traditional U.S. Intelligence Community and Department of Defense assumption, to wit, that the U.S. Intelligence Community has access to all relevant information and one just has to ask for it. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the U.S. Intelligence Community spends between \$50 billion and \$70 billion a year (at least half of this buried within the defense intelligence agencies and related programs), for the 5% of the information that can be stolen, and that generally has to do only with the seven denied area targets that are perceived to be capable of causing catastrophic damage to the United States.

We wasted \$20 million on a system able to receive all the U.S. Intelligence Community could offer, only to have the analysts begin lining up for the single Personal Computer (PC) with Internet access. We discovered the hard way that not only did the Marine Corps need its own intelligence center, because the U.S. Navy refused to do brown water, littoral, and expeditionary intelligence analysis and production,

but that we also needed our own global collection system, focused on open sources of information, because the U.S. Intelligence Community refused to be serious about all information, in all languages, all the time.

Although General Gray published a seminal article on this matter in 1998,⁷⁵ although Congress took note of the need in the National Security Act of 1992 that was rejected based on strong opposition from then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney,⁷⁶ and although both the Aspin-Brown Commission and the 9-11 Commission have found our access to open sources “severely deficient,” and in the latter case called for the creation of an entire new Open Source Agency, these recommendations have been ignored. The recent announcement of a \$100 million “Center” based on the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) within the CIA, when compared to the on-going investment of \$50 billion to \$70 billion a year in classified systems, can only be called “lipstick on the pig.” This is simply not serious.

As it turns out, acquisition and logistics are the biggest losers when the U.S. Intelligence Community fails to properly access open sources of information in all languages, all the time.

⁷⁵ General Alfred M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Global Intelligence Challenges,” *American Intelligence Journal* (Winter 1988-1989), available in PDF at <http://tinyurl.com/aykn3>.

⁷⁶ The two letters he was responsible for can be viewed at <http://tinyurl.com/92gxu>. Informed observers believe that Senator John Warner (R-VA) played a key role in defeating the National Security Act of 1992 because he equated reform with the potential loss of jobs in Virginia. A careful reading of Senator Warner’s dissenting letter at the conclusion of the Aspin-Brown Report (pages 149-150) adds credence to this view. We have learned, in consequence, that intelligence reform cannot be accomplished unless the key stake-holders are persuaded that reform can be accomplished in a job and revenue neutral fashion, state by state. We agree with 9-11 Commissioner John Lehman when he states in an Op-Ed in *The Washington Post* on 17 Nov 05 that the current round of intelligence reforms are ineffective, and that the excess funding is leading to bureaucratic bloat, not increased effectiveness. Truly expert intelligence reformists understand that only a 50% cut in the secret intelligence budget, preceded by the establishment of a national Open Source Agency, will actually yield the desired outcomes.

The Department of Defense, and specifically the uniformed Services, are charged with training, equipping, and organizing our air, sea, and land forces for whatever missions the Congress may approve and the President may order.

A careful study of the Program 50 budget (the military budget) will promptly show that roughly 90% of our defense budget is focused on a heavy metal military with too few systems, systems that are so complex they can only carry out one mission a day, systems so cumbersome they require enormous trains of logistic support, including the latest Army innovation, “one contractor per laptop.”

This book is focused on IO, and on mission effectiveness, but it is appropriate to note that mission effectiveness begins with understanding reality—with understanding what we term “strategic generalizations” about the operating environment where U.S. forces are going to go—and consequently, with designing, acquiring, building, maintaining, and operating the right systems. Such systems need to be sustainable over long periods of time, need to accommodate allied and coalition partners with limited budgets, and need to be simple enough for citizen-soldiers to employ without years or even months of training.

In the pages that follow, we print for the first time an article based on the first study, which is still relevant today to our need for “four forces after next.”⁷⁷

We spend more time on this than on the other sections, because acquisition and logistics have been the “red-headed step-children” of intelligence, never really properly supported, and this is perhaps the most important IO-heavy mission where open sources of information can have a transformative impact on our national security.

⁷⁷ The study, carried out by BDM under the author’s guidance, used only open sources and produced an unclassified report, *Overview of Planning and Programming Factors for Expeditionary Operations in the Third Word* (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, March 1990).

Introduction to Expeditionary Thinking

It is not possible to plan and program for the future of the Marine Corps without regard to three fundamentals: the threat, the expeditionary environment, and the primary means of transport and supply—in the case of the U.S. Marine Corps, a naval service, the U.S. Navy. It is also not possible to make significant changes in Marine Corps force structure if the starting point is always what we have and the starting premise is always “protect the shooters”. This section will examine each of these three fundamentals, and conclude with some specific recommendations regarding resource realignments and force structure changes for both the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Navy air-sea-land teams.

The Threat

Although Marine Corps planners and commanders have access to a number of threat studies, the focus of these studies continues to be on the traditional threat as represented by organized uniformed conventional forces. It was General Alfred M. Gray, in “Global Intelligence Challenges in the 1990’s” as published in the *American Intelligence Journal* (Winter 1989-1990), who first articulated the critical differences between the conventional and the emerging threat, as shown below (Figure 2).

CONVENTIONAL THREAT	EMERGING THREAT
Governmental	Non-Governmental
Conventional/Nuclear	Non-Conventional
Static Orders of Battle (OOB)	Dynamic or Random OOB
Linear Systems Development (Over Time)	Non-Linear (sometimes off-the-shelf!)
Known Rules of Engagement (ROE)	No Constraints (no ROE)
Known Doctrine	Unknown Doctrine
Strategic Warning	No Established I&W Net
Known Intelligence Assets	Unlimited 5 th Column

Figure 2: Commandant Gray’s Threat Assessment Model

Although General Gray laid out some of the implications of this dichotomous understanding of the threat in his article, his vision and that of the author become clearer if one understands that the Marine Corps faces today, and must be ready to fight—or not fight but rather to arrest, feed or detect and contain—four different warrior classes, each trained, equipped, and organized to carry out a different kind of war (Figure 3).




Figure 3: Four Warrior Classes

The four warrior classes, originally conceptualized by the author in the aftermath of General Gray’s seminal article on the emerging threat, help us to understand critical distinctions between the sources of power for each class (what are we up against), the type of stealth employed (how do we detect), the kind of targeting the enemy employs (what must we protect), and finally, the kinds of wars the enemy prefers (how will we fight).

At the most fundamental level, each of these four warrior classes, each of these four forms of war, demands an explicitly distinct approach to issues of surveillance and reconnaissance, of command and control, of fire and maneuver. If the Marine Corps were willing and able to seriously consider these implications, one can only begin to imagine how a different force structure and a different acquisition and development strategy might emerge. Both air and ground forces must adapt to four different types of threat and four different kinds of operational environment.

The next figure (Figure 4) illustrates this idea.



Figure 4: Four Forms of War, Four Operational Overlaps

The U.S. military, including the U.S. Marine Corps, is optimized for fighting only one kind of warrior class, the class that chooses to

engage in direct confrontations utilizing strategic nuclear and conventional means. The U.S. Intelligence Community is similarly optimized to provide indications & warning as well as estimative and other forms of intelligence, for this class only. Neither our military, nor our intelligence community are trained, equipped, and organized at present to deter and resolve conflict in three of the four areas illustrated here.

The above conceptualizations of what we are facing in the threat arena have very significant implications for how we think about Marine Corps capabilities and our plans for the programming of future force structure and future acquisitions.

Rethinking the Corps in terms of the four threat classes is a good start, but our understanding deepens further when we delve into the actual nature of the expeditionary environment, and consider carefully how our existing and planned capabilities lend themselves to effective sustained operations in this environment.

The Expeditionary Environment

For practical planning and programming purposes, the “expeditionary environment” is not, as some tend to assume, “every clime and place” (although the Corps must of course be able to fight anywhere), but rather a fairly well defined list of specific countries, and within those countries, specific operational areas and specific tactical missions. In 1988, when the author helped establish the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (now Command) at the direction of General Gray, among the first objectives was the definition of the expeditionary environment toward which our intelligence endeavors, and the calculations of the Warfighting Center, should be directed. The list below, of 67 countries and two island groups, was created by consensus with the Fleet Marine Force, and served as the basis for our first major product, *Overview of Planning and Programming Factors for Expeditionary Operations in the Third World* (Marine Corps Combat

Development Command, March 1990). The “strategic generalizations” outlined below are derived from this study. The specific countries used to establish the Marine Corps’ most probably operational environments is detailed in the table below (Figure 5).

WESTERN HEMISPHERE	MIDDLE EAST/ SW ASIA	AFRICA	ASIA/ PACIFIC	EUROPE/ MED.
Colombia	Bahrain	Algeria	Afghanistan	Denmark
Costa Rica	Egypt	Angola	Bangladesh	Greece
Cuba	Iran	Djibouti	Burma	Italy
Dominican R.	Iraq	Ethiopia	India	Norway
El Salvador	Kuwait	Kenya	Indonesia	Turkey
Grenada	Lebanon	Liberia	Japan	Yugoslavia****
Guatemala	Libya	Madagascar*	Malaysia	
Haiti	North Yemen	Namibia	North Korea	
Honduras	Oman	Somalia	Pakistan	
Jamaica	Qatar	South Africa	Papua NG	
Mexico	Saudi Arabia	Sudan	Philippines	
Nicaragua	South Yemen	Tunisia	PRC	
Panama	Syria	Uganda	South Korea	
Peru	U. Arab E.	Zaire	South Pacific**	
Surinam		Zimbabwe	Spratley Is.***	
Venezuela			Sri Lanka	
			Viet-Nam	
* Includes Seychelles and Mauritius				
** Includes Fiji, Kiribati, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Solomon Islands, vicinity of Australia & New Zealand				
*** Claimed by seven nations				
**** Representative of the now fragmented elements including Kosovo				

Figure 5: The Expeditionary Environment

The expeditionary environment is comprised of those countries where the Marine Corps believes there is a high probability of employment. It differs from the traditional DoD planning environment because it is almost totally comprised of Third World countries and represents challenges calling *primarily* for operations other than war. This is an environment where the Navy-Marine Corps team should be without peer, but as this article will document, our plans and programs

for the future do not actually consider the important parameters to be drawn from a study of this specific environment and its specific “strategic generalizations”.

A study of this environment allows us to consider three general aspects in detail:

- The threat, including not just the air, ground and naval orders of battle, but also the degree to which existing on-going conflicts are present, and the presence of drugs, terrorism, nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) capabilities, and gray arms/technology transfer.
- The physical environment itself, including operational elevations and temperature, cross-country mobility and intervisibility, hydrography, weather, culture, and the presence of U.S. citizens and investments. Generalizations about bridge loading, tunnel clearance, and river fording constraints are also very important.
- Logistics factors, including the availability of maps and charts, the distance of the capital cities from the five fathom line, the number of ports and airfields which can be used to introduce forces, and the time in days it would take the nearest forward-deployed Marine force to reach the country. Additional factors should include communications data (e.g. angle and availability of relay satellites, local switching facilities) and engineering information (e.g. bunkering, refrigeration, warehouse, lumber facilities).

Below are some of the strategic generalizations that emerged from the original study of the expeditionary environment. Although they were promulgated at the time, and the current *Expeditionary Factors Study* is in general use (but lacking the summary section), no one in the Marine Corps appears to have made the connection between these strategic generalizations, and how we train, equip, and organize the

Marine Corps for the future. Today's updated versions of the study are used as a handy reference for specific countries of interest and not as they should be, as the foundation for strategic and operational level planning guidance relevant to acquisition and logistics.

- The ground threat is complex and lethal. Between (then) Soviet proxies and Third World countries supplied by Western nations, the Marine Corps can expect to meet trained experienced infantry, modern armor, relatively sophisticated artillery including scatterable mines, and some smart or stand-off munitions as well as surface-to-surface missiles and other advanced coastal defense systems.
- On the air side many of our countries have night/all weather capabilities and early if not third generation radar, stand-off munitions, and integrated air defense systems.
- The naval threat to an Amphibious Ready Group without benefit of an accompanying Carrier Battle Group is of serious concern—many Third World countries can out-gun the standard 5" Navy gun and have significant coastal defense missile capabilities; many of these countries have submarines, frigates, corvettes, and in some cases aircraft carriers.
- Of the sixty-nine countries examined in the prototype study, seventeen possess or have used nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, and fully forty-one of the countries have active on-going insurgencies, drug wars, civil wars, severe instability, or a regional war in progress.

In brief, our world is a violent and unstable. Expeditionary operations must *not* be mis-construed as “lite” operations. There is however, a useful distinction to be drawn between very high-capability forces required for Asia and the Middle East, and relatively less-sophisticated and less-expensive capabilities required for Latin America

and Africa. This distinction also held true for the distribution of the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat—high in Asia and the Middle East, very low in the rest of the expeditionary environment.

In considering the physical operational environment, stark distinctions emerged between the real-world expeditionary environment, and the current planning model used by the Navy (which designs our aircraft) and the Army (which designs our major ground systems).

- We found our countries equally divided between mountains, deserts, jungle, and urban environments—we must be able to operate in all four environments, so much so that four distinct acquisition and training tracks would appear to be justified.
- Thirty-nine of our countries were hot, defined as a sustained heat index of 80° (and many were very humid as well) suggesting that our aviation systems will always be forced to operate at the outer edge of their performance envelope (or as one wag has summarized, they will go half as far and carry half as much as the book says they will, and this assumes 100% availability).
- Cross-country mobility was a showstopper—we could not get from the beach to the capital city off-road in 60% of our countries, and would have trouble in an additional 20%.
- The average line of sight distance throughout our world was less than 1,000 meters—only eight countries offered stand-off engagement ranges over 2,000 meters.
- Although not documented in the study, the average bridge-loading limitation in the Third World appears to be 30 tons, with many areas limited even more, to 10 and 20 tons.

In other words, in virtually our entire expeditionary environment, our aviation assets—both fixed wing and helicopter—are severely

constrained in terms of lift and range (or loitering capability) at the same time that we have virtually no cross-country mobility and our most expensive ground asset (the M1A1, which has consumed 50% of the Marine Corps procurement budget for years on end) is next to useless. It is at this point that the Marine Corps must be driven to reconsider the roles played by artillery and armor, and evaluate how some functions might be down-sized (if left on the ground), realigned (if moved to aviation) and/or enhanced (if augmented with C4I assets able to better orchestrate a mix of ground-based, air-based, and theater precision-munitions resources).

“Getting there” is half the challenge. When we looked at various parameters for Marine Corps deployment and employment, the following emerged:

- Forty-two percent of our countries could not be reached in less than six days with existing ARG deployment patterns.
- Half of our countries did not have usable ports and would require instream off-loading of both amphibious and Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships (MPS).
- Most of our world can accommodate strategic airlift.

Once there, we found very severe constraints on operational effectiveness:

- Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) logistics presented some real difficulty—between capital cities beyond the round trip range of a CH-46 (i.e. requiring forward refueling points), very hot aviation temperatures and the numbers of Embassy personnel as well as U.S. citizens, the study suggested that we would not be able to carry out most NEOs unless there were a major administrative draw-down of the U.S. presence beforehand, and/or we took extraordinary measures to increase both our

lift capacity and our lift range. Forward Area Refueling Points (FARP) will be the norm—we'd better be good at it.

- Hydrography was not a practical constraint to naval gunfire, as the five fathom line was close enough to the coast to permit the 5" gun to cover landing operations - *but the Navy's 5" is out-gunned by thirty-one of our countries' coastal defense systems.*
- The lack of adequate 1:50,000 map coverage of our world is a real show-stopper; only ten of our countries had relatively complete coverage, but it was generally dated and could not be relied upon to show existing roads, airfields, and other man-made features; most of our world had only maps for principal ports and cities, leaving our maneuver areas uncovered; twenty-two of our countries did not have useful maps, even dated maps, and would require the use of multi-spectral imagery with grid overlays. *This deficiency impacts not only on ground maneuver and fire support coordination, but also on aviation mission planning and precision-munitions targeting. This is the single most urgent constraint on Marine Corps effectiveness in the near and mid-term future.*
- Our "cultural terrain" included 40 countries whose primary language was Arabic or other than English, Spanish or French (most practicing Islam or an eastern or tribal religion), and 22 Christian/orthodox countries where Spanish and French were the most common language. Interestingly, fully seventy-nine percent of the expeditionary environment speaks English, Spanish, or French as a first or second language, with Arabic being the next most significant linguistic block.

What does this all mean? Our environment is lethal, but much of that lethality is static. We need to trade-off mobility against firepower, lift against weight, communications and intelligence against weapons systems—and at the strategic level, we need to take a very hard look at

the possibility of trading off maritime mobility for air transport mobility. An improved understanding of our cultural and physical environment, increased emphasis on lift and logistics, and the communications and intelligence architectures to support our operations, are our best means of maintaining capabilities in the face of a reduction in force. "Fighting smart" *must* join "first to fight" as our guiding precept.

Marine Corps Planning Guidance

Now, when we combine a strategic understanding of the four threat classes with an operational understanding of the expeditionary environment, one can easily draw from these the following elements of "planning guidance" for the Marine Corps:

- Restructure our forward deployment arrangements so as to become a true "911" force-in-readiness for the Nation. Our operational objective is to be able to place a reinforced platoon of Marines with a helicopter gunship overhead anywhere in the littoral world within 24 hours; a reinforced company with two VSTOL close air support aircraft within 48 hours; a full-up Battalion Landing Team within 72 hours; a Regimental Landing Team within seven days, and a Marine Expeditionary Force within fourteen days. We will adopt a new strategy that mixes air and sea delivery, that distributes our forward forces by company and platoon, and that is characterized by a "pile-on" approach to deterrence. We will rely heavily on a dramatically revised approach to aviation delivery and support that reflects our new commitment to a "pile-on" approach from distributed small platforms.
- Limit Marine Corps planning for conventional operations to those that are strictly expeditionary in nature, both in terms of forced entry, and in terms of rapid response high-intensity contingencies. Place special emphasis on coalition and civilian command and control capabilities including the management of shared intelligence, engineering, and civil affairs components. Assign 60% of

our resources to this focus of effort. Severely limit dependency on Reserve forces so as to be able to execute full operational missions without delay. Be very aggressive about defining U.S. Navy transport and fire support requirements in the out-years, to include brown water and riverine operations.

- Refocus the Corps on constabulary operations to include strong civil affairs, engineering, and low-intensity conflict intelligence capabilities. Dramatically strengthen our foreign affairs officer program and expand it to include senior noncommissioned officers. Place special emphasis on “bottom-up” sensing and multi-disciplinary tactical intelligence collection over a sustained period. Assign 20% of our resources to this focus of effort, but design in appropriate modifications to the remainder of the Corps. Place special emphasis on significantly expanded Reserve program in order to maintain the foreign area/foreign language expertise required. Consider the creation of integrated Reserve support battalions, one for each major language group, and each to have a civil affairs, intelligence, engineering, military police, and public affairs company with individual platoons capable of 90 day rotations in sequence. Create a new permanent cadre of mixed military-civilian personnel whose exclusive ongoing duty is the creation and nurturing of relationships with international, non-governmental, and business organizations active in the expeditionary environment (the Marine Liaison Group is a step in the right direction).
- Restructure each MEF to concentrate heavy capabilities with I MEF, medium capabilities with II MEF, and light long-range capabilities with III MEF. Provide for a dedicated urban operations unit within each MEF, and two specialty units for desert operations (I/II), jungle operations (II/III) and mountain operations (I/III). Ensure that our aviation restructuring and new acquisition reflects our needs for close air support and maneuver in these four different environments. Establish within each MEF a single

battalion to serve as the cadre for dealing with large numbers of people who must be fed and otherwise managed. Assign 10% of our resources to this focus of effort. Place special emphasis on cultivating key civilian agencies, both U.S. and foreign, with whom refugee and other operations must be coordinated.

- Conduct a comprehensive review of all Marine Corps Information Superiority capabilities across the subordinate Information Operations, Relevant Information and Information Systems elements. Develop a five year plan for dramatically expanding and improving organic capabilities in all three elements, with central emphasis on increasing by a factor of no less than 10 the amount of Relevant Information that can be brought to bear in support of policy, acquisition and FMF operations. Assign 10% of our resources to this focus of effort.

In the next few pages we examine what these strategic implications mean for the U.S. Navy. For the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Coast Guard, we address these latter two with two mission-type orders.

- **U.S. Air Force:** You are to train, equip, and organize so as to be able to provide long-haul strategic airlift sufficient to move a division a week for 12 weeks to any point on the globe, or to carry out a sustained “Berlin Airlift” with organic platforms, and a second “Berlin Airlift” with conscripted platforms, for up to three months at a time.
- **U.S. Coast Guard:** Become inter-operable with the U.S. Navy across all mission areas, and expand with a combination of information-intelligence innovations and increased deep water small platforms such that you can interdict and validate all maritime vessels of any size and speed before they enter the 12 mile sea control line, while also protecting all ports and waterways against attacks originating from within our borders.

The U.S Navy: Help or Hindrance?

U.S. Navy Ship Type	Actual 1987	Actual 1998	Planned 2010	Needed 2010	Notes
Ballistic Submarines	37	18	14	15	
Attack Submarines	102	65	50	50	
<i>Troop/Attack Submarines</i>	0	0	0	15	1
Aircraft Carriers (Blue Water)	14	12	12	8	
<i>Aircraft Carriers (Littoral Ops)</i>	0	0	0	4	2
Battleships	3	0	0	2	
Cruisers	36	29	27	36	
Destroyers	69	50	73	59	3
Expeditors (Modified DDs)	0	0	0	25	4
Frigates	115	38	16	33	
Amphibious Warfare Ships	63	40	36	36	5
<i>Patrol Craft/Brown Water Ops</i>	6	13	14	75	6
<i>Mine Warfare Ships</i>	22	16	26	20	7
Combat Logistics Ships	56	39	18	18	
Mobile Logistics Ships	19	19	9	9	
Fleet Support Ships	24	11	7	7	
Strategic Auxiliaries	6	1	7	5	
Other (AGF-LCC)	14	11	9	9	
<i>Assistance Ships (Large)</i>	0	0	0	8	8
<i>Assistance Ships (Small)</i>	0	0	0	8	8
<i>Hospital Ships (Large)</i>	2	2	2	3	9
<i>Hospital Ships (Small)</i>	0	0	0	5	9
USMC Focus (%)	11%	11%	11%	14%	
<i>Littoral Focus (%)</i>	5%	9%	13%	31%	
TOTAL SHIPS	588	364	320	450	0

Figure 6: US Navy—The Old, the Current, and the Proposed⁷⁸

⁷⁸ DOI: 2 April 1999. See next page for Notes. While six years have passed since this was done, on balance the author believes the U.S. Navy is adrift.

The figure above (Figure 6) is instructive. It shows three navies: the Navy of 1980's (the "six hundred ship" Navy focused on the Soviets), the Navy of the 1990's (a down-sized Navy confused about its mission and its threat), and the Navy of the 21st Century, both planned (the third column) and as desired (one person's concept for a balanced naval force). The desired Navy is achievable from where we are today, and will provide three critical elements for success in future conflicts: sustainment of the amphibious fleet; expansion of the littoral fleet; and creation of a new peacekeeping fleet.⁷⁹

The thrust above is straight-forward. We strive to retain the global reach and striking power of the traditional Navy, while significantly spreading out our existing amphibious forces across more platforms widely distributed. At the same time we increase our ability to project a littoral force with dedicated carriers, shallow-water troop/attack submarines, reconfigured destroyers (leading toward a new class of ship, the *Expeditor*) and a combination of patrol craft and mine warfare ships. Finally, we add the Seaborne Peace Corps, actually an important part of force protection in the 21st Century—assistance and hospital ships for every clime and place.

⁷⁹ Notes to Figure 6: 1987 and 1998 data primarily from USN Battle Forces series with CRS, NHC input. 2010 planned data from Norman Polmar. Note 1: 15 *Los Angeles* SSNs refueled and modified pending new design. Note 2: 4 carriers with air wings dedicated to VSTOL/gunships, Marines and anti-mine work. Note 3: Keep every destroyer alive as gap-fillers. 84 vice 73-25 (Note 4) = 59. Note 4: 25 SPRUANCE DDs converted to DD963V/DDH (aviation aboard) pending new class. Note 5: Achieve better balance between large LHA/LPD and enhanced WHIDBEY-class LHDs. Note 6: Extend program, create 25 three-ship squadrons: 1 VSTOL, 1 Marines, 1 fire support. Note 7: Achieve savings and spread capability by focusing on distributed helicopter assets. Note 8: Create MPS Civic Action variant with integrated field hospital, engineers. Note 9: Get serious about continental-level diseases, configure for bio-chemical recovery. Note 0: Totals include Cat A NRF and Cat B Mine Warfare and Hospital Ships.

These recommendations have been developed with the assistance of some of the best minds available to the Secretary of the Navy as well as to Members of Congress. A few specifics:

First, and there have been books on this topic, it makes sense to extend the utility of the attack submarine to the amphibious arena. There is no reason why 15 of the *Los Angeles* class submarines cannot be refueled and modified in order to carry 50-100 Marines and smaller vehicles. These SSN's have roughly fifteen years of service life remaining. With modifications, including improved sonar for shallow-water (<100 fathoms) operations and organic landing craft and related cranes for instream shallow-water offload, they would provide a stealthy and relatively invulnerable option for delivering reinforced platoons into urban and coastal areas where airfields servicing normal aerial delivery vehicles are not readily available.

Second, given the increased emphasis on littoral operations and especially the increased expectation of great turmoil in the rapidly growing urban areas of the Third World, it makes sense to earmark four of the Navy's twelve carriers for littoral/amphibious operations. These four carriers should have embarked, and be especially equipped to handle, air wings dedicated to a good mix of VSTOL/helicopter platforms for attack and close air support missions as well as very heavy lifting of large numbers of people and/or humanitarian assistance supplies. Each carrier should also have several anti-mine helicopters aboard, and be equipped to serve as a general repair facility for VSTOL and helicopter assets from the rest of the fleet. In those instances where a high level of air threat is anticipated, a companion "blue water" carrier with F/A-18 Hornets and (until 2010) F-14 Tomcats would be assigned combat air patrol duties. Air wing composition and embarked maintenance capabilities are the crux of the matter—*it is time the Navy gave amphibious aviation its due.*

Third, and many will say this is impractical, we should reexamine the symbolic as well as the military value of the battleship. Two are

recommended, one for the Atlantic Command and one for the Pacific Command, each to serve as a Presidential summit site as well as a fire support capability when needed. Although battleships as a type are expensive, their ammunition is dirt-cheap when compared with the extraordinarily expensive not-so-precision munitions that we cannot rely upon for sustained barrages. In fact, the annual operations cost including salaries for one battleship is almost exactly equal to the cost of the 79 rounds of precision ammunition expended against the Saudi terrorist leader in Afghanistan in one 1998 attack that killed 26 and wounded 40.

Fourth, we must protect the destroyer fleet and use it to fill gaps in our fire support as well as our amphibious strike capability. It may come as a surprise to many (as it did to the author), but a series of modifications can be made to the *SPRUANCE* (DD 963) that will permit it to carry as many as five Harrier-type aircraft or a couple of Harriers and a couple of heavy helicopters, while also embarking a reinforced platoon of up to fifty Marines. This same vessel can be fitted with a 64-cell VLS (vertical launch system) plus the enhanced 5-inch/62-caliber gun. Every destroyer should be kept alive, with 25 of them being refitted to carry Marines and amphibious aircraft, while the remaining 59 are upgraded in terms of fire support. In the 1970's Congress authorized funds for two DD 963 variants that could carry several VSTOL aircraft or helicopters, and designs were prepared. The Navy chose to ignore the will of Congress and built two normal *SPRUANCE* destroyers, leading to the termination of Congressional support for the variant. It is time to restore Congressional interest and make a serious commitment to this program as a means of refitting and retaining 25 of the existing *SPRUANCE* destroyers. A new class of ship can emerge from this initiative, one we have tentatively called the *Expediter*. The 2,000-ton *Streetfighter* described in a recent international publication does not exist, but it should—provided it is designed to carry Marines and VSTOL aircraft. At the same time, the planned DD-21, a \$1 billion dollar a copy vessel, must be held to very high standards of over-the-horizon fire support *as well as embarked aviation* tailored to the needs of the Marine Corps.

Fifth, we must recognize the imbalance present in our plans for a limited number of very large LPH/LPD craft—each an enemy submarine skipper’s dream target—and also take note of the fact that such large craft will tend to be four to six days away from crisis points at any given moment. Instead, if we accept the 24-48 hour response imperative and the implementing “pile-on” concept, we need to work toward a mix of the planned “big decks” and additional *WHIDBEY ISLAND*-class LHDs capable of carrying reinforced companies and VSTOL/helicopter gunships. In combination with the much faster modified *SPRUANCE*-class destroyers, this would give the Navy-Marine Corps team the ability to deliver *in extremis* platoons and companies anywhere in the world with only overnight notice.

Sixth, and here we take advantage of the newest class of vessel in the fleet, we need to dramatically expand acquisition of the *CYCLONE*-class patrol boat as well as the new deep-water patrol craft hull planned jointly by the U.S. Coast Guard with the U.S. Navy. The new craft, not a frigate but more like a corvette, is going to be in the 200-400 ton range, employing the SLICE technology (a modified SWATH design). Such a craft, at the mid-to higher tonnage range, could carry up to fifty Marines for limited periods, and could also operate two H-60 helicopters or one H-53 helicopter and one Harrier. It could not, however, carry fire support missiles in adequate number at the same time. This suggests that a good out-of-the-box solution for 2010 brown water needs as well as high-seas drug interdiction and other coastal defense needs might be 25 three-ship squadrons, with one ship being primarily a troop carrier, one a helicopter/VSTOL platform, and the third a fire support ship with one VLS and a mix of heavy-caliber anti-air and surface-to-surface guns. In combination with the troop/attack submarines, the modified *SPRUANCE* destroyers, and a few additional *WHIDBEY ISLAND*-class LHDs, the Navy-Marine Corps team would now be able to lay claim to being a serious global presence able to put Marines on the beach anywhere within 24 hours.

Seventh, we seem to have gone overboard on mine-laying ships, especially since the best element of anti-mine warfare is the helicopter. We can achieve savings and distribute the anti-mine capability more widely by reducing the planned number of ships from 26 to 20, while retaining the procurement program for the associated helicopters and their support packages and spreading these out as embarked organic assets across the fleet.

Eighth, somewhere in all the planning for the naval fleet of the 21st Century we seem to have over-looked operations other than war! The best force for the avoidance of conflict and the resolution of non-combat crisis is the force that can deliver food, water, medicine, engineering and other civil affairs relief *from the sea*, with a low logistics and ideological footprint. The seaborne peacekeeping force should be comprised of at least 16 roll-on/roll-off bulk carriers such as we use for the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) but modified to berth a few hundred engineering, police, and civil affairs personnel, to have a small field hospital capability combining onboard capabilities with MASH-type capabilities that can be established ashore, plus the right kind of supplies as well as a good mix of ground and air mobility assets. Half of these ships should be designed to operate in support of the half of the countries from which pier-side offload is not an option, i.e. they should be able to do a combination of instream and helicopter-borne offload.

Ninth and finally we come to hospital ships. Two exist in the reserve fleet and there are no plans for any more ships of this type. In the face of growing concerns about continental-level diseases and the risk of bio-chemical terrorism, and out of respect for the growing dangers of revolution and forced emigration related to starvation and disease, it would make sense to invest more heavily in medical assistance platforms, possibly with multi-national manning. A naval force properly cognizant of the four warrior classes and the deteriorating expeditionary environment should have three large hospital ships and five small hospital ships. In combination with the civil affairs platforms and a

discreet mix of destroyers and patrol craft, these hospital ships (capable of cooking 7,500 meals daily while also distilling 75,000 gallons of fresh water daily) could be the centerpiece of a naval peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance force.

Yes, this will cost money. One rough estimate, outlined in the figure below (Figure 7), suggests that it will cost (very roughly) just under \$20 billion dollars—or roughly 2% of the Department of Defense budget per year for just four years. Spread over four years, the cost is a number so small in the larger scheme of things that this becomes a no-brainer. At the same time, this entire cost is immediately convertible to jobs and new work for shipyards located in many different states, while providing truly responsive protection for Embassies and Consulates everywhere.

Rough Cost Calculations	Number of Ships	Acquisition Cost (M)	Conversion Cost (M)	Total (Billions)	Years To Do
Troop/Attack Submarine	15	0	200	3.000	2
Carrier Wing Realignment	4	0	50	0.200	1
Battleship Reactivation	2	0	125	0.250	2
Whidbey Island LHD Plus Up	9	0	75	0.675	2
SPRUANCE Conversions	25	0	200	5.000	2
Additional Patrol Craft	60	125	0	7.500	4
Reduction of Mine Ships	6	0	-125	-0.750	1
MPS Civil Affairs Conversions	16	50	100	2.400	2
Hospital Ship Conversions	6	50	200	1.500	3
TOTAL COST				19.775	

Figure 7: Rough Cost Calculations for Global Littoral Navy⁸⁰

⁸⁰ DOI: 2 April 1999 With appreciation to Ron O'Rourke, Congressional Research Service, for assistance in preparing very rough estimates. Costs are without refueling of submarines. Battleship reactivation cost based on August 1995 Navy estimate to SASC of \$115-210M.

Where should we go from here? The Marine Corps (and Congress, and the Administration, and the Navy) simply must come to grips with three fundamental realities:

- 1) Unless the U.S. Navy gets serious about expeditionary operations—to include support for a complete and rapid replacement of the aging helicopter fleet, accelerated acquisition of the MV-22, reintegration of 8” and equivalent missile fires, and a shift toward the acquisition of many smaller and more agile platforms suited to a widely dispersed littoral presence, the U.S. Marine Corps might as well stand-down and focus on being a show horse. At the same time, the U.S. Navy has much to gain by establishing a fleet of ships that can render engineering, disaster relief, and related health care assistance around the world—a Seaborne Peace Corps.
- 2) Unless the Marine Corps gets serious about trade-offs between intelligence and firepower, between firepower and mobility, and between long-term human skill retention and short-term career assignments, it will not be ready for the 21st Century.
- 3) Finally, the Marine Corps needs to come to grips with its changed mission in the 21st Century. While amphibious assault must remain one of its core capabilities, amphibious assault is but a means to an end—just as maneuver warfare is a means to an end. It may be more fruitful for the Marine Corps to return to its roots as a constabulary force, with all that implies in terms of force structure, and simultaneously consider the implications of “adaptive engagement” as its new mantra.

Adaptive engagement, understood in the context of the multi-faceted threat and the strategic generalizations that we have discussed above, provides a frame of reference for making deep and decisive changes in how we train, equip, and organize the Corps. Adaptive engagement will place a premium on foreign area and language skills; on civil affairs, military police, combat and non-combat engineering, public affairs, and intelligence skills. Adaptive engagement will place a

premium on being able to “pile-on” anywhere in the world—a platoon with a Cobra overhead within 12-24 hours; a company with a couple of Harriers within 24-48 hours, a battalion landing team in full force within 72 hours, a regimental landing team within seven days, a full-up Marine Expeditionary Force within fourteen days. Adaptive engagement will also validate the need to reduce shooters and doers by ten percent so that intelligence and other forms of “engagement” can be doubled and tripled within the declining force structure.

From this, I draw the following ten specific directives for consideration by those leading the Corps into the future:

- 1) Establish a Marine Corps commitment to the pile-on concept as the means by which it will serve as the global "911" force upon which Embassies, U.S. citizens, and the U.S. government at large can rely.
- 2) Create the new Marine Corps within a larger context defined by what USTRANSCOM, USSOCOM, Airborne, and the U.S. Coast Guard can offer as complementary capabilities. *Work much more closely with these specific entities to scrutinize and contribute to “joint” aviation and C4I proposals.*
- 3) Work with the U.S. Navy to move toward a 450 ship Navy that will support the pile-on concept while also creating a very robust brown water force shared equally between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. Focus initially on company landing teams and accelerated attention to over-the-horizon fire support. Support the new patrol craft program on this basis, while also calling for the preservation of all destroyers and the refitting of 25 destroyers and 15 attack submarines.
- 4) Re-design all Marine Corps aviation assets toward a hot humid day.

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- 5) Freeze the M1A1 (consolidate these assets at I MEF), adopt a modern M-60 plus (Israeli variant) or LAV bunker killer for II MEF and III MEF, and migrate as quickly as possible toward ground systems that weigh no more than 30 tons each.
- 6) Re-align assets among the three MEFs so as to focus I MEF on heavy, II MEF on medium, and III MEF on light capabilities. Within the three MEFs, direct the creation of three urban RLTs, two desert RLTs (I/II), two jungle RLTs (II/III), and two mountain RLTs (I/III). Create aviation wings/groups corresponding to each of the four employment environments and also aligned to the heavy, medium, and light concept of operations for each MEF.
- 7) Establish a requirement for mastery of a foreign language as a pre-condition for promotion to field grade positions within two years, and to staff non-commissioned officer positions within four years. Establish foreign language competency as a fast-track qualification for warrant officer positions.
- 8) Place MC&G (Mapping, Charting & Geodesy) at the top of the Commandant's deficiency list, and encourage each Combatant Commander and each other Service to do the same.
- 9) Reduce shooters by 10% and doers by 10%, increase thinkers/talkers by a matching number of personnel. This will translate into a doubling or tripling of the intelligence, civil affairs, medical, military police, and foreign area personnel on active duty.
- 10) Restructure the Marine Corps Reserve to place emphasis on foreign area and foreign language expertise in civil affairs, intelligence, engineering, military police and public affairs. Create Reserve regiments able to field integrated foreign area support battalions (one company or platoon for each key mission area) in 90-180 day rotations.

That's your challenge, Marines. It will be easier for you, and those who follow in future generations, if you plan and program the Corps in relation to the four warrior classes and the true nature of the expeditionary environment. Now go tell it to the sailors.

This untypically long section means to suggest that today defense acquisition and logistics are largely uninformed and out of touch with reality. At a higher level, national security spending between defense, diplomacy, information, economics, and other instruments of national power, is completely out of control. Budget-share and special interests rather than the needs of the Nation are driving us deeper and deeper into both debt, and divorce from reality.

Having a sensibly-designed military is part of the solution. Ensuring that the rest of the national security construct, including border control, immigration control, visa fraud detection, pro-active diplomacy, and coherent assistance programs that foster indigenous wealth instead of propping up dictators (1 down, 44 to go), are essential. The military cannot defend America with guns alone.

What the military *can* do is foster the modern practice of IO so that the rest of the government is informed, the public is informed, and we start driving public policy with public intelligence.

Combatant Commanders can and should use IO to do future planning and red cell operations. They can and should use Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) to monitor conditions across their AOR, they can and should use OSINT to monitor performance by the non-military agencies of the U.S. Government and by foreign coalition organizations as well as non-governmental organizations; and they can and should use OSINT to lay out before both the U.S. public and the relevant foreign publics a concept of operations for multinational stabilization & reconstruction that draws on all the instruments of national power of all nations. IO is the COCOM's lever for compelling inter-agency and multi-national action.

Not Covered by This Book

This book does not cover the dramatic, exponential changes that are occurring in the information technology arena writ large, namely the changes characteristic of information about and within genetics, robotics, nano-technology, and the related fields of cognitive science and informatics.⁸¹

We agree with those that believe that advances in information technology could produce revolutionary wealth and revolutionary solutions to the problems that plague the world, including poverty, pestilence, pollution, and the vanishing of most precious resource, water.

However, we also believe that the humanities are behind the sciences, and that Henry Kissinger is correct when he says that the sources and methods of governance are not keeping pace with the scale and speed of the challenges to governance.⁸²

⁸¹ Two current treatments are those of Ray Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology* (Viking, 2005), and the more populist Joel Garreau, *Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies -- and What It Means to Be Human* (Doubleday, 2005). Others, including Kevin Kelly, Howard Rheingold, Bruce Sterling, Stewart Brand, and Tom Atlee as well as Margaret Wheatley, have differing views that place a greater reliance on humanity than on technology.

⁸² Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? : Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (Simon & Schuster, 2002). From the author's Amazon review of this book: The core point in this entire work is that both economics and technologies, including Internet and communications technologies, have so out-paced politics that the world is at risk. Globalization, terrorism, and other threats cannot be addressed with our existing international, regional, and national political constructs, and new means must

It is our view that IO, if carried out by DoD in the brilliant manner that is potentially possible, has the possibility of revolutionizing governance by revolutionizing what government can know, how it knows it, how it decides, and how it communicates both its decision and supporting information to its citizens, other publics, and other governments as well as vital non-governmental organizations.

Modern IO is the first step toward ending conflict as we know it today, across all boundaries, political-legal, socio-economic, ideological, techno-demographic, natural-geography.

Modern IO is also the first step toward creating revolutionary wealth.⁸³

See the Epilogue for a short discussion of online gaming and the potential for using gaming to make sense of information at the same time that we mobilize individuals and actualize collective intelligence through gaming based on a constant and deeply historical, multi-cultural feed of ethically acquired open source information in all languages and all mediums.

be found—new political solutions must be found—if we are to foster security and prosperity in the age of complexity, discontinuity, and fragmentation.

⁸³ Alvin & Heidi Toffler are publishing a new book in April 2006 tentatively titled *Revolutionary Wealth*. It will surely build on their quarter century of informed observation and reporting, as well as the works of others, such as Thomas Stewart's *The Wealth of Knowledge* and Barry Carter's *Infinite Wealth*, *supra* note 3.

INFORMATION CHALLENGES

The Strategic Problem

At the strategic level, and directly related to a half-century of focus on a handful of hard targets considered to be military threats, the United States of America finds itself with a military optimized for force-on-force confrontations between nation-states, and a national intelligence community optimized for stealing secrets through technical means, with an extremely narrow range of focus and almost no flexibility. The bulk of the money for intelligence is invested in technical collection rather than in Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TPED).⁸⁴ 99% of the funding is focused on secret collection rather than open source information acquisition and exploitation.

⁸⁴ This was the major finding of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Commission Report of December 1999, concluding that we have been spending tens of billions of dollars on esoteric collection systems, without a commensurate investment in information technologies for Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TPED). Even today, as the IC experiments with ICMAP, intended to be an all-source collection management tool, OSINT is not represented and the tool fails to provide for establishing whether we already know the information, whether an ally knows the information, or whether we can obtain or buy the information from the private sector.

Emerging threats and non-state actors are best understood by achieving USDI Dr. Stephen Cambone's vision of universal coverage, 24/7, in all languages, using open sources of information. At the same time, the Department of Defense lacks adequate personnel with language skills relevant to most of the complex emergencies and conflict zones where U.S. forces are engaged.⁸⁵

Much of the needed information and knowledge can be found in unclassified sources, [but] the pursuit, exploration, and exploitation of open sources have taken a back seat to learning secrets. While we in no way denigrate the importance of the latter, we ask the [Secretary of Defense] to instruct [the Defense Open Source Council] to establish a vital and active effort focused on using open sources to provide information on cultures, infrastructure, genealogy, religions, economics, politics, and the like in regions, areas, and states deemed ripe and important.

Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transitions to and from Hostilities (Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, December 2004).

DoD does not have an effective language oversight program. There is no systematic requirements determination process. There is no comprehensive and accurate database of DoD personnel with language skills. ... What we [must be] concerned with is ... anticipating tomorrow's requirements.

Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transitions to and from Hostilities (Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, December 2004).

⁸⁵ There is also talk of a need for a Muslim Force, a division-wing team heavy up with civil affairs and non-combatant humanitarian assistance capabilities in which most of the individual members are of the Muslim faith, and inherently skilled in comporting themselves in keeping with Muslim behavioral standards while carrying out their mission.

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[T]he need for exploiting open source material is greater now than ever before...since the spread of information technology is immune to many traditional clandestine methods of intelligence collection...open source materials may provide the critical and perhaps the only window into activities that threaten the United States.

Report to the President of the United States (Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2005)

The Operational Problem

At the operational level, inter-agency collaboration within the U.S. Government, federal-state-county collaboration among the three levels of homeland governance, and multi-national inter-agency collaboration within any given regional theater of operations, are severely constrained, almost to the point of complete ineffectiveness, by decades of investment in unilateral classified communication systems to which others—including elements of the federal government not traditionally engaged in national security affairs, and U.S. law enforcement at the state and local levels—cannot be granted access. The problem is exacerbated in relation to the transition to and from hostilities, where the Defense Science Board has determined that information-sharing with non-governmental organizations is absolutely essential to both campaign planning for military operations, and the execution of post-hostilities stabilization & reconstruction operations. The problems evident in our own homeland security information environment are dramatically compounded when we are seeking to access and exploit foreign information.

Today there is no single agency or computer network that integrates all [national] security information [worldwide]...instead, most of the information exists in disparate databases scattered among federal, state, and local entities. In many cases these computer systems cannot share information—either ‘horizontally’ (across the same level of government) or ‘vertically’ (between federal, state, and local governments. Databases used for law enforcement, immigration, intelligence, and public health surveillance have

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not been connected in ways that allow us to recognize information gaps or redundancies.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security (The White House, 2004)

The U.S. government cannot meet its own obligations to the American people to prevent the entry of terrorists without a major effort to collaborate with other governments. We should do more to exchange terrorist information with trusted allies...

Information-sharing for Homeland Security: A Brief Overview (CRS, 10 January 2005)

The Tactical Problem

At the tactical level, two problems persist, one from the past and one newly recognized. The continuing problem is associated with the disconnect between classified national systems that cannot see under bridges, within neighborhoods, and into hearts and minds; and the distinct but related problem of delivering useful fused intelligence to the front lines—to the those fighting to achieve objectives in the last mile. The newly recognized problem, with the proliferation of coalition allies, non-governmental organizations (NGO), private military contractors (PMC), religious organizations, and increasingly self-organized citizens groups, is that of establishing effective means of both sharing unclassified information when it makes sense to do so, and of establishing a shared view of the battlefield, be it diplomatic, informational, military, or economic.

The other tactical problem is within the homeland security environment. DoD is totally correct to focus on defense in depth, but right now the troops on the front line—our citizens and our local police, paramedics, and firefighters—are completely outside of the C4I “loop.” Although DHS has labored heroically to address this, and there are close to 30 different C4I systems reaching various state and local authorities in generally convoluted difficult to use ways, the reality is that DoD needs to suggest to the President—the only person who can make this decision—that the time has come for America to have an end-to-end C4I system that goes from schoolhouse to White House—every agency, every office, every state, every county, every university, every business, every labor union, every religious parish—needs to be able to “plug in” to a national intelligence and information-sharing architecture, with the

state intelligence centers and networks as the “hubs” for state-based information sharing. Roughly 90% of what everyone knows is not secret, so it makes sense to focus this new tactical system on unclassified commoditized elements, rather than trying to force fit an unaffordable Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) architecture into a role it simply cannot fulfill.

Two specific examples remain valid today.

When the Marines rescued the U.S. Embassy in Somalia, launching at night from over 400 nautical miles out, carrying on with the mission despite a ruptured fuel line spewing fuel all over the embarked Marines, they arrived as insurgents were coming over the wall, and found that they had no means of communicating with the U.S. Embassy.⁸⁶

More recently, when PAVE LOW delivered Special Operations forces behind the lines into Afghanistan, they had no means of communicating with the CIA teams that had linked up with the Northern Alliance to establish discreet landing zones. Only the courage of the Special Operations personnel in off-loading absent confirmation (they were also dropped at the wrong locations); the absence of hostile forces; and the ability of the Northern Alliance to find them, saved the day.⁸⁷

Those concerned with tactical inter-operability should be looking at CISCO’s IPICS as well as good enough commercial cell phones with encryption capabilities.

⁸⁶ The author recollects the details from varied sources at the time. Since then the Pentagon has rewritten history to reflect the successful accomplishment of the mission, and to ignore the hard realities that gas lines burst and the Marines still cannot communicate with Embassies in extremis and requiring Non-Combatant Evacuations (NEO).

⁸⁷ See the book review in the annotated bibliography for Schoen, Gary, *First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* (Presidio, 2005).

The Technical Problem

Available information in 33+ languages and at least twelve dialects of Arabic has exploded.⁸⁸ Not only has print media information exploded, but African, Arabian, and Asian radio and television have exploded, and are often the only mediums available to illiterate individuals comprising a breeding ground for terrorists and criminals. Our national systems—both technical and human—are unable to scale up or drill down to acquire, translate, and analyze all relevant open source information. At the same time, much of what we know is buried in electronic mail and personal hard drives that are not normally indexed for search & retrieval by any enterprise-wide system, much less a network. Tactically, there is a need for a leap ahead in both Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) technology, and in the exploitation of globally-distributed multi-media and multi-lingual information for specific localized needs.

Perhaps more the point, it is now essential to emphasize that humans can no longer be relied upon as the primary processing unit for evaluating the flood of information that we can access. We absolutely must invest draconian levels of funding—on the order of \$10 billion a year—in processing, inclusive of fully integrated global networks of man-machine foreign language translation, and machine-speed statistical and predictive analysis and anomaly detection.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ *Supra* note 9.

⁸⁹ The real challenge in global information processing comes not from satisfying human speeds of comprehension, but machine speeds of information delivery, exchange, and comprehension.

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR GLOBAL IO (M4IS)⁹⁰

Appreciating the Magnitude of the Challenge

The global information explosion and its logarithmic increase cannot be understated. On the next page (Figure 8) is an illustration of where information quantities are headed. Information doubled this past two years, so we are now looking at 100 billion gigabytes or 100 exabytes, roughly equal to 2 trillion four-door filing cabinets full of documents.⁹¹ Within this complex, multi-media and multi-lingual environment, the noise to signal ratio will get tougher, and so also will the early warning, anomaly detection, and pattern recognition challenges.

⁹⁰ Multi-national, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, multi-domain information sharing.

⁹¹ The trolleys rolled into Congress with boxes and boxes of documents associated with the hearings for the nomination of Judge Roberts to the Supreme Court could be considered by a skeptic to be a sign of the Administration's desire to make it difficult for Congress to process the information. The reality is that across the federal government, hard-copy industrial era processes that are labor-intensive still rule. Interns screen the mail to a Cabinet secretary, and more often than not information coming into an agency is lost before it ever reaches the right person.




Figure 8: The Growth of the Global Information Challenge

This is just the digital information—when one adds unpublished local or expert knowledge, locally-available hard copy or “gray literature,” historical and cultural information, and geospatial information as well as television and audio programming not available through the Internet, the magnitude of this challenge becomes apparent.

The critical ingredient in making sense of all of this information in near real-time is a scalable database architecture that is capable of real-time content-based routing, and global fast constant indexing and rapid search and retrieval across all relevant databases both public and private.

Linking Strategic Communication and Special Operations

In our view, the Information Operations (IO) mission of the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRACOM), and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) mission of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), comprise the two ends of an axis along which all other Combatant Commanders, defense agencies, U.S. federal, state, and local information operations—and especially Public Diplomacy by the Department of State, and commercial risk monitoring by the Departments of Commerce and Treasury—can plug in.” We believe that the STRATCOM investments planned for global IO, and the SOCOM investments planned for enhanced information technology applications and open source intelligence (OSINT), can and should be integrated by USDI using a commercial “virtual back office” for unclassified DoD information.⁹²

There are other major contributors, notably elements of the United Nations engaged in combat peace enforcement operations and in stabilization & reconstruction missions, and international law

⁹² A concluding recommendation suggests that there is a need for a Combatant Commander for Intelligence and Information Operations (I2O), and that if such a COCOM is created, that STRATCOM should be re-directed to focus on planning and managing Big War. A case could also be made for a new COCOM for Stabilization & Reconstruction (S&R), or this could be assigned to SOCOM or NORTHCOM, depending on the prevailing view within DoD leadership as to whether S&R is more closely related to containing terrorism or helping failed states recover from disaster in all its forms. Our own view is that NORTHCOM and the National Guard would be the best place for the S&R mission while USSOCOM focuses on GWOT and long-range covert human reconnaissance as well as coalition counter-insurgency and training.

enforcement activities focused on capturing and containing terrorists, proliferators, and arms smugglers. This strategy is consistent with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) interest in considering the maximum possible use of commercial providers for defense and homeland security open source intelligence collection and processing,⁹³

Within the U.S. Government, the search for “common solutions” by OMB could be substantially enhanced if DoD were to fully integrate experts on the U.S. Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA), the Data Reference Model (DRM), and the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) into its planning and oversight of contracts related to inter-agency collaboration and information-sharing centers.⁹⁴

If all information were pre-tagged to FEA, DRM, NIEM, and Intelink standards, perhaps by embedding the standards in CISCO AON and allowing for new meta-tags to be instantly updated all over the world the way stock prices are now, not only would this dramatically expand real-time access and sharing for all participating open source information organizations, but it would allow for the information to be instantly uploaded to and exploited within the “high side,” the classified side.

The U.S. Department of State (DoS) deserves special mention. Although historically DoS has been the primary collector, processor, translator, interpreter, and disseminator of foreign language information relevant to U.S. national security and foreign policy, over time DoS has chosen to become an end-user of intelligence, and to abdicate its role as the Nation’s primary overt collector and evaluator of foreign information.

⁹³ Code M320 was created by Mr. Sean O’Keefe, Deputy Director of OMB at the time (2000-2001), acting on the advice of Mr. Don Gessaman, former Associate Deputy Director of OMB for National Security, who was originally informed by the author.

⁹⁴ One such expert, perhaps the ideal expert to help DoD and DHS work together, is Mr. Michael C. Daconta, author and co-author of ten technical books, Chief Architect of DIA’s Virtual Knowledge Base, inventor of Fannie Mae’s Electronic Mortgage Standard, and today the DHS Metadata Program Manager with responsibility for being the lead for FEA DRM Working Group, and the co-lead for NIEM.

The author advocates a partnership between DoS and DoD in which DoD provides DoS with ten non-reimbursable positions to create an Office of Information Sharing responsible for negotiating information-sharing treaties with nations and information-sharing agreements with organizations, including NGOs, universities, and other private sector parties. We also recommend that DoS along with DHS be treated as “first among equals” as clients for the DoD IO system.⁹⁵

The U.S. Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Transportation, as well as the Department of the Interior, also require special mention. Both Bin Laden and China as well as Iran understand that 21st Century warfare centers around economic advantage, not military advantage. Both are focused—the one for destructive reasons, the other for constructive reasons—on economic networks, trade networks, financial networks, and energy networks. It is not possible to protect U.S. national security nor to nurture U.S. national competitiveness without the application of the most advanced defense information and intelligence concepts possible, to commercial, economic, treasury, transportation, and interior, agriculture, and health matters. It is all connected.

STRATCOM-SOCOM represent the first tier of connectivity. DHS and NORTHCOM, followed by the regional COCOMs, are the second tier of connectivity. The rest of the US Government is in the third ring, while coalition governments and NGOs are in the fourth ring.

⁹⁵ The new Diplomatic Security Intelligence Center, focused on global visa fraud detection and prevention, may possibly be a potential center of excellence for organizing and managing global open source support, including private investigative services, helpful to all elements of the Department of State. It could also take the lead in coordinating a private sector service of common concern in able to offer fraud detection analysis services to Diplomatic Security, the Secret Service, the U.S. Special Operations Command, and international law enforcement authorities.

Creating the Open Source Information System – External

The original Open Source Information System (OSIS) was created in 1992 when the author lost an argument within the original Open Source Council. The author, having recognized in 1988 that millions of open sources were available in all languages, and that most of them could not be imported to “the high side,” was in favor of a Center of Excellence that could provide both a continuous source of expertise on ever-changing open sources of information (best prices, best practices as well as best sources), and also be a “cut-out” for adding operational security and devising cover support plans to obtain any combination of open sources, to translate them and make sense of them, and to deliver the distilled and discriminated product back to the all-source analysts. At the time the author was focusing only on the needs of the all-source analyst, and not on the needs of the policy-makers, acquisition managers, operators, logisticians, and strategic communicators.

The author lost to a one-two punch from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and The MITRE Corporation, the latter completely enamoured with technical solutions rather than human solutions. Both persuaded the CIA managers then serving that only six open sources were needed, and that these could be imported to the high side and the matter dismissed. This may have been the single most disastrous decision in the decade leading up to 9-11, followed closely by the refusal of DCI George Tenet to consider funding global coverage in July of 1997.

OSIS as it exists today is a tribute to the management skills of those who have labored against extraordinarily deficient legal and security mind-sets. Fewer than seven countries participate in this system,

and its own managers very wisely recognize they have reached the limits of what can be done within the classified world.

Below (Figure 9) is illustrated our understanding of the four quadrants of information that every COCOM and defense agency much be able to gain access to in order to plan and carry out their mission. Huge investments have been made in the two secret quadrants, and virtually no money at all has been spent on the two unclassified quadrants.




Figure 9: Open Source Information System – External (OSIS-X)

We recommend that DoD deliberately fund OSIS-X as a commercial venture, taking care to migrate key personnel and standards from Intelink and OSIS, in order to create a universal global network that

can not only receive and make sense of all unclassified information in all languages and all mediums, but can also be paid for—in cash and in kind—by all governments, corporations, and transnational organizations that choose to participate as shown below (Figure 10).




Figure 10: OSIS-X Participants in Cash & Kind⁹⁶

We expect to sharply reduce the cost of global information to the government, in part by eliminating the need for multiple subscriptions to

⁹⁶ This slide contains unreadable material. This slide, and most slides in this book, can be found at www.oss.net/Hackers. All slides are the intellectual property of OSS.Net and subject to copyright protection. They may be used liberally provided the OSS.Net logo is not deleted or obscured and credit is given to OSS.Net for its original thinking.

expensive commercial subscription and aggregation services⁹⁷ that have been over-taken by direct source access at lower cost via the Internet; and in part by creating a global network that facilitates the harnessing of distributed global intelligence that easily can be ported to the high side of USG systems.

This network should provide for the exploitation of leap-ahead commercial technology, and new forms of security that will increase what can be shared, with whom, under appropriate dissemination controls with useful audit trails.

In our view, if DoD funds OSIS-X, then all raw information coming in to OSIS-X from all over the world—from universities and non-governmental organizations—should be available at no additional charge to DoD. Value-added processing, in contrast, would remain a fee for service endeavor, and be purchased as needed by varied clients.

It merits comment that only Google appears poised to execute this vision, because of its globally-scalable “Googleplex” that has reduced the cost of a standard computing storage rack to one third the cost of any competing provider, while optimizing search to the point that they can provide ten times the performance at half the price. When combined with their plug and play expansion model, and their elimination of back-up issues, it would appear that the only thing they are missing is the security that comes from CISCO AON, and the distributed private database services of IBM DB2.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ In general the aggregators, whose value was undeniable years ago, are no longer worth the price of their demanded “gold license.” They tend to still be largely a collection of English-language sources focused on business. Where they offer historical or cultural information this tends to be deceptive—token coverage rather than comprehensive. With foreign indigenous PhD’s costing as little as \$4 a day to \$4 a week, the cost and price and technology models of the traditional aggregators are no longer competitive. OSS is in the process of developing a migration strategy for Indian call centers to move up the chain to become all-source analysis centers.

⁹⁸ Stephen Arnold, *The Google Legacy: How Google’s Internet Search is Transforming Application Software* (Infonortics, 2005), is the definitive study of Google.

Generic Information Collaboration Center or Command

The Joint Inter-Agency Collaboration Center (JICC) initiative at SOCOM (Figure 11), should become a replicable generic capability.




Figure 11: Providing a Generic Information-Sharing Solution

Such a capability could be migrated quickly from its first implementation at SOCOM, to STRATCOM and to the Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF-I) and then to other theaters (especially NORTHCOM for the homeland security implementation), and thereafter, to each State or Commonwealth (creating generic state-wide Community Intelligence Centers),⁹⁹ and then outwards to the varied NGO agencies that have important global databases and subject-matter expertise relevant to targets of mutual interest, including failed states.¹⁰⁰

Within this construct, although the COCOMs are not inclined to focus on open source software at this time, and will continue to spend too much money for proprietary single-point solutions from beltway bandits bent on optimizing profit rather than mission accomplishment, we believe that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is on the right track with STRONG ANGEL, and this excellent initiative merits a dramatic increase in funding and field testing.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ California is in the process of adding 20 analysts and an open source information collection and exploitation capability to its statewide intelligence network. We believe that every state will benefit from the USDI initiatives.

¹⁰⁰ This recommendation is consistent with the Defense Science Board studies on *Strategic Communication* (July 2004), and on *Transitions to and from Hostilities* (December 2004). However, by deliberately funding open source software collaborative work tools that can allow NGOs and state & local authorities to join the larger DoD network, the information power of these regional centers will be considerably enhanced, while dramatically increasing what they could contribute to OSIS-X and hence to DoD in the way of bottom-up information not available to DoD from national intelligence and counterintelligence organizations.

¹⁰¹ Goggling for <DARPA STRONG ANGEL> will produce useful documentation.

Creating Regional Multi-national Centers & Networks

OSIS-X could offer free uploading to all regional COCOMs and their coalition allies so that the information can be indexed, secured, and easily harvested to the high side by USDI's chosen integrator.




Figure 12: Concept for Harnessing Coalition Information

The generic ICC should be migrated to regional multi-national information-sharing centers that could eventually become multi-national all-source intelligence and operations centers (Figure 12) where coalition military can attract unclassified information from across their respective countries, while allowing a multi-national team led by the US to process and make sense of this information for regional early warning and action purposes.

It will be important, if we are to honor NGO concerns about transparency and propriety, to keep the core regional information center “pure” and dealing only with open sources of information that can be shared with NGOs. However, the depiction on the previous page deliberately reflects a future evolution of such centers (or mirror centers at another location) into all-source collection management and processing facilities.

MIOCs, plus the UN-sponsored JMACs, plus indigenous regional early warning and information-networks, add up to a massive—a truly massive—information base able to give the JIOCs an information advantage that is not otherwise affordable, nor achievable, by the U.S. Government acting unilaterally, regardless of how much money it is willing to spend.

To gain access to global information in all languages, all the time, the U.S. must first give up its delusional belief in the exclusive value of unilateral secrecy and unilateral collection.

Global Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations

DARPA's STRONG ANGEL¹⁰² open source software appears to be relevant, in conjunction with INTER-4 Tacticomps¹⁰³ sanitised for general use, to rapidly establishing both theater-wide and tactical information-sharing and collaboration networks with shared low-cost information analytics and decision-support functionalities. What is clear is that both NGO and the DHS constituencies (state and local governments) share a common problem: lack of funding for high-end communications and computing systems. The solution is to commit to extending STRONG ANGEL to the point that it can be easily adopted by anyone as a basic desktop and/or hand-held toolkit. It should be possible for NGOs and for state & local to contribute information to the DoD system at no cost to themselves, and for them to draw relevant

¹⁰² Goggling for <DARPA STRONG ANGEL> will produce various references. A roster of key players is provided by Cdr Eric Rasmussen, USN, who is the driving force, at <http://www.baselinemag.com/article2/0,1540,1813578,00.asp>. The other key person is Mr. Dave Warner of MindTel.

¹⁰³ USSOCOM has \$2M earmarked in 2006 for hand-held tactical computers. Separately, the World Bank is funding millions of Motorola cell phones that will be given out across the Third World to energize micro-capitalism. Somewhere between these two initiatives is the next hand-held that will be the sole communications and computing device for the billions of individuals in the Third World....hence it must be inter-operable with OSIS-X. This is something that the CEO of Google, Dr. Eric Schmidt, has publicly identified as a key factor influencing his global architectural strategy, and one reason that Google is playing early and heavy in the Short Message Service (SMS) marketplace. Visit <http://www.google.com/sms> for details.

information approved for release, at no cost to themselves. Enabling this participation will substantially increase the amount of relevant unclassified information available to all DoD elements, while also enabling collaborative online work and information sharing in near real time across all mission areas. This will also enable coalition partners who are not part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and who cannot afford unilateral top secret systems, to have a viable multi-national multi-agency information sharing toolkit available to them.

This merits emphasis. The existing DoD Global Information Architecture (GIG) is both out of date and unaffordable by anyone else.¹⁰⁴ The high-end proprietary IT solutions that are not only too expensive, but also pathologically non-interoperable. Open source software and open (electromagnetic) spectrum are, along with open source information, the heart of 21st Century IO. The “wealth” of knowledge can be mined by DoD if it makes open source software a viable option.

As predicted in our restricted White Paper, and advocated in this book, IBM and Google have announced the integration of IBM DB 2 with OmniFind, and Google Enterprise. If CISCO AON is added to this mix, what it makes possible is very low-cost, globally-scalable, search and retrieval across both public and private databases, with “by name” access and dissemination control. This advance in the information ecology has enormous implications for conflict deterrence through global stabilization & reconstruction as well as indigenous wealth creation.

¹⁰⁴ Two excellent reports that illuminate the problems that persist are *DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: The Global Information Grid and Challenges Facing Its Implementation* (GAO, July 2004), and *INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: Major Federal Networks that Support Homeland Security Functions* (GAO, September 2004). In both reports, GAO makes it clear that what we have now is not working, and what we have planned is out of date.

Harnessing the Seven Tribes

Within each nation-state, the national government, the military, and the national law enforcement community represent just a fraction of the local knowledge and the direct access to varied open sources of multi-lingual and multi-media information. The other “tribes” include the business sector, the academic community, the NGOs and the local or regional media, and finally, self-organized citizen groups, labor unions, and religions (Figure 13).




Figure 13: Seven Views of Reality

It is imperative, if we are to understand and interact with the complex world we have created, that we be able to integrate and deconflict the competing views of reality that each of these tribes holds, in each region of the world. There are no absolute truths, only relative truths, and it seems clear that only those decisions that are informed by varied views, that reconcile varied views, are in fact affordable and sustainable.

Our concept of operations provides for the facilitation of web-based voluntary but also *accredited and authenticated* participation by any and all elements, generally through and with the encouragement of their governments, whose employees will be afforded anonymous access across the system.

The creation of such networks within each nation-state, and within each region, actually facilitates Strategic Communication in that the same network used to receive open source information can also be used to broadcast, in a carefully measured manner, specific messages to specific groups and even specific individuals.

It is important to stress that classified information is a fraction of the relevant information needed for Strategic Communication, Peacekeeping Intelligence, Information Peacekeeping Early Warning, or Stabilization & Reconstruction as well as Acquisition and Logistics. The vast majority of the information needed by DoD is unclassified, generally not online nor subject to deep web data mining, generally not in English, and generally not readily identifiable unless a witting willing volunteer from the owning organization “offers it up.” Roughly 80% of the information we need is unclassified, and available only from organizations that will not share that information with secret agencies. Civil affairs is the model to use. The intelligence liaison model will *not* work.

Sense-Making

The U.S. Government has some pockets of excellence in sense-making, but in general most of DoD and most of the USG is still in the industrial era of paper reports and isolated human analysts trying to “connect the dots” without adequate toolkits. DoD needs a Strategic Decision-Support Center such as has been proposed by Capt Scott Philpott, USN, one of the original architects of the USSOCOM “pit.” Such a Center must bring together in one place the following:

- OSINT Super-Searchers with global access
- Classified Super-Searchers with full access to all raw secrets
- Brainstorming network with both in-house and distributed experts
- Geospatially and time-date based visualization
- Modeling & simulation using rapid response incremental approaches
- Organic scalable gaming that can digest all available information

While the integration of virtual reality gaming and open source information feeds in all languages and all mediums is in its infancy, we expect this to explode in the next two years. BreakAway Ltd has produced what may be the first in a new class of games, “A Force More Powerful,” to teach non-violent resistance movements how to avoid the early mistakes that can lead to their being captured and killed before they become effective. We believe that Google will eventually fund this integration, and this will have a revolutionary effect on education, such that students can actually be Simon Bolivar or Hugh Chavez or Dick Cheney or Thomas Jefferson, and interact with reality at any point in time or space. This will change continuing education and corporate training, it will change the craft of intelligence, and it will make policy makers accountable to the public for due diligence in decision-making.

Putting the I Back Into DIME¹⁰⁵

DoD needs to create or contract for a global open source acquisition, analytics, and technical information-sharing environment that will increase by an order of magnitude, and then a double order of magnitude, the near-real-time multi-lingual and multi-media information that can be delivered to DoD elements in support of operational planning, acquisition and logistics management, and all-source intelligence targeting, evaluation, and integrated production.

This capability must merge global acquisition, translation, statistical analysis, analytic services including historical and cultural analysis, and tailored dissemination in near-real-time. Such a capability will dramatically reinforce DoS Public Diplomacy, DoD Strategic Communication and other missions, and be directly transferable to DHS—for example, the man-machine foreign language network can be used to reinforce all 911 Emergency Responder networks now lacking in foreign language capabilities, and to receive volunteer inputs, put in voice or analog and in digital form, often with locationally-aware context, to a new 119 number for accepting “dots” from the bottom on up.

¹⁰⁵ DIME: Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic—this is a short-hand means of describing the primary areas of inter-agency coordination when the subject is taught at the Army War College and elsewhere. While it does not list Law Enforcement or Religion or Culture or Charitable organizations, today’s military officers are extraordinarily sophisticated and well-trained, and well-aware of the variety of actors and the nuances of perception that are characteristic of modern IO and modern war. They cannot be held accountable for failures in civilian leadership, or politically-motivated decisions that fly in the face of all military experience or the truth.

The I cannot be put back into DIME from the high-side or secret side of the U.S. intelligence and information environment. It can only be restored from the unclassified side, the side that is open to both receiving information from external parties, and sharing information with those same parties. DoD, using the overt civil affairs model for liaison, rather than the secret intelligence model for bi-lateral covert liaison, is the only element of the US Government capable of putting the I back into DIME.

Google, in the private sector, may offer a solution. Google is the only truly affordable, scalable network available to all parties in all languages. Google's main problem is its lack of security and the imprecision of its search, which substitutes popularity for relevance. Both of these shortfalls are resolvable, the one by integrating CISCO Application Oriented Networking (AON) family of capabilities for secure content-based routing and global security access rules; the other by integrating IBM's Database 2 with OmniFind as an internal database standard for corporate and non-governmental access.¹⁰⁶

The day of unilateral secret systems is over. DoD has begun to recognize that 80% of the content—and 80% of the capabilities—for achieving information superiority are in the non-government or private sector. The initiatives being taken by USDI are right on target, but need to be orchestrated to achieve information superiority in all languages.

The private sector, not the government, is where the open source revolution will take place. It will have five dimensions: open source software, open source information, open (electromagnetic) spectrum, open document system, and open hypertextdocument system.

¹⁰⁶ As the book went to press, this was announced to the public by IBM and Google. We anticipate multiple CISCO developments in 2005-2007 that will completely alter the art of the possible, including both geo-coded automated information fusion in all languages, and easy integration of disparate radio communications using the new CISCO Internet Protocol Interoperability and Collaboration Systems (IPICS), in all languages and across varied security barriers that can be complemented by the security features of CISCO AON. 911 and 119 are ready for all language, all the time, operation.

REQUIREMENTS STATEMENT

Global Access to Open Sources

A major impediment to DoD and U.S. Government effectiveness in the Open Source Information (OSIF) and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) arena is the lack of a single system that can store all OSIF/OSINT funded by all elements of the U.S. Government, while simultaneously offering a means of distributed search and retrieval from across all private and public databases that are not part of the U.S. Intelligence Community (and do not desire to be).

OSIS-X will resolve this deficiency, and in adopting all relevant Intelink and OSIS meta-tagging standards, will allow for easy constant harvesting from OSIS-X back up to the high side.

USDI and the Defense Open Source Council (DOSC) are to be congratulated for a superb first-ever definition of DoD mission-oriented needs for tailored OSIF/OSINT support to the COCOMs and the various defense elements.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Although the DOSC lacks representation from policy offices, operational commanders, acquisition managers, and logisticians, it never-the-less fulfilled its simple original mandate from USDI. We expect all stake-holders to benefit from OSIS-X and to increase by a factor of 1000 what can be known by DoD via OSIS-X.

Among the helpful understandings that diverge from traditional U.S. Intelligence Community approaches to OSIF/OSINT:

- Need near-real-time processing of all open sources in all languages
- Translators need not be U.S. citizens if using cover support plans
- Includes global access to subject matter experts not U.S. citizens
- Includes commercial imagery and geospatial information
- Includes offline gray literature as well as “street talk” and sermons
- Must be shareable with NGOs and other foreign organizations

Deep web content acquisition such as is not available from commercial aggregators is a major aspect of the open source information challenge, but it is not the only source. Private databases, especially NGO databases, niche and mainstream publications, gray literature, sermons, and street talk as well as new knowledge created by subject matter experts on demand, are part of this larger global pool that must be addressed in at least 33 languages all the time, and up to 185 languages some of the time.¹⁰⁸

At this time there appear to be roughly \$1.5B over five years in open source information contracts under disparate management across the COCOMs and the various elements of DoD. It is imperative that those contracts be brought under centralized oversight so that requirements can be de-conflicted, standards established, best prices and practices understood, and—most important of all—deliverables brought together into OSIS-X and not buried within various “pits.” Ideally, such contracts will inspire matching funding for DHS, and OMB will eventually persuade the President that a national Open Source Agency, a sister agency to the Broadcasting Board of Governors, one independent

¹⁰⁸ The imminent possibility of live video and audio streaming from cell phones all over the world to 119 numbers, suggests that Google, not the National Security Agency (NSA), will be the primary processing power—the Googleplex is less expensive, more scalable, and more responsive than NSA. What Google lacks in security and precision recall is more easily corrected by CISCO, Vivissimo, and Silobreaker, than what NSA lacks in modern semantics and synthetic information production capabilities.

of all Cabinet departments, is the best way to address national needs for both unclassified and sensitive information sharing as well as nurturing advances in the other open arenas: software, spectrum, and documents.

It merits comment that access to open sources is not achieved solely through physical contact or cash payment. Sharing begets sharing. The Silicon Valley Hackers Conference discussed this in the 1990's,¹⁰⁹ concluding that for every piece of useful information that one posts on the Internet, 100 unsolicited pieces of related information come back, of which 10 are unique and useful. That is a 10:1 return on the sharing investment. OSIS-X will not only make sense of all that we can know, and prevent dots from being dropped in the future, but it will create an information ecology, an environment in which information attracts more and more information, makes more and more sense, and ultimately changes the American way of war, the American way of commerce, and the American way of life.

The beltway bandits do not have the global access to individual offline sources that the U.S. Government and all legitimate governments, require. As we have tried to document throughout this book, only a global endeavor, one that unites governments with non-governmental organizations, universities, corporations, and civil societies, will offer the possibility of successful global coverage and understanding.

Thus revitalized, and our morality restored, we can go on to save the world with IO in every clime and place.

¹⁰⁹ The author is an elected member, and was present for this discussion. The author's presentation to the 2005 Hackers Conference, an elite Silicon Valley group, on 13 Nov 05 in Santa Cruz, California, can be found at www.oss.net/Hackers.

Geospatial Tagging & Visualization

In 1988, at a meeting of the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) taking place at USSOCOM, the Marine Corps representative (the author) stressed the need for geospatial tagging of all data collected by all disciplines, pointing out that automated all-source fusion would not be possible until this became a pervasive practice. In 1992, at a meeting of the Council of Defense Intelligence Producers (CDIP) taking place at Offutt AFB, the Marine Corps representative (Col Bruce Brunn, then Director of the Marine Corps Intelligence Center) said, “I don’t care how much order of battle data you give me, if I cannot plot it on a map it is useless to me.”¹¹⁰ Being Marines, both were referring to 1:50,000 combat charts with contour lines, the only acceptable resolution when you are an infantry commander trying to survive in defilade, or kill other people who are themselves using defilade to avoid artillery and direct fire.

Today, seventeen years after Col Mike Pheneger, then J-2 of SOCOM,¹¹¹ and the author, made this an issue, we still do not have 1:50,000 combat charts for most of the Third World where stabilization & reconstruction operations will take place, and where UN forces are engaged in combat operations across sixteen complex emergencies.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ As recorded in Robert David Steele, *ON INTELLIGENCE: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World* (AFCEA, 2000), page 36. The GDIP account is based on personal recollection. Mr. Marty Hurowitz and Mr. Keith Hall were parties to the conversation.

¹¹¹ Col Pheneger received a Golden Candle Award in 1995.

¹¹² An excellent world map depicting the current sixteen missions, and the manpower involved (over 60,000 personnel) is at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>.

There is good news. The National Geospatial Agency (NGA) has evolved toward a digital geospatial architecture, and Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) is available at 10, 3, and 1 meter resolution, some Swiss-cheese data gaps notwithstanding. It is now possible, if all data inherits geospatial tagging upon being entered into the system of systems, to move toward automated geospatial depictions of data from multiple sources in multiple languages. At the same time, the commercial geospatial industry has matured, and it is now possible to mirror NGA capabilities in the private sector.

There is more good news. Google Earth and Google Maps, and new third party “push pin” programs, are accelerating the integration of traditional list or database information, with geospatial information.

We need three initiatives:

First, we must demand geospatial tagging from all disciplines including Human Intelligence (HUMINT). This will be aided by the emergence of locationally-aware devices, but needs flag-level attention now.¹¹³

Second, we must fund commercial production of 1:50,000 combat charts for the UN combat missions that will eventually require the introduction of US forces engaged in stabilization & reconstruction activities.

Third, we must fund the Open Source Agency (OSA) and use it to accelerate the evolution of Google, or post-Google networks if Google fails to adapt to fee-for-paragraph needs. China, India, and Venezuela are all ready to fund post-Google is Google will not rise to the challenge.

¹¹³ The National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) has been experimenting with XML-Geo. There are undoubtedly other standards under consideration. Establishing a geospatial tagging standard must be a high priority if we are to reap the benefits in 2006 and beyond.

On the next two pages are two illustrations (Figures 14 & 15) of alternative and geospatially-based visualizations.¹¹⁴




Figure 14: Alternative Visualization Options

There are numerous open source as well as proprietary visualization tools that can be applied. Below is one depiction from one promising DARPA-funded source. There are others. We specifically avoid favoring any one visualization system—it is the underlying data processing, including the CISCO AONS and the geospatially-compliant data meta-tagging that Team L-3 provides, which makes customized visualization possible for a wide variety of needs across the full spectrum of end-users.

¹¹⁴ The first is from IcoSystem, a pioneer in visualization, the second from Dr. Dave Warner of MindTel, a pioneer in creating TIDES and other means of predictive analysis.

Shareable situational awareness enables successful operations of distributed force networks and their coalition partners. On request we can describe in more detail the conceptual, experimental and operational basis for developing and deploying a visual representation tool to enhance methods of generating and sharing situational awareness information in ongoing operations.




Figure 15: Operationally-Oriented Situational Awareness

Experience from Operational Intelligence (OPINT) based experimentation during recent deployments to Afghanistan, Indonesia and Iraq has highlighted the profound need for shareable situational awareness tools and visual representation methods to enable rapid sharing of complex critical data in a timely manner with multiple coalition partners. These capabilities are needed to support the complex

modern missions of distributed networked forces and their coalition partners in austere environments with complex rules of engagement.

These kinds of depictions, and the ability of varied parties to share near-real-time “looks” at trends, patterns, and emerging event sequences, will all be facilitated by embedding geospatial tagging attributes into all hand-held and other collection and reporting devices.

Modeling and Simulation Visualization¹¹⁵

OSINT will collect vast amounts of data that can be leveraged in a variety of ways: data mining, visualization, interpretation, etc. One important source of competitive advantage is threat and environmental modeling and simulation.

We do not believe that gigantic models of the universe that take years and millions of dollars to develop can provide any value. We believe, instead, that a Rapid Modeling and Simulation Response (RMSR) approach can both leverage continuous data feeds and provide either predictive power or scenario awareness. In RMSR, a model is built in a matter of hours around a particular scenario or hypothesis elicited by the data. The model is as simple as possible but no simpler, a basic principle of science that is almost always forgotten by modelers of geopolitical scenarios, terrorist networks and other forms of asymmetric threats. *This is a radical departure from the classical DoD contractor approach, which consists of developing huge models over many years and that are then usually swept under the rug for their lack of predictive power.*

While it is impossible to predict the future with certainty, small but carefully designed and rapidly developed models can predict a range of possible outcomes or the likelihood that the hypothesis being tested is true. Such models have the potential to amplify weak signals which otherwise would be lost in an ocean of noisy, incomplete and sometimes

¹¹⁵ This short section is provided courtesy of IcoSystem.

fraudulent data. RMSR has been developed over the last 8 years on consumer behavior for commercial clients, and tested in a joint OSD-CIA project dealing with political instability in Central Asia.

RMSR relies on a simple but powerful modeling technique called agent-based modeling,¹¹⁶ which consists of modeling the constituent units of a system from the bottom up. For example, if one is modeling a terrorist network, the agents in an agent-based model would be the terrorists. As can be seen, modeling a system in such a way is natural and facilitates the integration of data. Also, because the behavior of the system is described from the bottom up, agent-based modeling can capture emergent phenomena. But while agent-based modeling gives us the opportunity to capture emergent phenomena from the bottom up, one of the main issues of most models of asymmetric threats at this point is their reliance on too many parameters and variables for reasonable quantitative validation and calibration to be possible. As a result, most models are usable only as vague learning tools that sometimes generate insight but cannot be leveraged to explore and design policies.

The RMSR approach consists of building models that are as simple as possible. Although this approach cannot describe behavior at the finest level of detail, we believe that its power lies in its ability to create predictive models. Once a predictive model is available, it then becomes possible to design policies, at a level of description consistent with the model's, using advanced search techniques to explore policy space and the model as a testing ground to evaluate each policy.

The RMSR methodology is comprised of a sequence of steps:

- Define the question the model is addressing.

¹¹⁶ The worlds of modeling & simulation and of computer gaming are rapidly coming together. Cf. Bruce Damer, *AVATARS: Exploring and Building Virtual Worlds on the Internet* (Peachpit, 1998).

- Define the model output (a real-world observable for which data can be obtained via OSINT).
- Identify levers (a general notion of what model parameters are under our control) and their building blocks (a lever can have multiple dimensions, for example US support of a foreign government can take many forms).
- Build a “structurally correct” model with the following characteristics: simple, high-level, involves few parameters, connects the internal workings of the model to the selected output.
- Perform analysis and exploration of model.
 - Calibrate the model manually, looking for qualitative agreement with collected data and information.
 - Perform sensitivity analysis to determine regions of parameter space where small changes have nonlinear, disproportionate effects on observables.
 - Design and test surrogate variables that can be measured to provide insight into the values of parameters whose values cannot be directly observed (because they’re hidden, or subjective, or too expensive to obtain).
- Design and test policies.
- Move on to next model.

This last item is somewhat provocative but illustrates an important point: in RMSR, a model is designed and developed to address a specific issue with a specific data feed to rapidly detect emerging threats.

Once the issue has been addressed by the model, the model is added to a library of models for potential reuse later, but it should NOT be expanded, and expanded, and expanded beyond its limits of validity. The process of building the model and exploiting it should take no more than a few hours. The figure below (Figure 16) outlines the process.

It merits comment that we anticipate such mini-models being readily available to individuals within five years. Purchases will be based less on the immediate need for an item, and more on the long-term consequences of the purchase, with neighborhoods and communities choosing to band together into “decision collectives.”




Figure 16: Rapid Modeling and Simulation Response

This approach has application to policy development, acquisition decision-making, logistics decision-making, intelligence collection management, and strategic communication. Any problem that has observable variables (including visual and text messages that are reactions to observable variables) is capable of being modeled, reactions simulated, and adjustments proposed.

See the Epilogue for our brief discussion of online gaming as an alternative implantation of RMSR.
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Man-Machine Foreign Language Translation Network

Machine translation, despite decades of effort, is in its infancy. While CYBERTRANS and SYSTRAN are useful in a limited manner, they are by no means adequate to the task of comprehensive near-real-time translation, nor even to the task of nuanced selection of materials for closer examination by humans. They are, with Babylon Enterprise, helpful in providing “good enough” title and text translation for a human eye to evaluate possible utility, and they are also helpful in translating searches from English into foreign languages to search for relevant documents across varied systems (e.g. SAP, Oracle, Siebel).

Online dictionaries, despite claims made by many promoters of these tools, are also in their infancy. Dramatic improvements are expected soon, but not through the beltway bandits. We have found that indigenous personnel can create really excellent online dictionaries at a fraction of the price demanded by beltway bandits, and with the advantage of having nuanced terms and tailored specialty dictionaries included as a routine part of the development.

Where major gains can be made in the near-term is in the exploitation of distributed human subject-matter experts with native-level fluency. We must break out of the straight-jacket mind-set that says that only U.S. citizens with clearances can be used to do translations for national security or intelligence purposes. When most of what is being translated is unclassified, and cover support plans as well as global

piece-meal web-based translation assignments are the norm, it makes sense to think in terms of translators in this specific order of utilization:

- Foreign indigenous personnel under cover support plans
- U.S.-based native-fluency personnel under cover support plans
- U.S. citizens with near-native fluency living overseas
- U.S. citizens with clearances including reservists working from home
- U.S. citizens with clearances on site

Open sources without near-real-time evaluation, gisting, extraction, or translations are of marginal value. There are four distinct time-cost paradigms in the foreign language arena, and our current practices do not manage the four adequately. We must avoid the temptation to demand the translation of everything. Translations are a complement to pattern and predictive analysis in the original language, and gisting by experts with native-level fluency. We must focus on the wheat, not the chaff.

Analytic & Decision-Support Services

In evaluating those who offer “analytic” services, always ask them to present their models for analysis. More often than not, they will not have any, but will instead be relying on “bodies by the hour” doing cut and past extraction and database stuffing. That is not analysis.

Key personnel being proposed as analysts must demonstrate, apart from the required educational and experience credentials, an ability to break down a problem, create and test hypotheses, construct a research argument or finding, and itemize essential elements of information that are missing and that could, if found, help resolve uncertainty.

There is no substitute for subject-matter experts (SME). However, the current practice is biased in favor of SMEs who are captive within vendor organizations, and consequently just one layer removed from the bureaucratic mind-sets they are supporting. There is also a bias toward SMEs that are US Citizens and have clearances. This is not the most effective means of understanding the real world. Instead, we must strike a balance in our outreach and integration by embracing:

- World-Class experts regardless of nationality hired one day at a time
- World-Class experts that are U.S. citizens without clearances
- Retired U.S. government and private sector specialists
- Dedicated full-time analysts at the journeyman level

If a vendor cannot readily identify the top 25 experts in the world on any topic, they are not ready to provide world-class support.

Statistical analysis and pattern or predictive analysis and trend detection are very important aspects of modern IO now that the center of gravity has shifted toward content analysis. The government should be very cautious in evaluating claimed capabilities where there is a heavy reliance on statistics packages or pre-packaged software. If the individuals engaged in the work do not have a very heavy mathematical background (multivariate analysis/data mining), then they are just blind users of software they do not understand, the equivalent of a student using a crescent wrench without the slightest idea of the physics underlying mechanics.

One common mistake within IO is to substitute quantity for quality, and analyze chatter in relation to volume, with no real opportunity for delving into the content.

The best pattern and predictive analysis is done against unstructured multi-media data, in the original languages, with a global network of SMEs able to detect and highlight nuances in the context of the patterns found by automated analysis. Such capabilities are not linear in nature—they detect anomalous clusters, and they also flag vacuums—missing information that would normally be present.

In addition, each vendor should be asked to specify their approach to global information collection, across all countries and languages, and be asked to specify the capabilities that their analysts can use to make sense of information in all mediums and all languages. On the next page is a depiction of where we see Google and CISCO AON going, in effect eliminating middleware and making possible extraordinary analytic support to hand-held and lap-top devices anywhere.

Below (Figure 17) are two depictions of standard automated capabilities provided by Silobreaker.




Figure 17: Standard Low-Cost Analytics Online

Open Source Software Collaborative Analytic Toolkits

Multiple governments, including the Brazil, China, Germany, Israel, Norway, and the United Kingdom, are moving toward open source software instead of proprietary software such as is offered by Microsoft, for three reasons:

first, because they feel that they cannot impose on their citizens a requirement to buy proprietary software in order to read government documents;

second, because proprietary software is unaffordable at local levels trying to catch up to the national level's embrace of modern information technology; and

third, because proprietary software, and Microsoft in particular, is notoriously insecure.¹¹⁷

Open source software, while its maintenance is not free, offers a lower total cost of ownership than proprietary software. DARPA STRONG ANGEL is on the right track. Both DHS and its state and local constituencies, and the NGOs, merit DoD support in this area.

¹¹⁷ Apart from its relative lack of concern about security, with constant patches being the norm (as opposed to Macintosh, or Linux), Microsoft now brags that most of its code is being written in China and India, both of whom have every opportunity to plant back doors and Trojan Horses into software being delivered to Microsoft for mass marketing.

We use SILOBREAKER (illustrated in Figure 17) to obtain an unmatched combination of web-based access to tens of thousands of sources around the world, and the Elucidon suite of tools. The larger American and European information industry players—the ones created in the aftermath of World War II and in the heyday of mainframe computers that still dominate many of their operations, will be completely overshadowed—and many driven to bankruptcy—by the new secure Internet, OSIS-X, and SILOBREAKER-like capabilities that are now being commoditized.¹¹⁸

As this book was going to press, IBM and Google announced to the public their agreement to implement one of the stated objectives of this book, namely the integration of IBM DB 2 with OmniFind and Google Enterprise. The missing link is CISCO's Application Oriented Network (AON), which can resolve the insecurities present within Google Enterprise, and enable all other database types and all other middleware applications to become available to users of open source software toolkits.

Once Google and CISCO come together, we believe the analytic tools depicted on the next page (Figure 18) will become routinely available from any device connected to the network, including hand-held cellular telephones that are the full equivalent of a tactical computer.

¹¹⁸ This capability can be examined at www.silobreaker.com. It is the heart of the OSS.Net system for producing multi-lingual OSINT, when combined with our global networks of low-cost by highly-skilled human collectors, translators, and subject matter experts (SME), all securely connected via the Internet and cell phones including encrypted cell phones (<http://www.cryptophone.de/support/downloads/CP200.pdf>).




Figure 18: Emerging Middleware Capabilities on the Net

Tactical Hand-Held Devices

In the Third World, it will be the cell phone, not the personal computer, which drives micro-capitalism, informed democracy, and localized access to the global grid. The World Bank is to be complemented for its initiative in demanding and then funding, when Motorola qualified to meet World Bank demands, millions of cell phones to be distributed in the Third World at a cost of under \$30 each. It is important to note that in areas where individuals are surviving on \$2 a day, this cost, while trivial to us, is as great an investment as the average American might make in their personal automobile.

The Tacticomps commissioned by USSOCOM, hand-held computing devices, are at the other end of the spectrum. Between them are commercial specialized hand-helds that include locational awareness, cameras, and the ability to use a simple template to report ground truth information upwards, and to pull down tailored information whose relevance is enhanced by the locational awareness of the device (“show me car rental agencies within a mile of my location” or “show me a 1:50,000 depiction of the other side of that hill, 500 meters away”).¹¹⁹

Within complex emergencies in particular, where U.S. forces will be heavily interactive with NGOs as well as coalition law enforcement and others, it is the tactical hand-held device that will bear the greatest burden in IO. Such devices, in addition to being locationally aware,

¹¹⁹ Google has devised a superior approach to hand-held web queries by utilizing the Short Message Service (SMS) feature of the cellular telephone, instead of the more expensive and convoluted web search feature. Simply enter the zip code and the query (e.g. Chinese restaurant) and it sends back a ranked list of relevant hits. For more information go to <http://www.google.com/sms/>.

must also be aware of who else is in their area, by classification (NGO, USG, etc.) and will, by virtue of this knowledge when combined with localized content-based routing, be able to exchange “dots” locally without having to suffer the long reach-back and delayed processing characteristic of today’s stovepipes.

In addition, CISCO’s new Internet Protocol Inter-Operability Collaboration System (IPICS), which solves the radio non-interoperability problem among varied emergency responders stuck with legacy systems not designed to work with other systems from other vendors, could be a major new solution. By translating all disparate radio communications into digital packets that can then be routed via CISCO’s Application Oriented Network (AON), CISCO has in one magnificent leap forward relegated much of the DoD GIG to the tarpit of history. When combined with IBM’s recent integration of DB2 with OmniFind and Google Enterprise, the possibility of a Marine with a hand-held device having instant reliable precision access to exactly the right dots, regardless of where entered or how spoken, becomes a probability, not a possibility.

We specifically anticipate, because of what CISCO AON now offers, localized self-actualizing information sharing networks at multiple levels of discretionary commercial security, easily satisfactory for Corporate Proprietary & Confidential as well as U.S. Government, U.S. Law Enforcement, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and United Nations (UN) SECRET intelligence sharing. Such self-actualizing systems will also implement new security protocols that dispense with the Stone Age “absolutes” and apply “just enough, just in time,” speed-based security as has long been advocated by Winn Schwartau.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Cf. <http://infosecuritymag.techtarget.com/articles/1999/schwartau.shtml> for a current example of his thinking. Winn Schwartau was a pioneer of information warfare in the 1990’s, and his book *TERMINAL COMPROMISE* remains a classic, as are his varied other books on IW and cyber-war.

Precision Strategic Communication

Novices do broadcast press releases. Journeymen do specialized broadcast lists. The real masters know how to reach key communicators in any domain, any country, “by name.” *Individualized messages*, informed by values-based biographies and sophisticated social network analysis.¹²¹

¹²¹ The author begs forgiveness for the brevity of this section. We have been cheated so many times by larger organizations willing to steal our intellectual property without proper compensation that our natural inclination to share has been tempered by some restraint. We were over seven years ahead of others in our overt human expert network building through the use of citation analysis, in our development of tribal orders of battle and provincial interest-influence networks, and in our ability to access very low-cost human translators able to provide real-time translations over the Internet, 24/7, in all languages and dialects. Now we are about ten years ahead of the crowd with respect to “by name” Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy. Our partner has spent years devising specified lists of influentials across varied domains, and we are helping them extend their work into every country of interest to the U.S. Government. By definition, we only support overt legal ethical message delivery, and we do not support any form of individual spotting, assessment, development, and recruitment for clandestine purposes.

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

IO And The Fate Of The Nation

The fate of the Nation rests on IO and how we execute the IO mission in the next several years.

There are three parts to that mission: Strategic Communication (the message), OSINT (the reality), and JIOCs (the technology).

On the next page we illustrate (Figure 19) our vision for how a commercial implementation, funded and overseen by DoD, could impact on the information health of our Republic. Naturally this vision can be implemented by any Nation independent of the US, and by any organization with a globally distributed interest. It is the author's view that regardless of what the U.S. Government does or does not do to foster regional information-sharing, that the emergence of regional information power blocs is inevitable, and it is going to happen fast. It will be based on Google and the post-Internet as enabled by IBM and CISCO, and it will fully integrate man-machine foreign language

translation on the fly, as well as advanced analytics, mini-models, gaming, and cell phone collection, production, and decision-support.




Figure 19: Creating the World Brain for US Benefit

Each of the above layers is both achievable in the near-term, and of inestimable value in revitalizing national education, research & development, and intelligence. Below and on the next two pages we describe each very briefly. If Google owners and their managers can be engaged, it will happen faster than Google plans already, and much much faster than the crippled U.S. Intelligence Community might imagine, much less implement.

OSIS-X. The commercial implementation of OSIS discards the legal and security legacy mind-sets and moves directly to commercial level openness combined with commercial-level security. By migrating the “look and feel” of OSIS and Intelink to the commercial sector, and by adopting the excellent meta-tagging philosophy of both Intelink and the federal data management and national information exchange models, OSIS-X provides all federal agencies and all state & local authorities with an open but secure “leap ahead” approach to information-sharing.

GPS RFID-X. The government has been slow to adopt both Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and mandatory geospatial tagging such as XML-Geo. This next level up will provide incentives for data that is properly tagged with geospatial as well as time and date information, and will enable “Green Lane” speed of processing for compliant sectors (e.g. cargo ships with containers so equipped).¹²²

S&T Revitalization. The Defense Technical Information Service (DTIC) does information monitoring in support of defense Science & Technology (S&T), but its access to foreign language information, where most of the real innovation is occurring, is virtually non-existent. USDI’s initiative, when implemented commercially, will open the floodgates of access to foreign S&T, and will lead to a resurgence of Nobel Prizes across the U.S. S&T community.

Global Scope. A Director of Global Information (DGI), perhaps sitting on top of a government-sanctioned skunk works or an

¹²² The paranoia of the intelligentsia about RFID is very well articulated in Katherine Albrecht and Liz McIntyre’s *SPYCHIPS: How major corporations and government plan to track your every move with RFID* (Nelson Current, 2005). It is very important that we respect the peoples’ concerns about privacy. RFID has enormous potential for good, but it could be “shut down” if a balance is not found between reasonable logistical and other needs, and a fear of having everything you own broadcasting your preferences, location, interests, and so on. The individual’s expectation of privacy and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure must be migrated to the RFID arena.

international non-profit consortium sponsored by the United Nations,¹²³ and orchestrating a multi-national Global Intelligence Council (GIC) and a multi-national Global Strategy Council (GSC), will take American understanding, and American influence, to a new level of play.

Intelink-X. Multilateral classified information-sharing—this is unavoidable. If governments do not lead in this direction, they will be displaced by private sector and non-profit organizations that leverage “good enough” commercial security to achieve massive information advantages supportive of tax avoidance, cost reduction, profit enhancement, and market penetration. Nothing about this book should be taken to mean that secure, sensitive, and restricted sharing is of no value. On the contrary, in a world where all open sources can be leveraged to mutual advantage, secrets can become even more precious. In the war against organized crime and wide-spread corruption, the sharing of sensitive information, and the tracking of who knew what when for the purpose of shutting down leaks and penetrations, will be vital. Be certain of this: drug cartels and organized crime are ahead of us here, and will remain ahead unless we commercialize government intelligence practices to the fullest extent possible.¹²⁴

¹²³ This is not the Federally-Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) envisioned by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and his staff. Any FFRDC that is beholden to and subordinate to the legal and security and mind-set biases of the U.S. Intelligence Community is “dead on arrival” (DOA). Instead, this is envisioned as similar to the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC), a unique private partnership created to help the United States preserve its edge in computer technology and led for a time by Admiral Bobby Inman, USN (Ret.). With an anti-trust waiver from the Department of Commerce, this skunk works would focus on creating public intelligence sources, softwares, and services that elevate the utility of all information to all citizens all the time.

¹²⁴ This does not mean abandoning secret intelligence, simply reducing it to \$20 billion a year. The rest of the money, reduced by 20% per year for five years running, and redirected to TPED (tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination), OSINT, and global multilingual information-sharing networks, will be the real revolution in intelligence affairs. Everything else is bureaucratic sloth enabling beltway bandit carpet-bagging. It certainly does *not* mean out-sourcing \$70 billion to second-string flakes in the private sector that have no idea what they are doing in global OSINT.

In an era when information converted into intelligence and knowledge is a substitute for wealth, violence, energy, water, and everything else, only the the United States of America has the power to execute this practical vision. DoD is the catalyst for its achievement.¹²⁵

The 21st Century, unlike the 20th Century, demands a sophisticated and constant application of all the sources of national power. It is no longer sufficient to have the strongest largest military, or the strongest largest economy. Indeed, under the pressures of the twin deficits and the Global War on Terror (GWOT), there are those who say that America is “running on empty,”¹²⁶ and at risk of a strategic collapse.

Modern IO is the seed crystal for a total transformation of the American way of war, a new American way that practices information peacekeeping, and reflects a new commitment by America to stabilize the world intelligently rather than violently. It is a holistic mission that must be accomplished by the J-3 using a civil affairs mind-set, with the J-2 limited to internal validation and support. There are not enough guns on the planet to force our will upon others or to protect our quality of life for future generations.¹²⁷ IO is the new way of war, of peace, and the new way to create indigenous wealth and foster democracy.

¹²⁵ If the U.S. Government does not openly, ethically, legally, and aggressively support Google as a pioneer, with no back-door baloney, then we expect an information arms race to develop, with the result that the US will lose the IO war and teen-agers all over the world will be raised to hate the U.S. We have one chance to get this right. It demands the rapid free exportation of Google capabilities via cell phone and residual free DoD satellite capability.

¹²⁶ Peter G. Peterson, *Running on Empty : How the Democratic and Republican Parties Are Bankrupting Our Future and What Americans Can Do About It* (Picador, 2005). The author is remarkable for being President of the Council on Foreign Relations, and therefore very much an “establishment” elite personality.

¹²⁷ Cf. Jonathan Schell, *The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People* (Metropolitan, 2003).

The USDI strategy of integrating Strategic Communication (the message), OSINT (the reality) and JIOCs (the technology), is nothing short of brilliant and transformative. This strategy must be understood by all concerned, and it must be managed as a whole, not as isolated financial hand-outs with limited localized mission-oriented contributions. While Strategic Communication is the mission to be supported, OSINT must come first. Without global OSINT, 24/7, down to the neighborhood, village, tribal, and provincial levels, we will not be able to do the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) necessary to deliver effective messages “by name,” nor to act intelligently, using all the instruments of national power, in every clime and place.

We cannot do this alone. We can fund the architecture, and we can offer other legitimate governments and organizations an opportunity to participate, but we must do so with a willingness to listen to what we hear, and a willingness to change our behavior where it makes sense to do so in keeping with our objective of stabilizing and reconstructing the world. Seven generations from today, what will we have wrought?

Recommendations

While oriented toward the United States of America, which has the funding flexibility to actually implement these ideas, the author is totally committed to the proposition that U.S. dollars alone are insufficient—that the U.S. must engage with its multi-national and multi-agency partners, to include many whom the U.S. does not necessarily favor—if we are to actually gain direct access to all information, in all languages, all the time.

We are at a point where we have only one reasonable choice: to collaborate with all legitimate governments and organizations in the creation of a World Brain. Anything less betrays the American public.

- **Executive.** The creation of a National Information Council (NIC), co-equal to the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Economic Council (NEC), is necessary if the White House is to both harness the distributed intelligence of the Nation and the World, and also achieve its objectives in public diplomacy, strategic communication, inter-agency information sharing and collaboration, the renaissance in public education, and the resurrection of national research. One priority should be the orchestration of information technology and informatics initiatives from the various elements of the government (e.g. the National Science and Space Administration and the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency) so as to accelerate the application of information advances to conflict prevention and resolution, and to the creation of wealth.

- **Congress.** Intelligence and information-sharing are inherent critical aspects of all government operations. Each Congressional committee should create a Sub-Committee on Intelligence and Information Operations (I2O). The chair and ranking minority member of each of these sub-committees, or their designated representatives, should in turn comprise a new Special Committee on I2O that has oversight over the national Open Source Agency, information operations across all federal agencies, and a special relationship with the respective Intelligence Committee, which shall continue to focus on classified sources & methods.
- **White House.** Expand the extraordinary Earth Science information-sharing initiative to include the sharing of information about disease, crime, poverty, and other non-traditional threats to our national security and prosperity.
- **Director of National Intelligence.** Establish the Open Source Agency (OSA) as recommended by the 9-11 Commission, but free it from U.S. Intelligence Community affiliation or direct oversight. Instead, follow the expert recommendation that it be a sister agency to the Broadcasting Board of Governors under Department of State auspices. Endorse DoD funding of the Open Source Information System – External (OSIS-X) as a commercial venture open to all legitimate governments, non-governmental organizations, and private sector corporations, universities, and groups.
- **Department of State.** Establish an Office for Information-Sharing Treaties and Agreements. This small office of perhaps ten individuals, led by accredited diplomats, would negotiate information sharing treaties with nations, and information sharing agreements with

organizations, with the immediate objective of extending data and information standards to all participants. Integrate all Embassies into OSIS-X, and sponsor the rapid integration of any and all U.S. Citizens resident overseas who wish to participate in local information-sharing networks. Revive the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and make it the focal point for information sharing in every country of the world.

- **Department of Defense**
- Fund the Open Source Agency (OSA) and the Open Source Information System – External (OSIS-X)
- Rapidly establish JIOCs within each Combatant Command (COCOM) as well as a DoD JIOC, while standing up a new Combatant Commander for I2O, and assigning Stabilization & Reconstruction to USNORTHCOM, which should assume OPCON over the National Guard and begin the process of redirecting the Guard toward a true Home Guard role in which they have specialized units for medical, fire, police, and disaster-relief engineering that are equally suitable for homeland security duties as well as support to global stabilization & reconstruction operations.
- Integrate the Strategic Decision Support Center envisioned by Capt Scott Philpott, USN, into COCOM I2O. Redirect the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) toward the oversight and orchestration of Big War. COCOM I2O should have oversight of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Technical Information Service (DTIC), and the varied Departmental-level intelligence organizations as well as authority over the JIOCs at each COCOM similar to that

retained by the Services over ground, sea, and air components. Deliberately attend to the I2O needs of policy, acquisitions, logistics, and operations with OSINT as the source of first resort (always copied simultaneously to the relevant all-source intelligence provider).

- Direct DARPA to establish a Stabilization & Reconstruction Directorate charged with developing advanced solutions for conflict prevention and resolution, and the creation of indigenous stabilizing wealth.
- **General Services Administration (Office of Intergovernmental Solutions).** Sponsor a summit and an on-going Wiki web site on the four “opens” that will energize information sharing in the future: a. Open Source Software; b. Open Source Information; c. Open (Electromagnetic) Spectrum; d. Open Hyperdocument System (OHS).¹²⁸
- **Department of Commerce.** Issue an anti-trust waiver for a private sector OSINT skunkworks that will fully integrate and test all available open sources, softwares, and services. This will do for IO/OSINT what the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) initiative sought to do for artificial intelligence under Admiral Inman. This skunkworks will accelerate the development of open common standards for information sharing that will be truly world-wide, with the added advantage of developing commercial alternatives for the sharing of secret information across

¹²⁸ As devised by Doug Englebart, inventor of the mouse and director of the Bootstrap Institute. This new invention makes possible both the tagging and linking of all information at the paragraph level, which in turn enables micro-cash payments for copyrighted information at the paragraph level.

national, cultural, and government to non-government boundaries on a by-name, by-paragraph basis.

- **Department of Justice.** Submit to Congress legislation for passage that shall mandate the open disclosure and stability of Application Program Interfaces (API) within all software purchased by the government and offered for sale within the United States of America. API are the equivalent in cyberspace of a common railway gauge such as was required to make national rail a reality. Demand that all software have transparent stable API by 2008, or be banned from the Federal marketplace. This is the only way to achieve our full IO potential.¹²⁹
- **Open Source Agency.** Execute the 100-day start-up plan that has already been drafted and is easily achievable by drawing on the OSINT pioneers across the U.S. Army and within other services to include:
 - 1) IO/OSINT training program, residence, mobile, and distant learning
 - 2) IO/OSINT help desk, 24/7, multi-lingual
 - 3) IO/OSINT global translation web in all languages, support 911 calls and receive 119 inputs
 - 4) IO/OSINT historical and cultural “Manhattan Project,” starting with China and Iran

¹²⁹ When combined with what Google and CISCO are bringing to the marketplace, and expanding utilization of open source software, this will have the happy result of burying both Microsoft and ORACLE as well as price-gouging information intermediaries.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS: All Information, All Languages, All the Time

- 5) OSIS-X with DoD first, then NATO, then each COCOM's coalition partners
- 6) OSIS-X free access to all NGOs and academic institutions
- 7) Create a living directory of top 100 experts on each country and topic.
- 8) Create Texas Early Warning Center
- 9) Create New York Corporate Warning Network
- 10) Do Digital Marshall Plan using residual capability in abandoned satellites
- 11) Sponsor the University of the Republic to foster information-sharing.
- 12) Make OSIS-X available free to feed online video gaming companies desiring to create real-world decision-support scenario and budget trade-off games.

We support the idea of creating a national Open Source Agency as called for by Congressman Simmons in his Foreword to this book, but we are also very skeptical of the ability of the respective bureaucracies within the U.S. Government, and the respective Congressional jurisdiction, to break from the Industrial Era past and get with the program for creating 21st Century information and intelligence capabilities that deter conflict and create indigenous wealth that is inherently stabilizing.

For this reason, we conclude that Google, not the U.S. Government, is likely to be the most intelligent organization on the planet within five years from this date. That is probably a very good thing.

EPILOGUE

Just before sending this book to the printer, one of our many volunteer sources around the world alerted us to a new video game called “A Force More Powerful.” This “game” by BreakAway Ltd teaches anyone who wishes to learn how to implement non-violent resistance endeavors in favor of democratic change. It is particularly valuable as a means of helping non-violent resisters avoid the early mistakes that may often allow a dictator to capture and kill or imprison the proponents of democracy.

We discussed the company and its offering with our team members, and especially those specializing in rapid-response modeling and simulation based on real-world data, and we realized that with this game, at this time, the old industrial model of secret data in support of secret decisions has been buried.

We ourselves know, and discuss in *THE NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE: Personal, Public, & Political*, that top-down unilateral decisions based on secret information, and focused on short-term objectives, are being displaced by bottom-up multi-cultural consensus based predominantly on open sources, and focused on the long-term collective good of humanity.

This radical change in the decision-making environment is depicted on the next page (Figure 20).




Figure 20: Emergent Collective Intelligence (Bottom-Up)

The emergence of varied collective intelligence movements is facilitated not only by the Internet, which offers electronic mail, document sharing, blogging, and other similar features, but also online multi-player gaming and, soon, evolutionary games that change as the real-world information changes.

What we had not realized was that video gaming had moved so far so fast. Two major changes have occurred:

- 1) It is no longer a laborious construction process. Re-usable code and object-oriented programming have reached a point where games can be turned over to the

end-users, who can “program” alternative scenarios, enter new data, and so on.

2) The combination of digital data, automated geo-coding, and XML protocols has finally made it possible to “feed” unstructured data into welcoming decision-support games that support constant changes in the data and the options being considered.

A revolution has taken place. It is not the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) or the Revolution in Intelligence Affairs (RIA).

It is the Revolution in Public Gaming (RPG). Information is a substitute for violence, a creator of wealth, and as we finish this third book in the series, we have been inspired by BreakAway Ltd and its game, “A Force More Powerful.”

Public gaming, not secret intelligence, could be the Holy Grail, the Chalice through which the public may drink of public information, from which it may develop its collective public intelligence, through which it may demand, drive, direct, and dispose of public policy.

Armed with non-violent RPGs, the public may, possibly, be able to restore morality and equality to democracy and capitalism, both of which have been perverted and manipulated by special interests and corrupt politicians in the United States of America as much as anywhere else.

The military wants to win wars. The police want to stop crime. The corporations want to make money. The government—that part of it which is honest—wants to nurture the Commonwealth. The people need to understand the forces that impact on their well-being and quality of life, and to contribute to the political process that shapes who we are as a Nation, and how we do as a Republic. In the face of an apathetic and ill-informed public, gaming appears poised to do what schools and the

governments, appear to be the key to bottom-up collective intelligence, using public intelligence to shape public policy.

This gaming capability is relevant to each of the various IO-heavy mission areas, and especially so to national education and research as well as national budgeting.

It now becomes possible for education to transition from rote learning to existential learning, vastly increasing actual trial and error experiences through virtual reality, and to also dramatically improve the reliability and responsiveness of continuous education, permitting every worker to draw on virtual mentors to practice any aspect of their profession.

Gaming will take modeling and simulation, scenario testing, and alternative courses of action and alternative investment plans, to a whole new level of public access and public engagement. Done properly, it will gut the special interests and make pork barrel spending a thing of the past. When connected to the peoples' budget, it will allow for the scrutiny of planned investments at the county, state, national, regional, and global levels.

IO will create wealth by eliminating waste and corruption, encouraging collaborative co-evolution, illuminating mutual benefits and the advantages of burden-sharing, and by generating new ideas for indigenous wealth creation. IO will help the public understand the value of social programs and pass-through investments for the benefit of future generations, and in so doing, will facilitate the crucifixion of corrupt politicians who fail to look after the public interest; who loot the public commonwealth, and who take America to war on a web of lies.

IO, done ethically, *is* democracy.

IO, done ethically, *is* moral capitalism

IO, done ethically, *will* save our souls and our lives.

This is a good thing.

APPENDIX: Analytic Models for Modern IO

There are numerous analytic frames of reference and methodologies, and we strive to recognize and exploit them all, as appropriate. Here we wish to put forward just two (Figures 22 & 23) that the author created and Team L-3 has found useful and relevant to the challenges facing STRATCOM and SOCOM, among others.




Figure 22: Analytic Domains & Levels of Analysis

It has been our experience that too many so-called analytic services limit their efforts to database stuffing and summarization. There are four levels of analysis, and the threat—and consequently the needed message—changes at each of these four levels. By distinguishing between Military, Geographic, and Civil domains, and by understanding the uniqueness of each of four levels of analysis—strategic, operational, tactical, and technical—and by placing particular emphasis on the civil domain, with a strong focus on Civil Psychology, on indicators of Civil Stability, and on influences relevant to Civil Allies (and Competitors), in combination with an understanding of the Civil Infrastructure, and all forms of communication in the target societies, we can enhance our analytic tradecraft.

Our second analytic frame of reference (Figure 23, on the next page) combines a deep understanding of human psychology and sociology with a suitably complex yet refined understanding of the dimensions of revolutionary change in any nation-state, tribe, or neighborhood.¹³¹

Analysis of emerging and unconventional threats is not about traditional orders of battle (OOB), but rather about the psychology of the individual and the sociology of the sub-state group. It is about connecting ideas and people.

¹³¹ All of the factors in these two models have been operationalized, which is to say, for every single one, we have identified specific measures and specific sources of information by which to measure the status of each factor.

	Political- Legal	Socio- Economic	Ideo- Cultural	Techno- Demographic	Natural- Geographic
Perception	Isolation of elites; inadequate intelligence	Concentration of wealth; lack of public disclosure	Conflicting myths; inadequate socialization	Acceptance of media distortions; inadequate education	Reliance on single sector or product; concentrated land holdings
Identity	Lack of elite consensus; failure to define priorities	Loss of economic initiative; failure to do balanced growth	Loss of authority; failure to provide and honor national myth system	Failure to accept and exploit new technologies and new groups	Failure to integrate outlying territories into national system
Competence	Weak or inefficient government; too much or too little bureaucracy	Break-down of fiscal, monetary, development, or welfare policies	Humiliation of leaders; loss of confidence by population	Failure to enforce priorities, with resulting loss of momentum	Failure to prepare for or cope with major national disasters
Investment	Ego-centric or parochial government	Excessive or insufficient mobility; lack of public sector	Cynicism; opportunism; corruption	Failure to nurture entrepreneurship or franchise all groups	Failure to preserve or properly exploit natural resources
Risk	Elite intransigence; repression; failure to adapt	Failure to deal with crime, especially white collar crime	Failure to deal with prejudice; desertion of intellectuals	Failure to develop national research & development program	Failure to honor human rights; failure to protect animal species
Extroversion	Ineffective tension management; failure to examine false premises	Structural differentiation; lack of national transportation network	Elite absorption of foreign mores; failure to deal with alienation	Failure to develop communications infrastructure, shared images	Failure to explore advantages of regional integration
Transcendence	Foreign control of government; arbitrary or excessive government	Loss of key sectors to foreign providers; loss of quality control	Media censorship; suppression of intellectual discourse	Failure to control police, army, or terrorists; failure to employ <i>alphas</i>	Failure to respect natural constraints or support organic growth
Synergy	Failure to assimilate all individual or respond to all groups	Status discrepancies; lack of economic motivators	Absence of sublimating myths; failure of religion	Failure to provide program and technology assessment	Failure to distribute benefits between urban and rural
Complexity	Garrison, industrial, or welfare states	Unstable growth; excessive defense spending	Cultural pre-disposition toward violence	Excessive urbanization, pollution, or development	Lack of land for expansion; inefficient use of land

Figure 23: Framework to Predict & Understand Revolution¹³²

¹³² This model was fully developed as a Master's thesis for Lehigh University in 1976. It has not been superseded since then. The simpler analytic framework on the previous page was developed by the author when he helped created the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (now Command). Both models are fully operationalized.

Annotated Bibliography

Preface

I had to make two decisions in putting this bibliography together. The first was hard: I decided to include only the books that I have read and reviewed since publishing *THE NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE*. The reader will find roughly 150 book reviews in that book, mostly dealing with reality, and another 150 or so in the first book *ON INTELLIGENCE*, mostly dealing with the many aspects of information and intelligence. The other decision I had to make was whether to include the entire 1000-word reviews as posted to Amazon, or to provide an abbreviated review. I chose the latter both to conserve the page count, and to make the bibliography as readable as possible. For almost every review here, there are another 600-800 words at Amazon. Finally, I decided to print this in 11-font size instead of the traditional 10-font size, because the bibliography is actually a second book, a collage of perception that some of you may not like, some of you may not agree with, but if just one of you can have an “aha” experience herein, I will be most gratified.

Pages 187 and 189 provide the tables of contents for the bibliographies of the first and second books, to provide a sense of context for this third bibliography. Unlike previous books, I am including in the index the annotated comments, authors, and titles in this third bibliography but would emphasize this is really two different books—one on the technical integration of IO, and one on the real-world context within which IO must be practiced.

This third bibliography is posted online at www.oss.net as a link under the Modern IO Portal Page, dated 2005-11-19. Each of the titles in the online bibliography is hot-linked to the Amazon home page for the respective title. Amazon reviews have reached a critical mass—they are an educational resource in the own right. The IO professional can gain a great deal of knowledge by spending time in the Amazon “stacks,” even without purchasing a book, but I do hope each of you will purchase and read multiple books from Amazon. *St.*

DISCLAIMER

The Individuals who honored this book with advance praise did so primarily on the basis of the technical text that comprises the main body of the work. The subjective detail in this annotated bibliography is the personal opinion of the author. In no way should the endorsements of the book in general be suggestive of the specific agreement by any individual with the personal opinion of the author as posted to Amazon and as abridged here.

It is a fact that there are multiple realities, and our primary purpose in life is not to specify which reality we believe in, but to make it possible for all people, everywhere, to know, to learn, to share, and to co-exist.

Information is a substitute for violence and a creator of wealth. Government corruption—including ideological fantasies imposed on an inattentive people and an unassertive Congress, and immoral capitalism as well as illicit activities facilitated by failed states, are three stakes in our modern heart.

The opinions that follow are based on a fortunate life, a life that has included decades spent wandering across the planet, multiple graduate degrees, a very aggressive reading program documented daily at Amazon, and the fortunate acquaintance with over 8,000 intelligent internationalist individuals who really care about the future of the world. Very few have done all this, been a spy, stood up a national intelligence analysis command, and gone on to write books and coach entire governments.

I apologize for whatever mistakes can be proven, for whatever wounds my words might inadvertently cause, but I stand firm in demanding that we seek the truth, that we share our views, and that we not accept leadership from charlatans, thieves, and liars. *E Veritate Potens*—from truth, power. *St*

Book 1 Annotated Bibliography Categories¹

Information, Crime, Risk, and Hackers
Information, Economy
Information, Environmental
Information, Geospatial and Visualization
Information, Internet and Silicon Valley
Information, Productivity & Politics
Information, Strategic Perspectives
Information, Tactical Methods
Information, Warfare (Cyberwar)

Intelligence
Intelligence, Analysts
Intelligence, Business and Competitive
Intelligence, Coalition and Peacekeeping
Intelligence, Collection
Intelligence, Counter
Intelligence, Covert Action and Paramilitary
Intelligence, Economic Espionage
Intelligence, Foreign Capabilities
Intelligence, Law Enforcement
Intelligence, Military
Intelligence, Police
Intelligence, Reference
Intelligence, Reform and Future

Management, Acquisition
Management, Future
Management, Leadership
Management, Organizational

¹ Robert David Steele, *ON INTELLIGENCE: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World* (Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association—AFCEA 2000, OSS International Press 2002, 2003). This book details everything that is wrong with classified intelligence, and ends with recommended reforms, none of which have yet been enacted.

Book 2 Annotated Bibliography Categories²

America in the Eyes of Others
Biology, Evolution, & World Brain
Bureaucratic & Western Reasoning Pathologies
Citizenship, the Polity, and Power to the People
Conflict in Every Clime and Place
Corporate Corruption & Irresponsibility
Environment & Public Health
Foreign Affairs and International Security Policy
Intelligence (Fiction)
Intelligence & Information Studies (Non-Fiction)
Reference
Strategy
Trade-Offs (Instruments of National Power)
Treason & Traitors

² Robert David Steele, *THE NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE: Personal, Public, & Political—Citizen's Action Handbook for Fighting Terrorism, Genocide, Disease, Toxic Bombs, & Corruption* (OSS International Press, 2003). This book is a combined primer on Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), which is a foundation element for the modern Joint Intelligence Operations Commands or Centers (JIOC), and includes both a copy of the *NATO OSINT Handbook*, and also a comprehensive overview of reality—the IO foundation.

Book 3 Annotated Bibliography Categories³

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This bibliography is available online at www.oss.net under the Modern IO Portal page, at the link dated 2005-11-19. Using the online version enables direct access to the Amazon page for each book, and consequently to the many reviews as well as to direct purchase.⁴

³ Robert David Steele, *INFORMATION OPERATIONS: All Information, All Languages, All the Time—The New Semantics of War & Peace, Wealth & Democracy* (OSS International Press, 2005). This book is intended to stimulate collaborative efforts among nations, corporations, non-governmental organizations, universities, media, and civil societies. Information can support dictators, or it can support people.

⁴ If we have time in January, we are planning to create a consolidated online annotated bibliography that includes all of the books we have reviewed, with an integrated directory.

Blow-Back

Bearden, Milt, *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB*

This book is both historical and essential in understanding two facts: 1) Afghanistan was the beginning of the end for USSR and 2) CIA made it happen, once invigorated by President Ronald Reagan and DCI William Casey. It may not be immediately apparent to the casual reader, but that is the most important story being told in this book: how the collapse of the Soviet effort in Afghanistan ultimately led to the collapse of Soviet authority in East Germany, in the other satellite states, and eventually to the unification of Germany and the survival of Russia as a great state but no longer an evil empire. There are two other stories in this book, and both are priceless. The first is a tale of counterintelligence failure across the board within both the CIA and the FBI. The second story is that of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and how the anti-Soviet jihad nurtured by America and Pakistan ultimately turned back on both countries.

Hertsgaard, Mark, *The Eagle's Shadow: Why America Fascinates And Infuriates The World*

I regard this book as one of the three "must reads" for every American. The other two are #1 William Greider, *The Soul of Capitalism: Opening Paths to a Moral Economy*, and #2, Jonathan Schell, *The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People*. ... On page 10 the book's main argument is perfectly captured by a quote from a South African: "we know everything about you [Americans] and you know nothing about us." Therein lies the problem. As the author notes later in the book, after a review of the decrepitude of both our media and our educational systems in relation to foreign affairs and national security, "Ignorance is an excuse, but it is no shield." ... This book has persuaded me that America needs not one, but two Truth & Reconciliation Commissions. We need a Truth & Reconciliation Commission, ideally managed by Colin Powell, to investigate the perversion of both capitalism and democracy in the US, and to outline a way forward such as William Greider discusses in *The Soul of Capitalism*. We also need, even more desperately, a Truth & Reconciliation Commission, ideally managed by Nelson Mandela and Lee Kuan Yew, to catalog and acknowledge, and apologize to the

world for the war crimes, the unethical behavior, and the enormous political, social, cultural, economic, demographic, and natural resource costs we have imposed on the world through our ignorance and arrogance. **IO NOTE:** I expect anger from some quarters over this latter observation. My love for America, and for the truth, is unconstrained. Someone has to say this. Sorry it has to be me.

Johnson, Chalmers, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire

I found this book very much on target with its principal thesis, to wit, that the United States is too quick to take pre-emptory and often covert or illicit action against short-term threats, and that we pay a very heavy price over the long run for doing things like reinforcing despotic regimes, overturning anti-American regimes, and so on.

Leebaert, Derek, The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America's Cold War Victory

Two quotes, one from the beginning, one from the end, capture all that lies in between, well-documented and I would add—contrary to some opinions—coherent and understandable. "For the United States, the price of victory goes far beyond the dollars spend on warheads, foreign aid, soldiers, propaganda, and intelligence. It includes, for instance, time wasted, talent misdirected, secrecy imposed, and confidence impaired. Particular costs were imposed on industry, science, and the universities. Trade was distorted and growth impeded." (page xi) "CIA world-order men whose intrigues more often than not started at the incompetent and went down from there, White House claims of "national security" to conceal deceit, and the creation of huge special interests in archaic spending all too easily occurred because most Americans were not preoccupied with the struggle." (page 643)

Pearse, Meic, Why the Rest Hates the West: Understanding the Roots of Global Rage

Sane, calm, reasoned review by man of the cloth from Scotland, on how West has lost touch with history and has a stunning lack of understanding of real-world. Calls for renewal of respect for all traditions, rejoining of the human race, and restoration of moral and religious vision.

Sardar, Ziauddin, Why Do People Hate America?

The heart of this book is not why people hate America, but rather about how Americans have lost touch with reality. Here are a few points made by this book that every American needs to understand if we are to restore true democracy, true freedom of the press, and true American values to our foreign policy, which has been hijacked by neo-conservative corporate interests: 1) "Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel." Dr. Samuel Johnson said this in 1775, on the eve of US revolution from British tyranny. When patriotism is used to suppress dissent, to demand blind obedience, and to commit war crimes "in our name," then patriotism has lost its meaning. 2) According to the authors, Robert Kaplan and Thomas Friedman are flat out **wrong** when they suggest that "they" hate us for our freedoms, the success of our economy, for our rich cultural heritage. Most good-hearted Americans simply have no idea how big the gap is between our perception of our goodness and the rest of the world's perception of our badness (in terms set forth below). 3) According to the authors, a language dies every two weeks. 4) According to the authors, America is "out of control" largely because the people who vote and pay taxes are uninformed. 5) According to the authors, the impact of America overseas can be best summed up as a "hamburger virus" that comes as a complete package, and is especially pathological. 6) Finally—and the authors have many other points to make in this excellent book, but this is the last one for this "summative" evaluation of their work—according to the authors the USA is what could be considered the ultimate manifestation of the "eighth crusade", with Christopher Columbus and the destruction of the native American Indians (both North and South) having been the seventh crusade. ... There you have it. According to the authors: 1) Americans are uninformed about the real world 2) Americans are not in charge of their own foreign policy 3) What is done in the name of all Americans is severely detrimental to the rest of the world, and Americans will pay a heavy price if they allow this "hamburger/gunboat imperialism" to continue.

Soros, George, George Soros on Globalization

At a time when the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is treating anti-globalization activists as just one step under terrorists (in one recent case denying a Canadian activist entry to the U.S. to honor an invitation to speak at a U.S. university), George Soros' is easily the most responsible and the wealthiest voice cautioning all of us that the combined forces of globalization (which

reduces citizen sovereignty) and consumerism (which reduces citizen prosperity) could be the death knell of capitalism. ... Globalization and consumerism threaten billions of Arabs, Chinese, Indians, Muslims, and Russians around the world--and thus they threaten us as well. Although many brilliant minds foresaw these challenges in the 1970's, among them those speaking to the limits to growth, sustainable growth, and the need for new forms of world governance, it is only after 9-11 that the world appears ready to listen to George Soros and others who understand that we cannot continue to emphasize short-term corporate profit over long-term citizen survival.

Vidal, Gore, Dreaming War: Blood for Oil and the Cheney-Bush Junta

Gore Vidal speaks truth bluntly and clearly. He addresses points that need to be addressed by every voter, for the people of America are losing their birthrights—their freedoms, their power over their own fate, their control of the resources of the nation that have been—quite literally—hijacked by a mandarin wealthy elite that would sooner cut deals with terrorists and their oil-field sponsors, than look after the best interests of the American public. Interestingly, this book emphasizes something I had not considered that bears emphasis: although there were numerous intelligence failures in detail, Vidal suggests that the Director of Central Intelligence is correct when he claims that 9-11 was not (at root) an intelligence failure—but then leaves unsaid what Vidal says explicitly: it was a policy failure in that Bush-Cheney decided not to alarm the people and not to share the warning information, in part to avoid turbulence and in part because such an attack would be welcome—as Pearl Harbor was welcome—as a means to remilitarize foreign policy. ... It is the US, in its obsessive anti-communism (perhaps aided by the desire of those in power to accumulate wealth and extend their power) that really kicked off the Cold War and was willing to support any dictator, commit any crime, and violate any oath, in pursuit of anti-communism. The number of US attacks within an *undeclared* war status is over 250—and this does not count the secret bombing runs into the Soviet Union in the early years when we were just testing their vulnerability.

Democracy

Atlee, Tom, *The Tao of Democracy: Using Co-Intelligence to Create a World That Works for All*

I see so many things starting to come together around the world and through books. The Internet has opened the door for a cross-fertilization of knowledge and emotion and concern across all boundaries such as the world has never seen before, and it has made possible a new form of structured collective intelligence such as H.G. Wells (*World Brain*), Howard Bloom (*Global Brain*), Pierre Levy (*Collective Intelligence*), Willis Harman (*Global MindChange*), and I (*New Craft of Intelligence—Personal, Public, & Political*), could never have imagined. This book is better than all of ours, for the simple reason that it speaks directly to the possibilities of deliberative democracy through citizen study circles and wisdom councils. The book is also helpful as a pointer to a number of web sites, all of them very immature at this point, but also emergent in a most constructive way—web sites focused on public issues, public agendas, new forms of democratic organization, and so on.

Crenson, Matthew, *Downsizing Democracy: How America Sidelined Its Citizens and Privatized Its Public*

The authors discuss and document ten points in each of ten chapters: 1) The tyranny of the minorities has reached its ultimate perversion—single individuals, well-educated, well-off, get what they want, and the poor masses lose the power that came from groups with diverse backgrounds. 2) Citizenship has lost its meaning—taxation is automatic, and the US can be said to be back in a situation where the broad masses are experiencing "taxation without representation." 3) Elections now feature only the intensely loyal minority from each of the two major parties--the bulk of the voters have dropped out and elections are thus not representative of the wishes of the larger community. 4) Patronage has changed, with corporations rather than citizens getting to feed at the public trough, and the focus being on influencing policy after elections, never mind who the people elected. The authors also do an excellent job of discussing polling and the manner in which it misrepresents the actual concerns and beliefs of the people. See longer review at Amazon.

Gillmor, Dan, We the Media

This book could become a standard undergraduate reference on non-standard news sources and the blurring of the lines between producers and consumers of information (or in the government world, of intelligence). Resistance to change by established media; the incredible emotional and intellectual growth that comes from having a "media" of, by, and for the people that is ***open*** to new facts and context and constantly being ***refreshed***, and the undeniable ability of the people in the aggregate to triumph in their assembled expertise, over niche experts spouting biases funded by specific institutions, all come across early in the book. The book is provocative, exploring what it means when more and more information is available to the citizen, to include information embedded in foods or objects that communicates, in effect, "if you eat me I will kill you," the author's most memorable turn of phrase that really makes the point. Gillmor is riveting and 100% on target when he explores the meaning of all this for Homeland Security. He points out that not only is localized observation going to be the critical factor in preventing another 9-11, but that the existing budget and program for homeland security does not provide one iota of attention to the challenge of soliciting information from citizens, and ensuring that the "dots" from citizens get processed and made sense of. The book ends on a great IO NOTE: for the first time in history, a global, continuous feedback loop among a considerable number of the people in possible. This may not overthrow everything, as Trippi suggests, but it most assuredly does ***change*** everything.

Havel, Vaclav, The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe

Living within the truth is the ultimate act of citizenship, and such living, even in the face of totalitarian repression (as in Czechoslovakia) or consumerist subversion and corporate corruption of the political and financial systems (as in the USA) can ultimately empower the powerless. ... Havel opens by noting that "the system has become so ossified politically that there is practically no way for ...nonconformity to be implemented within its official structures." This forces the vast majority of the public to "live within a lie," and accept, either consciously or unwittingly, the huge chasm between political freedom and economic fairness in the ideal, and what the totalitarian or hijacked capitalism models offer in reality. Brutally stated, from the point of view of the normal wage earner, there is no difference between totalitarianism and corrupt

capitalism. In page after page, Havel, poet and president, documents this truth. See longer review at Amazon.

Loeb, Paul Rogat, The Impossible Will Take a Little While: A Citizen's Guide to Hope in a Time of Fear

My title page, where I put my summary notes, is covered with writing. The first and most important point: this is not a "do gooder feel good" book—it is a compelling, absorbing book that lays out some good insights and provides an antidote to paralysis and despair. It is, in short, a book that inspires many small actions that in the aggregate could lead to revolutionary improvements in democracy and our quality of life. At a tactical level, this book complements Bill Moyer's *Doing Democracy*, and is a personal counterpart to Jonathan Schell's work, *The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People*. I put the book down with one big thought ably communicated by this book: The problem among us is not that we lack power, but that we lack the will and perspective to use the power that we do have in small ways that add up to big power in the aggregate.

Moyer, Bill, Doing Democracy

This book is both a strategic orientation to, and a tactical primer on, how to develop and manage non-violent social movements at the grassroots or "people power" level. The reason this book is important is because it solves the most important problem or gap facing all social movements: the lack of strategic models and methods that help activists understand, plan, conduct, and evaluate their social movements. I have read this book from cover to cover and it fulfills the objective. Had Howard Dean and Joe Trippi read this book six months ago, they would not have blown the lead and come in a sorry fourth (less than half of what Kerry had, less than a quarter Kerry and Edwards combined), to guys that did *not* figure out MoveOn.org and the Internet as a collective consciousness tool.

Rheingold, Howard, Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution

At the very end of the book, the author quotes James Madison as carved into the marble of the Library of Congress: "...a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." And there it is—Howard Rheingold has documented the next level of the Internet, in

which kids typing 60 words a minute with one thumb, "swarms" of people converging on a geospatial node guided only by their cell phones; virtual "CIAs" coming together overnight to put together massive (and accurate) analysis with which to take down a corporate or government position that is fraudulent—this is the future and it is bright. As I go back through the book picking out highlights, a few of the following serve to capture the deep rich story being told by this book—breakthroughs coming from associations of amateurs rather than industry leaders; computer-mediated trust brokers—collective action driven by reputation; detailed minute-by-minute information about behaviors of entire populations (or any segment thereof); texting as kid privacy from adult hearing; the end of the telephone number as relevant information; the marriage of geospatial and lifestyle/preference information to guide on the street behavior; the perennial problem of "free riders" and how groups can constrain them; distributed processing versus centralized corporate lawyering; locations with virtual information; shirt labels with their transportation as well as cleaning history (and videos of the sex partners?)—this is just mind-boggling. **IO NOTE:** Forget about the "message!" Put Internet access in the hands of the indigenous people and get out of their way.

Simon, James, *What Kind of Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and the Epic Struggle to Create a United States*

I found it absolutely gripping to see how the Federalists created the Sedition Act, the Naturalization Act, the Alien Act, and the Alien Enemies Act as a means of preventing new immigrants from reinforcing the Jeffersonian Republicans (we would probably call them Democrats of the southern conservative persuasion today); and as a means of repressing thoughtful criticism from supporters of Thomas Jefferson. I was especially fascinated by the abuse of Federal power and the deliberate hunting down and prosecution of critics of the Federal administration, using a combination of the Sedition Act (forbidding "false, scandalous and malicious" accusations against the President, the Congress, or the government) and corrupt judges disallowing testimony in favor of the truth of the accusations. America is on a very slippery slope right now, and there is much to be learned from the efforts of Thomas Jefferson to prevent Federalist abuses against both the rights of the states and the rights of the people.

Surowieki, James, *The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations*

Read this book along with Howard Rheingold's *Smart Mobs*, Tom Atlee's *The Tao of Democracy* Pierre Levy's *Collective Intelligence*—and if you wish, my own, *The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, and Political*. The author examines three broad situations: coordination, aggregation, and cooperation, and in all three concludes, with sufficient and compelling evidence as well as anecdote, that the best answers are from multiple disparate views that have been normalized. The author is also effective in pointing out that most "experts" rarely agree with one another, or get it right in the first place. This book is relevant to the application of emerging technologies, for example, application oriented networking systems and intelligent networks where P2P puts most of the knowledge at the edge of the network. What hit me with great force is that P2P and intelligent networks cannot be fully effective without an aggregation capability, a super-sized federated database system that scales infinitely—hence disqualifying all of the so-called relational databases, and making it clear that Google is positioned to realize this objective.

Trippi, Joe, *The Revolution Will Not Be Televised: Democracy, the Internet, and the Overthrow of Everything*

There are a number of gems throughout the book, and I will just list a few phrases here: -- politics of concentric circles--find the pebble in every town -- polling substitute's conviction for bullshit (his word) -- citing Robert Putnam in *Bowling Alone*, every hour of television watching translates to a 10% drop in civic involvement -- what gets destroyed in scorched earth politics is democracy -- McCain led the way for Dean in using the Internet and being an insurgent ("the Republican branch of the Republican Party") -- the dirty secret of US politics is that fund-raising (and I would add, gerrymandering) take the election decision out of the hands of voters -- the existing party machines are dinosaurs, focused on control rather than empowerment--like government bureaucracies, they cannot accept nor leverage disruptive innovation (see my review of *The Innovator's Solution*) -- Media will miss the message. He has bitter words for the media spin and aggression that helped bring Dean down, but his more thoughtful remarks really emphasize the mediocrity of the entertainment media and its inability to think for itself. -- TIRED: transactional politics. WIRED: transformational politics -- Democratic fratricide killed

Dean—Gephardt died on his own; and Clark with backing from Clinton; killed the insurgency.

West, Cornel, Democracy Matters: Winning the Fight Against Imperialism

Nobel-level reflections on the need to nurture democracy with open-minded faith as opposed to evangelical zealotry, to use dialog instead of debate, and to acknowledge the hypocrisy of imperialism before constructing our worthy message for those we seek to convert to democracy.

Economics

Daily, Gretchen, The New Economy of Nature

This is a fine book of success stories where environmental good is achieved while also demonstrating economic benefit in traditional terms. It is less effective at drawing generic lessons (other than "sue them"). I would emphasize, however, that these are important stories and the book renders a valuable service in documenting them for on-going reference, similar in support of everything written by Lester Brown. Bottom line: E.O. Wilson's *The Future of Life* is the best of the lot, see my review of that book for the best in class slice. The other book I recommend in support of E.O. Wilson's encompassing and specific work, is that by Brian Czech, on *Shoveling Fuel for a Runaway Train: Errant Economists, Shameful Spenders, and a Plan to Stop Them All*.

Daly, Herman, Valuing the Earth: Economics, Ecology, Ethics

There is a chart on page 20 of this book that is quite extraordinary. Titled "The ends-means spectrum," it brilliantly runs down from the top: Religion and Ethics as guidelines to ultimate and intermediate ends of humanity; to the middle Political Economy as a means of managing the factors of production to specific political ends; to the bottom: Technics and Physics as the "ultimate" foundation or "ground truth" of flow-entropy-matter-energy that must constrain political and religious ends. This book, in which Kenneth N. Townsend is the second contributing editor-author, blends practical, political, economic, and theological writings, over several decades, in a most pleasing manner. E. F. Schumacher's "Buddhist Economics" jumped out at me, reminding me that our

predominantly Protestant corporate capitalist ethos is very far removed from the realities that guide and repress billions around the Earth, all of whom have fewer options than we do.

Daly, Herman, *For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future*

Part Three, a major factor in my choosing this book over the others for broad pro-bono distribution, addresses the specifics of policies one element at a time: free trade versus community; population; land use; agriculture; industry; labor; income policies and taxes; from world domination to national security as an objective. Finally, Part Four, without being corny or preachy, describes the religious or ethical vision (I still think the Golden Rule works as a one-sentence definition of common interest).

Farley, Joshua and Herman Daly, *Ecological Economics: Principles and Applications*

Of the three books (the third one that I reviewed is *Valuing the Earth: Economics, Ecology, Ethics*) this, the text-book, is assuredly the most up-to-date and the most detailed. If you are buying only one book for yourself, this is the one that I recommend, because these are important issues and a detailed understanding is required with the level of detail that this book provided. It should, ideally, be read with *Valuing the Earth* first (see my separate review of that book, from the 1970's updated with 1990's material and new contributions), then *For the Common Good*, and finally the text book as a capstone. But if you buy only one, buy this one. Tables of Contents rarely do justice to the contents but in this case, they excel. This is one of the most intelligent, structured, useful outlines it has been my privilege to examine. Read the Table of Contents information provided by the publisher to satisfy yourself. From Part I with three chapters (An Introduction to Ecological Economics) to Part II with 4 chapters (The Containing and Sustaining Ecosystem: The Whole) to Parts III and IV (Microeconomics and Macroeconomics, respectively, five and four chapters each) to Part V with four chapters (International Trade), and finally to Part VI (Policy) with chapters on General Policy Design Principles, on Sustainable Scale, on Just Distribution, and on Efficient Allocation, the content of the book is elegantly organized and accurately described.

Minarik, Joseph. Making America's Budget Policy: From the 1980s to the 1990s

The bottom line in this book is clear: America can find \$500 billion more in revenue if we return corporations to paying 25% of the total revenue (down to 6% now from a high of 32% in the past), eliminate subsidies and import-export pricing fraud; if we eliminate the tax code and all of its special interest provisions, and rely instead of the marketplace to choose winners and losers; and if we shift to a flat fair tax with no deductions except the mortgage and savings not counted as income. I am over-simplifying, but this book desperately needs distillation.

Reich, Robert, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism (Vintage)

Robert B. Reich's *The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism* can be read with renewed appreciation and respect if one if also now reading William Greider's *The Soul of Capitalism: Opening Paths to a Moral Economy* or any of the books by Herman E. Daly (e.g. *Ecological Economics: Principles and Applications*).

Education

Bok, Derek, Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of Higher Education

Derek Bok, former President of Harvard University and author of two useful books on "the state of the nation," has done a very fine job of examining the commercialization of the university, with separate chapters on athletics (the golden goose tends to cost more to maintain than most realize, both in financial terms and in terms of negative impacts on scholarship); scientific research; and customized executive education offered on a for-profit basis. While the author concludes with some recommendations, the book is best for its reasoned discussion of the problems. The prostitution of the universities, and the blandness of undergraduate education, are issues that will not be solved by any one community, any one state, or even by Congress. This is going to require a President committed to national education and public health as the "first plank"

of any national strategy to united and nurture what I think of as the "seven intelligence tribes:" national (spies and counterspies), military, law enforcement, business, academic, non-profit and media, and religions-clans-citizens.

Garten, Jeffrey, The Politics of Fortune: A New Agenda For Business Leaders

Originally inspired by the "double-whammy" of 9-11 and Enron on business—the one costing America, by Fortune's estimate for businesses alone, \$150B in additional security measures, or close to 1.5% of the Gross Domestic Product; while others suggest 9-11 has reduced profits by 5-6%), the author provides an easy to read, well-documented overview of why CEOs have to engage in rebuilding the integrity of business, protecting the homeland, preserving global economic security and free trade, taking on global poverty, and influencing foreign policy. ... This book is *loaded* with common sense and specific ideas for getting business leadership back into the global stabilization dialog. The author focused on two ideas that I consider to be especially important: the need to reexamine how the taxpayer dollar is being spent on national security, with a view to redirecting funds (I add: from military heavy metal to what Joe Nye calls soft power: diplomacy, assistance, intelligence); and on the urgency of restoring the independence and expanding the mandate of the U.S. Information Agency so as to overcome the acute misperceptions of the US fostered by Saudi-funded schools for youths being taught to hate, and little else. ... Finally, the author concludes with a focus on business education. While citing many improvements made by many schools, he notes that a comprehensive study and reengineering overall has not occurred since the late 1950's and early 1960's, and that the time is long past when graduate business education must be completely revamped. He is exceptionally astute and credible throughout the book as he explores the many things that CEOs need to know but do not receive training on, to include understanding and dealing with government, NGOs, citizen advocates, and the real world. As he notes, Master's in Business Administration tend to train students for the first years in the corporation, not the long-haul. He places some emphasis on the need to consider continuing education as an extension of the original program, and I immediately thought of an MBA as a limited-term license that must be renewed by recurring personal investments in education. **IO NOTE:** if one believes that a fundamental part of IO is in proper education and orientation for key inter-agency personnel in touch with foreign publics, then this book is a helpful guide in that vein.

Kerr, Clark, *The Uses of the University: 5th Edition (The Godkin Lectures on the Essentials of Free Government and the Duties of the Citizen)*

Of the three books read and reviewed on the role of the university within a nation, this is the best, with Derek Bok's volume on universities in the marketplace being the runner up. With a new preface written in 2001, and a pattern over the course of five editions of each time updating, correcting, and commenting on differences between past predictions and actual outcomes, this book appears to be the best available on this topic. The author is alarmed by the possibilities that universities, which were nurtured by post-World War II federal funding and state funding that is now vanishing, could begin to fail in almost catastrophic terms. Between aging and unrepentant faculty, the vanishing of liberal arts (or even quality education) for undergraduates, and the prostitution of graduate education to commercial purposes, there does appear to be a crisis. ... The author, who clearly has a very strong ethical perspective, quotes Alfred North Whitehead, who concluded that any society that "does not value trained intelligence is doomed" and adds his own view, that "the university that does not fully dedicate itself above all else to the continuing advancement of trained intelligence is also doomed."

Levin, Richard, *The Work of the University*

The author of the book, *The Work of the University*, is clearly educated, articulate, and well-intentioned. The book shows, throughout, that he is a committed and talented advocate for education as a process that evolves values and the capacity for critical thinking; that he understands the relationship of the University to its alumni, its host city, and the nation at large; and—in an antiseptic sort of way—that China, to take the one example prominent in his book—merits attention, both as a source of students and a host for joint educational ventures. Early in the book, I thought I was in for a treat when the author, in one of his welcoming speeches to a new class (this is a book of past speeches, not an integrated work) says: "You have the most to learn from those who are least like you; they will challenge you by asking questions you should ask yourself." The rest of the book helped me understand that these "others" consisted of the Yale faculty and the Yale students, the latter predominantly American but with a full leaving of homogenized wealthy international students all dressed alike in Abercrombie & Fitch ensembles. The book went downhill from there.

Schank, Roger, *Virtual Learning: A Revolutionary Approach to Building a Highly Skilled Workforce*

The seven core ideas that I drew from it are: 1) Learn by doing. Training must be fully integrated into day-to-day responsibilities and available on the fly. 2) Expert Modeling. Web-developers, multi-media experts, all these folks are *useless* unless there is a cadre of proven subject-matter-experts who can be used to devise the substance of the training in an interactive fashion. 3) Survey before modeling. Apart from having experts integrated into the design team, a larger survey of experts prior to the module design is recommended. 4) Embed failure. The author is a leading proponent of the idea that the best lessons are those that are learned from failing. They are, in a word, memorable. 5) Provide options. Building on the learning that occurs from failure, the author proposes strong emphasis on options menus that allow students to branch in different directions immediately after the failure. 6) Include ambiguity. The author suggests that avoidance of the "school solution" is helpful—there should be no one answer, but degrees of answer. 7) Prototype and test draft module. As obvious as it might seem, the author's experience suggests that too often distance learning modules go straight into production without being tested on real students, something he considers essential.

Ethics

Ahmed, Nafeez Mosaddeq, *The War On Truth: 9-11, Disinformation And The Anatomy Of Terrorism*

I am persuaded of the three core propositions in this book: 1) That CIA and FBI managed clandestine relations with those who first blew up the World Trade Center with a car bomb, for years, and generally concealed and obstructed Justice investigations after 9-11 because of their antecedent misbehavior; 2) That both the Clinton and Bush White Houses actively supported the Taliban and the secret Enron negotiations with the Taliban to build energy pipelines, not realizing at the time (as we know today) that the extraction and transportation of the energy as envisioned then is actually not supportable; and 3) That the Bush White House was already planning to invade Afghanistan and seek regime change in Iraq, with all of the operational plans drawn up as early as July 2001, and 9-11 was treated as a Pearl Harbor pretext. Having read most

of what has been written by Brzezinski, Kissinger, and others I accept the author's speculation that the U.S., the U.K., and France, among others, have been actively using terrorists, nurturing terrorists, as part of a geopolitical and economic strategy, and that in their naiveté, they nurtured a force they cannot control today. Bottom line: cheap oil is the fool's gold of this century, only it is toxic and radioactive. The White House, Enron, and a cast of rather poorly read bureaucrats came together to create a toxic mold called sub-state terrorism. The bureaucrats were following orders or had good intentions—the politicians and their corporate cronies were and are out and out thieves who continue to loot the Republic for their own selfish gains, firm in the belief that enough people will be fooled until they are out of office and laughing all the way to the Cayman Islands. They are probably right.

Allott, Philipp, The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State

Of the hundreds of books I have reviewed on Amazon, this is one of a handful that can be considered truly revolutionary. Three others that come instantly to mind are those by Jonathan Schell (*Unconquerable World*), William Greider (*Soul of Capitalism*), and E.O. Wilson, (*The Future of Life*) The author joins William Greider in suggesting that the state as a corporate personality is as immoral (and irrational in terms of natural law) as is the corporate personality that allows corporations to treat humans as "goods." In this book the author sets out to do nothing less than logically overturn centuries of absolutist amoral power institutionalized by elites in the form of state governments with sovereign rights divorced from accountability, with eminent domain over their subjects (vice citizens); and to propose a new form of globalized human society that restores the human aspect to relations among peoples and among nations of peoples. ... This book, apart from offering an enlightened vision of the law as a living thing able to encapsulate changes morality and changing interests among parties, does nothing less than reconceptualize international relations. This author is to the law of nations what Vaclav Havel was to communism. ... He joins Jefferson and the founding fathers in focusing on the health and happiness of the people as the ultimate organizing principle (some would translate "happiness" as "fulfillment", a more accomplished and less frivolous objective). ... On page 137 he is quite clear in suggesting that capitalism as it is practiced today, is nothing less than a form of totalitarianism, and he goes on to say on page 139 that social evil is the greatest challenge facing humanity today. Instead of socializing individuals into the reduced status of "goods" we should be socializing the state into a representative and general democracy by

rehumanizing humanity and rehumanizing the organizations that are supposed to provide collective voice to the people. In following pages the author provides a brilliant catalog of the ills of democracy, reconceptualizes democracy as being based on the rule of law (for all) rather than on who rules (for the benefit of the few), and he explicitly condemns the largely unaccountable forms of concentrated power (by which we take to mean the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and other devices for perpetuating immoral capitalism irrespective of local needs). The full force of the author's thinking comes into full stride in the concluding portions of the book as he integrates new concepts of international law, history, social relations, and new forms of intergovernmental relations truly representative of the species as a whole and the people as a moral force. He laments the manner in which an extraordinarily global elite has been able to "separate" people from morality and from one another, leading to a common acceptance of five intolerable things: 1) unequal social development; 2) war and armaments; 3) governmental oppression; 4) physical degradation; and 5) spiritual degradation. The author concludes by proposing a new view of the human world, and his remarks must be read in the original. He ends, as do Will and Ariel Durant in their summative *The Lessons of History*, by noting that the necessary revolution is that which must take place in our minds, not on the streets. **IO NOTE:** if there were just one book I would try to get every IO professional to read, this is it. It is tough going, but it captures the "big picture" in an extraordinary manner. Nothing we do at the tactical, operational, or even strategic levels can be successful in the long-run unless we first appreciate what this author is telling us.

Attenborough, Richard, Gandhi DVD

This is the movie to watch if you want to get down to fundamentals; Gandhi's three basic lessons of war and peace as shown so beautifully here are these: 1) the only devils are in our own minds; 2) the separation of Pakistan and India, like the separation of Palestine and Israel, violated the civil order between Muslims and Hindus, and destroyed all that Gandhi had achieved: peaceful coexistence of peoples within a single nation; and 3) in the end, after great pain, truth and love will inevitably triumph. I paused to reflect on the past. It was the Spanish who first committed genocide against the American Indians, who expelled the Muslims and then the Jews, who sponsored the Inquisition and the Crusades. It was the British who stupidly pitted Muslim against Hindu in their attempts to assert their imperial will—nothing makes them look as stupid as the movie's coverage of how the "Empire" forbade the locals to take salt from their

very own sea: the Indian Sea. Now fast-forward to today. Bottom line: boy, have we screwed this up. First off, invading Afghanistan made Al Qaeda stronger, not weaker. Second off, invading Iraq has made America weaker, not stronger, and inflamed the Middle East, Central Asia, Eastern Africa, the Pacific Rim, and the Muslim populations in the Americas. We need a \$200 billion a year investment in peace starting with renaming Israel Palestine, fully integrating both Israelis and Palestinians, and providing a massive peace force and assistance such that an entire new generation of Palestinians—both Jewish and Arab—can be grown from kindergarten to the age of 35.

Bronner, Stephen Eric, *Blood in the Sand: Imperial Fantasies, Right-Wing Ambitions, and the Erosion of American Democracy*

Here are a few of my summative notes that serve as a review of the author's key points, all of which I find to be admirable and well-documented: 1) US Democracy is in crisis, in part because the "Halliburton Administration" is comprised of several liars and thieves, among whom I would suggest Dick Cheney and Karl Rove are the worst. Their resignations, and the appointment of Senator John McCain as an ethical vice president, strike me as necessary. 2) The Democratic Party failed to understand that ideological passion and the Republican mobilization of their own base would more than crush the Democratic pragmatism, focus on the economic case, and a heroic but insufficient increase in registered voters. In essence, the Democratic Party relied on mobilization and failed to find its voice or its spine in 2000 and 2004. Even when the Democrats knew—as Greg Pabst documented—that the Florida election was stolen twice (one with the disenfranchisement of over 35,000 people of color, the second time with the rejection of over-count votes in pro-Gore countries—while revalidating them in pro-Bush counties), they failed to rise to the challenge. 3) The author is brutal in a very polite and professional way as he describes the origins of the neo-conservatives and their commitment to looting the commonwealth of the poor and middle class in order to fund wealth transfers to the already rich, and a larger garrison state with which to pursue imperial adventures. See Amazon for several other extended points.

Butler, General Smedley, USMC, War Is a Racket: The Anti-War Classic by America's Most Decorated General, Two Other Anti-Interventionist Tracts, and Photographs from the Horror of It

he following quotations from the book are intended to summarize it: "I helped make Mexico, especially Tampico, safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefits of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is long. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909-1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. In China I helped to see to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested." [p. 10] "War is a racket. ...It is the only one in which the profits are reckoned in dollars and the losses in lives." [p. 23] "The general public shoulders the bill [for war]. This bill renders a horrible accounting. Newly placed gravestones. Mangled bodies. Shattered minds. Broken hearts and homes. Economic instability. Depression and all its attendant miseries. Back-breaking taxation for generations and generations." [p. 24] General Butler is especially trenchant when he looks at post-war casualties. He writes with great emotion about the thousands of traumatized soldiers, many of who lose their minds and are penned like animals until they die, and he notes that in his time, returning veterans are three times more likely to die prematurely than those who stayed home. **IO NOTE:** General Butler is, with Chesty Puller, one of the most decorated Marines in the history of the United States of America. His views are therefore all the more compelling and powerful, and must be carefully considered by any military officer who wishes to serve the Nation, the Republic, with loyalty to the Constitution, rather than thieves in the White House who play the powerful pervert rather than the honest civil servant.

Callahan, David, The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead

I recommend that this book be read together with John Perkins, *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man*, and William Greider's, *The Soul of Capitalism: Opening Paths to a Moral Economy*. As a pre-amble, I would note that a Nobel Prize was given in the late 1990's to a man that demonstrated that trust lowers the cost of doing business. Morality matters—immorality imposes a pervasive sustained, insidious, long-term, and ultimately fatal cost on any community, any Republic, and that is the core message of this book that most reviewers

seem to be missing. What this author makes clear is that our population has become a cheating population, one that cheats in school, cheats their employer, and cheats their clients (lawyers, accountants, doctors, all cheating). Such a population is literally undermining national security by creating false values, and undermining true values. **IO NOTE:** IO professionals may feel that it is not their job to understand our domestic vulnerabilities, but I beg to differ—it is not possible to be effective with an external audience unless you first understand your internal reality—and ideally, demand that the internal pathologies be fixed prior to trying to remake the rest of the world in our mold.

Chomsky, Noam, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism & Global Order

This book begins with a very fine introduction by Robert McChesney, who defines neoliberalism as an economic paradigm that leaves a small number of private parties in control and able to maximize their profit (at the expense of the people). He goes on to note that a distracted or apathetic or depoliticized public essentially "goes along" with this, resulting in the loss of community and the rise of consumerism. Chomsky himself, over the course of 167 pages, points out the damages of neo-liberalism (public abdicating power to corporations), not just to underdeveloped nations and their peoples, but to the American people themselves, who are suffering, today, from a fifteen year decline in education, health, and increased inequality between the richest and the poorest. Over the course of several chapters, he discusses various U.S. policies, including the U.S. policy of using "security" as a pretext for subsidizing the transfer of taxpayer funds to major arms dealers. The declaration of Cuba as a threat to U.S. national security is one that Mexico could not support—as one of their diplomats explained at the time: "if we publicly declare that Cuba is a threat to our security, forty million Mexicans will die laughing." See the longer review at Amazon.

Dalai Lama, The Art of Happiness at Work

Although Peter Drucker and I have both written about "work as a calling" and the importance of finding joy in what you do, and that could serve as a one-sentence summary of the book, there is more to this book than that. Taken with patience, and used as a mind-calming exercise to slowly read a chapter or two and then apply it to one's own (presumably uncalm) work environment, the book could serve as a touchstone for "backing off" and reflecting. There are a number of books on Zen Buddhism, including my very own all time favorite,

not by a Zen Buddhist, on *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*. They all seem to boil down to fulfillment within the circumstances, making the most of what you have, treating everyone as an equal, and being glad you are not in a Turkish jail on drug charges—life could be worse.

Doblmeier, Martin, Bonhoeffer DVD

* Possible for one man to detect evil early on, and to resist evil * Bonhoeffer excelled at pointing out that for any man or nation to presume that God takes sides or endorses any particular position is very pretentious * God is *community* -- God is present to the extent that community of man thrives * If the working poor turn away from the church, it is failing; if the petty bourgeoisie flock to the church it is failing and pretentious * In times of economic crisis, fascism can be attractive to BOTH the industrial leaders AND the forlorn working poor "Peace is the opposite of security" (one is actual, the other is enforced) * Study, service, prayer. * Oppressed people of color have piety and also have something to teach to all Christians, an innate passion for celebrating faith. * What cost oppression? The cost is the loss of God. * Ethics is situational—will of God has infinite variations. Ethics is less about principles and more about flexibility. Ethics is an act of faith—every minute, every day. Many more notes in the longer Amazon review.

Ellsberg, Daniel, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers

On such a foundation [see additional listing with different information under Methods], the author discusses the ethics of Presidential leadership. He is especially strong—and relevant today—in discussing how Presidential appointees regard loyalty to the President as a mandate for lying to Congress and the media and the public. The author excels at bringing forward how our own corruption in abetting foreign corruption is easily recognized and interpreted by indigenous personnel—just as how whom we support is quick evidence of how little we know about local politics. From here the author segues into the ethics of collateral damage and the liability of the American people for war crimes and naked aggression against the Vietnamese because of our deliberate violation of the Geneva accords and our support for a corrupt series of dictatorships in South Viet-Nam. Much of what we did in Viet-Nam would appear to qualify for prosecution under the International Tribunal, and it may be that our bi-partisan history of war crimes in Viet-Nam is what keeps us from acknowledging the inherent wisdom of accepting the jurisdiction of the

International Tribunal in future wars. Tellingly, at one point his wife reads the Pentagon Papers and her tearful reaction is: "this is the language of torturers."

Etzioni, Amitai, *The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society*

My over-arching note on the book is that information can and should be a moral force, and a force for good within any community. The author's bottom line is that morality must be inherent in the individual—it cannot be imposed, only taught—that those who consider themselves religious are not necessarily moral, and that politicians cannot be neutral on moral relativism, or they open the door to moral extremists. Among my notes in the margins, inspired by the author: cannot turn responsibility into duty; citizens failing to be socially responsible can open the door to tyranny; anarchy comes with excessive autonomy—deviance allowed is deviance redefined as acceptable; communitarians may be an alternative to the extreme right, something is needed with the collapse of the democrats; organizational morality is important—should corporations be allowed to degrade and exploit humans in the name of "neutral" economic values?; shared values are the heart of sensible sustainable policy making; laws can inspire corruption and crime; inherent morality is the opposite; many policies (e.g. transportation, housing, education) do not provide for social impact evaluation; no such thing as "value free" anything; monolithic communities harm the multi-layered community.

Feffer, John, *Power Trip (Open Media Series)*

The book explores the mis-direction of US foreign policy, with sections on resources, military, international law, foreign economic policy, intelligence, and culture. The discussion includes the specifics on Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia.

Green, Mark, *Selling Out*

The bottom line is clear: until the 60% of America that is eligible to vote but does not vote, comes back into the democracy as active participants who question candidates, vote for candidates, and hold elected representatives accountable *in detail and day to day,* then corporate corruption will continue to rule the roost and will continue to concentrate wealth in the hands of an unreasonably wealthy few at the expense of the general public.

Greider, William, *The Soul of Capitalism: Opening Paths to a Moral Economy*

Politically and economically, this book offers the citizen-voter-consumer-stockholder an objective and balanced account of exactly what is wrong with the existing American way of capitalism (both at home and abroad), and how we might, over time, fix it. Most importantly, the author destroys all of the myths and lies about the rising American standard of living, and demonstrates that when one revises the Gross Domestic Product calculations to subtract rather than add the negative products such as prisons and health care stemming from unsafe products and practices, the over-all national economic indicators have been steadily declining for over thirty years. The author is brilliant—truly brilliant—in studying the work of others and putting together a case for redefining capitalism and the financial accounting for capitalism to include social costs and benefits as part of the evaluative calculus. He excels at understanding and explaining the benefits to be had by introducing long-term sustainability, worker-friendly labor and management cultures, and balanced work force composition (save the middle class) and compensation (end the looting of America and its pension funds by an out-of-control corporate elite). In discussing the soul of capitalism, the author is in fact discussing America's soul. See the much longer review at Amazon.

Hiro, Dilip, *Secrets and Lies: Operation "Iraqi Freedom" and After: A Prelude to the Fall of U.S. Power in the Middle East?*

In some ways, this book is a great deal more distressing than the various pundit books slamming Bush (Moore, Hightower, Frankel, Krugman, Carville, etc.) because there is not a single caustic turn of phrase, not a single line of satire, not a single double entendre in the entire work. This is a brutally straightforward, earnestly researched, ably footnoted, totally credible review of all of the secrets and lies that led to the war in Iraq. This book is a cold-hearted look—so cold-hearted it ignites a flame of righteous anger in any careful reader—at how America has destroyed its credibility and its ability to have a positive influence in the Middle East. Truth matters. Paul O'Neil is correct to speculate that we will heal ourselves, and equally correct to point out that this will happen only if we speak and hear the truth about these grievous circumstances in which great evil is done "in our name." This book, more so than the others that I cited above, is perhaps the first serious building block toward righting our ship of state.

Kasrils, Ronnie, "Armed and Dangerous": My Undercover Struggle Against Apartheid (African Writers Series)

In the end, and over-all, I am left with four impressions: a) Morality really does matter, as does mass. A mass of people with morality is more powerful than an elite with guns. b) Torture and murder by minions can be forgiven and understood—it is their political masters who must be held accountable. c) Women are the best. the most steadfast revolutionaries—and their men could not survive decades of hardship without the steadfast commitment of their companions. d) South Africa is ready (he quotes Thabo Mbeki) to make its own history. **IO NOTE:** 21 others points are made in the longer review at Amazon. There is a lot to be learned from this book. Kasrils, incidentally, is white—one of the very few to join the black liberation revolution from the beginning.

Levy, Bernard Henri, War, Evil, and the End of History

The real gem in the book is the connection he makes between 9-11 and our deliberate ignorance of the many wars, genocides, crimes against women and children, torture, corruption, etcetera that we in the West have manifested. He writes with conviction and insight about the "meaningless war" across Africa, South Asia, around the globe, where entire regions have descended into a chaotic hell of kill and be killed, work and die, slavery or death, rape then death. His point, which I like very much, is that history does not end, it recycles, and in 9-11 and the global war on terrorism what we have is a "homecoming" of all these wars to America and its Western allies. The book concludes on a note worthy of the greatest philosophers, a reflection on the death of memory within Western civilization, the death of *moral* memory. Morality has a tangible value in helping nations, organizations, and individuals "get it right." The last two pages of the book are the best, and conjure up clear and frightening pictures of billions of dispossessed swarming over the European and US cities, bringing the despair we have ignored to our doorstep. Ignore history, ignore evil, and it will eventually, inevitably, come to your doorstep. We—or perhaps even more sadly, our children and grandchildren—will pay for our moral cowardice and our historical blindness.

Mills, James, UNDERGROUND EMPIRE

There are two kinds of government crime against the taxpayer, and both are wide-spread and costly to the taxpayer. There is corporate corruption, the

buying of politicians, such that decisions are made that in effect transfer the taxes paid by individuals (who carry every government's costs) to unethical corporations focused on profit at any cost (to others). This book documents the second kind of crime: where government agencies charged with protecting the taxpayer from drugs or crime or terrorists or other threats, themselves become allies with criminals, and seek to profit from crime while permitting field officers to go bad, steal money, and become nothing more than officially sanctioned criminals. If and when each Nation cleans house within its "secret world," the ethics of intelligence, and how to police the police, will be among the most fearsome challenges to be addressed. This extraordinary book, at 1165 pages (1974 edition) is a deeply documented, thoughtful, credible account of the second kind of corruption. It is strongly recommended for purchase by anyone who pays taxes.

Peosay, Tom, Tibet - Cry of the Snow Lion DVD

I was educated by this documentary. I had never really thought about Tibet as other than a spiritual oddity. This documentary very effectively points out that it can and should be a zone of peace, not least because it is situated between China and India, two of the most populous nations on earth, between them holding one half of the earth's population, and both of them nuclear *and* poor. The documentary ends on a high note. It explicitly calls for liberation through knowledge and compassion, and one educator is very effective in pointing out that no one expected apartheid to end in South Africa, or the Berlin Wall to fall, yet both came to pass. Tibet, by this telling, is next.

Perkins, John, Confessions of an Economic Hit Man

The alter ego of this book, in this case from Latin America, is Alvaro Vargas Llosa's *Liberty for Latin America: How to Undo Five Hundred Years of State Oppression*. As populism sweeps across Latin America, and Western corporations are expelled, as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela works to extend European concepts of Social Democracy and egalitarian distribution of wealth, this book (*Confessions*) can be said to be the equivalent of Martin Luther's posting to the cathedral door—it outlines all the reasons why Americans—US citizens—must heal themselves and retake control over their own economy, ceasing the transfer of its plagues to others. At root, this book is about what we teach in our schools and practice in our daily lives: values, or a lack there-of. Together with other related books, such as Clyde Prestowitz' *ROGUE NATION*:

American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions, this book makes crystal clear the fact that we have abandoned our original moral focus on a Republic offering hope to all mankind, and have instead created an Empire, by, of, and for the 1% of the American population that is now in super-sized wealthy elite status.

Schmookler, Andrew, The Parable of the Tribes: The Problem of Power in Social Evolution

This is tough reading, in part because the publisher's choice of paper and font are not the best. As one who has previously recommended such books as Lionel Tiger's *The Manufacture of Evil: Ethics, Evolution, and the Industrial System*, Norman Cousins *The Pathology of Power*, and many other books on the pathologies of treating man as a "commodity," of scientific objectivity as "value neutral" and therefore bad, of secrecy as counter-productive to "precautionary principle" decision-making, I immediately recognized this book as an integrative work, possibly supplanting all those other books by bringing the various arguments together in one place. This is indeed a brilliant product by a towering intellect, and it has the bibliography and index that one would expect from a world-class endeavor. I recommend it together with Philip Alott's *The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State*, Stewart Brand's *Clock of the Long Now*, and John Lewis Gaddis *The Landscape of History*. The author's bottom line: not only must we come to grips with how power is managed in every nation and organization, but also we must manage at the *global* level if we are to succeed in optimizing fulfillment at the *individual* level.

Seagrave, Sterling and Peggy, Gold Warriors: America's Secret Recovery of Yamashita's Gold

This book is earth-shattering and faith-shaking, a well-documented tale of deceit at the highest levels of the US government. So controversial and potentially explosive are the findings of this book, to wit, that the White House recovered most of the Nazi and Japanese loot and created a secret slush fund for covert political operations world-wide, that the authors go the extra mile and offer, at a nominal price, two CD-ROMS containing 60,000 pages of supporting documentation including the Japanese treasure maps used by the US to recover the gold and other valuables. Citi-Bank comes in for special scrutiny. The books is strongly supportive of two secret budgets—one run by Wall Street and

one run by Treasury—both off the books and both used to further the agenda of a very small wealthy elite that treats Washington as a “front” for its global corruption and looting. See also my review of *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man* by John Perkins. **IO NOTE:** The Chinese did not sign the treaty foregoing reparations for World War II. Their claims against this gold, both for looting and reparations against the US and Japanese *vis a vis* Prisoner of War mis-treatment, are the smoking gun of this decade.

Senge, Peter, et al., *Presence: An Exploration of Profound Change in People, Organizations, and Society*

"At the heart of the challenge facing HP—and lots of other businesses—is the way information moves around the world. In order to grow in line with our business, new ways of experiencing information will be needed. When Humberto says that 'love is the only emotion that expands intelligence,' it reminds us that legitimacy and trust are crucial for the free flow of information and for how information gets transformed into value." Page 216—the only decent thought in the book.

Tiger, Lionel, *The Manufacture of Evil: Ethics, Evolution and the Industrial System*

Summing the book up in one sentence: the industrial system disconnected the ethics of kinship and community from the production process. It allowed "objective" industrial management to devise complex processes in which each individual plays a functionalist role with minimalist information, and no one person can see the relationship between their "objective" task, and the massively dysfunctional, pathological, and corrupt outcomes of the total industrial system. This is an erudite, well-documented, well-reasoned book. It carefully addresses the manner in which socio-pathological organizations—including militaries and the corporations that create them in their image—undermine national security and the national commonwealth. It concludes on a positive **IO NOTE:** restoring group governance, and restoring the connection between kinship, community, ethics, and the manner in which national security and national economic decisions are made, can reverse this destructive evil trend, and restore mankind to a state of grace among men and between men and nature. This is an inspiring important work.

Wallis, Jim, *God's Politics: Why the Right Gets It Wrong and the Left Doesn't Get It*

This hard-hitting book is full of both common sense and scholarship. Over-all it slams both Right and Left--the Right for claiming that Jesus is pro-war, pro-rich, and a selective moralist; the Left for not embracing faith and God as part of the politics of America. Early in the book I am immediately won over by the author's preliminary manifesto in his preface: we who have faith are not single-issue voters; we believe that poverty is a religious issue; that caring for God's earth is a religious issue; that war—and making peace—is a religious issue; that truth-telling is a religious issue; that human rights are a religious issue; that our response to terrorism is a religious issue; and finally, that a consistent ethic of human life is a religious issue. Throughout this book the author returns again and again, to a theme that I am now seeing everywhere: morality matters.

Will, George, *Statecraft as Soulcraft*

Although George Will can be an extremist in some of his views, he has a good mind and is gifted as an author and orator. This is nowhere more evident than in this collection of 20th century essays, where he focuses on "statecraft as soulcraft." Thomas Jefferson understood that an educated citizenry was a Nation's best defense, and the Vietnamese have clearly demonstrated that a nation with a strong strategic culture can defeat the United States when it practices the American way of war (lots of technology, little public support for the war). Today we are beginning to understand that the moral aspects of national character are 3-5 times more important than the physical and economic and technical aspects. Michele Borba's new book, *Building Moral Intelligence*, together with George Will's dated but still powerfully relevant book, comprise the urgently needed elementary education for all adults who would be responsible citizens--or leaders of citizens.

Ziegler, Jean, *The Swiss, The Gold And The Dead: How Swiss Bankers Helped Finance the Nazi War Machine*

This is a good book, with good notes and a good index, and there is no denying the power of its retrospective examination of Swiss misbehavior. Three aspects of this book stood out for me: 1) The glorification of secrecy as an end in itself, justifying almost any position—in substituting secrecy for morality the Swiss have aided and abetted war crimes, not just by the Nazis, but by many other

evil people and organizations. 2) The lesser known aspect of Swiss misbehavior in rejecting hundreds of thousands of refugees, condemning them to certain death, while also bank-rolling and arming Hitler, essentially rescuing Germany from certain defeat in the early days, while prolonging the war toward the end. 3) The fact that today Switzerland continues to be the financial haven of choice for dictators and genocidal war-mongers of all sorts. I happen to like Switzerland and admire the Swiss, but this book is a good spanking and it will be a test of their character as well as their "situational awareness" to see if in the aftermath of 9-11 they recognize the possibility that some forms of money should not be laundered, some forms of client should not be served—as one famous plastic surgeon once said, "you make your money on the ones you do, you make your reputation on the ones you do not."

Futures

Petersen, John, Out of the Blue

I recommend this book, updated from the 1997 version, very highly. It is a well-structured look at all sorts of "jokers" or "wild cards", and I particularly like the methodology for calculating impact across nine factors (rate of change, reach, vulnerability, outcome, timing, opposition, power factor, foresight factor, and quality), all combining to create the tenth "impact index". After a short introduction, each major "earth-shaking" wild card is covered with two pages of clear graphics that are easy to absorb. **IO NOTE:** If I have learned one thing since the last two books (*ON INTELLIGENCE*, and *THE NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE*), it is that intelligence is a tiny sub-set of IO, and that IO done right is about early warning and peaceful preventive measures—IO is for Nations what "be prepared" is for the Boy Scouts—figure it out and get 'r done, *first* at home, *then* overseas.

Sterling, Bruce, Tomorrow Now: Envisioning the Next Fifty Years

The author focuses on generic engineering, imagining an order of magnitude of achievement beyond what is now conceptualized; he properly redefines education in the future as being disconnected from the schools that today are socializing institutions, beating creativity out of children and doing nothing for adults that need to learn, unlearn, and relearn across their lifetimes; he is

brilliant in conceptualizing both crime as necessary and exported instability as tacitly deliberate—Africa as the whorehouse and Skid Row of the world; he recognizes oil as the primary source of instability and inequality, sees all politicians as devoid of grand vision (and we would surmise, character as well); he is hugely successful in talking about the mythical "American people" that do not exist, about moral panics after Enron or 9-11 that achieve no true reform; and his focus on the information age basics that make it cheaper to migrate business than people, that make it essential for the Germans to see through Microsoft's insecure code and thus to opt for LINUX or open source code for their military as well as their government systems in general. He ends brilliantly in conceptualizing a new world order within a new world disorder, in which very rich individuals combine with very poor recruits from a nationless Diaspora, a new network that looks like Al Qaeda but has opposite objectives. In the larger scheme of things, as the author concludes, Earth is debris and the humans are on their way to being the Sixth Extinction. Party while you can.

History

Brand, Stewart, *The Clock of the Long Now: Time and Responsibility: The Ideas Behind the World's Slowest Computer*

At it's heart, this book, which reflects the cumulative commitment of not only the author but some other brilliant *avant garde* minds including Danny Hillis, Kevin Kelly (*WIRED*, *Out of Control*, *the Rise of Neo-Biological Civilization*), Esther Dyson, Mitch Kapor (Lotus, Electronic Frontier Foundation) and a few others, is about reframing the way people—the entire population of the Earth—think, moving them from the big now toward the Long Here, taking responsibility for acting as it every behavior will impact on the 10,000 year long timeframe. This book is in the best traditions of our native American forebears (as well as other cultures with a long view), always promoting a feedback-decision loop that carefully considered the impact on the "seventh generation." That's 235 years or so, or more. The author has done a superb job of drawing on the thinking of others (e.g. Freeman Dyson, Esther's father) in considering the deep deep implications for mankind of "thinking in time" (a title popularized, brilliantly, by Ernest May and Richard Neustadt of Harvard), while adding his own integrative and expanding ideas. He joints Lee Kuan Yew, brilliant and decades-long grand-father of Asian prosperity and

cohesiveness, in focusing on culture and the long-term importance of culture as the glue for patience and sound long-term decision-making. His focus on the key principles of longevity, maintainability, transparency, evolvability, and scalability harken back to his early days as the editor of the *Whole Earth Review* (and *Catalog*) and one comes away from this book feeling that Stewart Brand is indeed the "first pilot" of Spaceship Earth.

Durant, Will and Ariel, The Lessons of History

This is the first book that I discuss in my national security lecture on the literature relevant to strategy & force structure. It is a once-in-a-lifetime gem of a book that sums up their much larger ten volume collection which itself is brilliant but time consuming. This is the "executive briefing." Geography matters. Inequality is natural. Famine, pestilence, and war are Nature's way of balancing the population. Birth control (or not) has *strategic* implications (e.g. see Catholic strategy versus US and Russian neglect of its replenishment among the higher social and economic classes). History is color-blind. Morality is strength. Worth saying again: morality is strength. See my various lists. This book, John Lewis Gaddis on *The Landscape of History*, and Stewart Brand *The Clock of the Long Now* are among my "top ten of all time."

Gaddis, John Lewis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past

He is bluntly critical of the political science and social science communities, branding them with an inability to engage in methodical research or articulation. History is a "denied area." When we combine our current lack of appreciation of history across all the disciplines, with our long track record of disdain for religion and culture as fundamental aspects of the total intelligence picture, we must recognize that we have created many "virtual denied areas" for ourselves, Islam being but one of many. In that vein, this book can be considered a primer on how to go about understanding a "denied area" by substituting analytic tradecraft for the multiplicity of sources that characterize the more obvious targets of our interest. **IO NOTE:** Scholars are a real mixed-bag. Avoid the ones that hang around the beltway—try to integrate Asian, European, and Southern Hemisphere scholars. Above all, cast a wide net.

Morris, Errol, *The Fog of War - Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara* DVD

- Lesson 1: Empathize With Your Enemy.
- Lesson 2: Rationality Will Not Save Us.
- Lesson 3: There's Something Beyond Oneself.
- Lesson 4: Maximize Efficiency.
- Lesson 5: Proportionality Should Be A Guideline In War.
- Lesson 6: Get The Data.
- Lesson 7: Belief & Seeing Are Both Often Wrong.
- Lesson 8: Be Prepared To Re-Examine Your Reasoning.
- Lesson 9: In Order To Do Good, You May Have To Engage In Evil.
- Lesson 10: Never Say Never.
- Lesson 11: You Can't Change Human Nature.

There will always be war, and disaster. We can try to understand it, and deal with it, while seeking to calm our own human nature that wants to strike back in ways that are counter-productive. See Amazon for paragraphs detailing each of the above lessons.

Parry, Robert, *Lost History: Contras, Cocaine, the Press & 'Project Truth'*

This book is a real gem. It outlines a tale of both corruption and ideological mendacity within the White House, and of ignorance and unprofessionalism with the Directorate of Operations in the Central Intelligence Agency. As one who served on the Central American Task Force at the time, and as a clandestine case officer focused on these matters, I find it especially fascinating that I, from the inside, was truly unaware of the degree to which we were engaged in direct support to a band of contras characterized by drug-running, money-laundering, corruption, rape, torture, routine murders, and perhaps worse of all, total incompetence and ineffectiveness. ... First, as the title suggests, there is a "lost history" that is unavailable to the American people. The author is not alone in making this charge. The editors of the history of the Department of State have on several occasions complained, both publicly and privately, that an accurate history of the foreign relations of the United States of America cannot be written without more complete disclosure of our various covert operations. ... The other major value of this book is its examination of how the White House, first under Reagan and now under Bush junior, and personified in the activities of one Otto Reich (Reich and Rove are exemplar

representatives of the neo-Nazi and neo-conservative aspects of the Cheney-Bush regime), has violated various US laws and values by running psychological operations and media campaigns against its own public. ... Usefully, the author documents a General Accounting Office (GAO) decision on 30 September 1987 that the "white propaganda" of Otto Reich and the Public Diplomacy Office in the Department of State amounted to "prohibited covert propaganda activities" against the US media and the US public. **IO NOTE:** If you are an IO professional concerned about possibly being engaged in activities that are illegal and unethical in relation to the US tax-paying public, this is a very good book for an orientation. Read the longer review at Amazon before buying the book.

Reston, James, *Dogs of God: Columbus, the Inquisition, and the Defeat of the Moors*

The author excels at showing the human side of history, the manner in which craven banal human weaknesses wreak havoc on civilizations, tribes, and nations. There is one point in which I am reminded of the power of courtiers, and another in which the same courtier uses homosexuality as a means of subduing a king—both are all too close to reality today. In short, this book has lessons for us today, both in seeing how dangerous our fundamentalist religious extremists are in waging armed crusades lacking in contextual balance, how dangerous courtiers with too much power can be; how vulnerable nominally powerful rules can be when they suffer from deep and unresolved inner conflicts, and how deeply the historical antipathies might lie within Islam against the West. The relationship between evil, intolerant religion, weak kings and powerful courtiers, and suffering peoples of all faiths, is compelling depicted in this book—history is brought forward in a truly excellent manner. We learn, or we repeat. Can anyone justify the Inquisition or the Crusades? Is it possible to denounce individual terrorists while embracing 44 dictators, many of them practicing genocide, others supporting the looting of their entire commonwealths? Could we not have spent the last trillion of our common wealth more wisely?

Intelligence

Alvarez, David, *Spies in the Vatican: Espionage & Intrigue from Napoleon to the Holocaust (Modern War Studies)*

The book suggested to me three "big" ideas that need to be considered by every national intelligence service: 1) Structure and capabilities are needed to study religious intelligence and counterintelligence. 2) Secure communications make a very important contribution to candor and accuracy. 3) Finally, while the author does not cover Vatican betrayals of its own people through the Inquisition, of Muslims through the Crusades, and of Jews during the Holocaust, it is clear from this book that for all its limitations, the Catholic Church is an important global player whose local nuncios and bishops and priests and lay personnel can and should be legally and ethically leveraged for sounder understandings across many cultural divides. I would go so far as to resurface Richard Falk's 1970's idea about a world council of peoples and religions, with a twist: each Foreign Ministry must establish a separate Bureau of Religious Understanding, and devote considerable resources to studying and interacting with religious organizations (and cults, although these can be dealt with on a confrontational law enforcement basis).

Andrew, Christopher, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World*

Tremendous scholarship applied to unique Soviet intelligence archives, reveals the draconian waste of resources and pedestrian results of decades of spying and covert actions. Toward the end, documents the enormous penetration of DoD by U.S. contractors recruited by Soviets (and I might add, by everyone else including the Chinese, Iranians, Israelis and even Third World countries).

Baker, John, *Commercial Observation Satellites: At the Leading Edge of Global Transparency*

As one who regards the collection of imagery as a supporting event, in support of the creation of geospatially-based all-source databases and integrated analysis, I would observe that this book must be regarded as skewed toward policies and capabilities related to commercial imagery collection. It does not

address the many vital topics having to do with geospatial databases, the integration of diverse sources of geospatial imagery including Russian military maps and classified digital terrain elevation data, or the integrating of imagery into the all-source analysis process. I recommend this book strongly, both for commanders who would like to exercise some control over national imagery collection policies and investments; and for business leaders who might wish to contemplate how the taxpayer dollar could be better spent in support of generic commercial imagery capabilities whose fruits can be easily shared with the private sector and especially non-governmental organizations.

Crile, George, *Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History*

CIA analysis was constantly flawed because of its reliance on technical collection or foreign liaison reporting. Examples of actual human observation of Egyptian arms failures made the point that there is no substitute for the human case officer in the field. Bureaucracy: CIA bluebloods were timid—"bureaucratic cowardice" is a term seen several times—and so were the AID leaders, the Pentagon, the State Department, and even the White House. CIA did not want more money for Afghanistan, was at war with the State Department, did what it could to slander and undermine Congressman Wilson, was slow in every respect ("what we did with Charlie in one month would have taken us nine years to accomplish [through normal channels]." Israel. Israel is in a class by itself. American Jews funded Charlie Wilson's survival and Israel empowered him in multiple ways. It is a real irony of this book that Israel was the key factor in creating the armed Islamic jihad movement, with consequences no one anticipated. Lawyers. Page 165 and throughout the book document the essential castration of the CIA by its own lawyers. As Avrakotos is quoted in the book: "If I asked them they would have jerked off for three months trying to figure out why we couldn't do it." Operations. The book documents some severe shortfalls in CIA's operational capabilities, including a great quote: "Out of twenty-five hundred [case officers]...maybe five percent are super, twenty percent good, and five percent shot." [IO NOTE: this leaves 70% in a dead zone.] The incompetence of the CIA's covert procurement process is of special concern. Tribal Knowledge. The book documents the CIA's abysmal lack of understanding, which continues today, of tribal personalities and power relationships, history, and context.

Feis, William, *Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox*

Three themes stayed with me as I put the book down: 1) A great deal can be accomplished in terms of intelligence with even a very small number of people—as few as 1-2 on staff, 3-5 behind the lines. 2) Maps, especially "information maps," are worth their weight in gold. 3) Deserters, prisoners, and legal travelers are a gold mine of information and must, must, must be systematically exploited.

Gertz, Bill, *Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11*

The author has done a good job, but without any reference to any of the fifteen books on intelligence reform published between 1999 and 2000, in quickly reviewing the key elements of intelligence failure and in recommending some specific reforms that thus far have been denied by successive Administrations.

Graham, Senator Bob, *Intelligence Matters*

The book is most important as an unclassified record of what can be known about our failures—in both intelligence and in policy—as understood by the then serving Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI).

1) Senator Graham recognizes better than most that in the absence of public pressure for reform, there is little incentive for Congress or the Executive to take action.

2) Page 243 covers both of the other two points. The first is that the Department of State has become a neglected orphan in US intelligence and US policy making about global threats, and this needs to change.

3) Although disappointing in its brevity, especially since both the Aspin-Brown Commission and the 9-11 Commission found cause to note the importance of open sources of information, Senator Graham also notes on page 243 that a primary corrective measure to the failure of the intelligence community to "connect the dots" and related "incestuous amplification" lies in combining a renewed primacy by the Department of State with greatly increased investments in Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) such as Congressman Rob Simmons (R-

CT-02) is planning to continue championing within both the House Armed Services Committee and the House Committee on Homeland Security..

Senator Graham joins Dick Clarke (whose book, *Against All Enemies* I strongly recommend) in condemning both Saudi Arabian sponsorship of terrorism, and the bi-partisan Clinton-Bush pandering to the Saudi's, accepting despicable sustained actions by the government of Saudi Arabia against the government and people of the United States of America, for the sake of cheap oil (see also the books by Michael Klare and by Robert Baer). Senator Graham ends his book by lamenting the lack of accountability in both intelligence and policy.

Helms, Richard, *A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency*

Richard Helms is, after Allen Dulles, arguably the most significant US spymaster and intelligence manager in history. It is a fortunate circumstance that he overcame his reluctance to publish anything at all, and worked with the trusted William Hood, whose own books are remarkable, to put before the public a most useful memoir. Below are a few of the gems that I find worth noting, and for which I recommend the book as a unique record: 1) Puts forward elegant argument for permissive & necessary secrecy in the best interests of the public 2) Defends the CIA culture as highly disciplined—he is persuasive in stating that only Presidents can order covert actions, and that CIA does only the President's direct bidding. 3) Makes it clear in passing, not intentionally, that his experience as both a journalist and businessman were essential to his ultimate success as a spymaster and manager of complex intelligence endeavors—this suggests that one reason there is "no bench" at CIA today is because all the senior managers have been raised as cattle destined to be veal: as young entry-on-duty (EOD) people, brought up within the bureaucracy, not knowing how to scrounge sources or meet payroll. ... 4) Compellingly discusses the fact that intelligence without counterintelligence is almost irrelevant if not counterproductive, but then glosses over some of the most glaring counterintelligence failures in the history of the CIA—interestingly, he defends James Angleton and places the blame for mistreating Nosenko squarely on the Soviet Division leadership in the Directorate of Operations, a declaration which strongly supports Senator McCain's informed objections to allowing the President or the CIA to have any recourse to torture, which is—in my own experience as a case officer chasing after terrorists—an absolute wrong. Many other points in longer review at Amazon.

Johnson, Loch, *Strategic Intelligence: Windows into a Secret World*

The book is very strong on historical overviews of US intelligence, and is easily the single best collection of US-oriented materials available to the professional or students of intelligence. Absolutely recommended as a readings book for all university classes, both graduate and undergraduate, focusing on intelligence.

Keegan, Sir John, *Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda*

I feel so strongly about the misdirection of this book, its eminent author notwithstanding, that I actually did a press release responding to the early publicity. I hope you find it interesting, because we will lose many more lives and pay much higher costs in damages if we fail to reform national, military, and law enforcement intelligence at the strategic, operational, tactical, and technical levels. Where Sir John misses the point is with respect to the distinct role of intelligence at the strategic level. As Sun Tzu (and perhaps even Colin Gray) would no doubt observe to Sir John, "If you've gotten yourself into a war at all, then you have failed to win by other means, and it is this that is the larger intelligence failure."

Mahle, Melissa Boyle, *Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9-11*

This is, without question, one of the best books available on the intimate subject of the clandestine culture, and it offers some lovely gems and personality assessments that intelligence professionals will appreciate more than the general public. I have taken one star off for lack of detail and context, but strongly recommend the book to anyone who has served in the clandestine service and wishes to be reminded of the dark years when case officers were under such attack, from both their own CIA lawyers as well as external investigators, that they were advised to take out legal insurance to protect themselves—and to anyone who has not served in the clandestine service, and wishes to have a small glimmering of the down side of it all. It's possible to be a good case officer and to accomplish miracles—we just need to educate the lawyers, get new and more intelligent security officers, and groom a whole new generation of ethical intelligent adventurous managers.

Odom, General William, Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America

There are two very important themes running through this book, and they earn the author a solid four stars and a "must read" recommendation. First, the author is correct and compellingly clear when he points out that even the most senior intelligence professionals, including DCIs, simply do not understand the full range of intelligence organizations, capabilities, and problems that exist—just about everyone has spent their entire career in a small niche with its own culture. Second, the author is unique for focusing on an area that is both vital and ignored today: that of creating joint and combined intelligence concepts and doctrine to ensure that minimal common understandings as well as training competency levels are reached across varied jurisdictions; and to enable competent community resource management, also non-existent today. ... Among the many important points that he makes, I especially agree with his pointing out the need to fully integrate the management of inputs and outputs within each of the major collection disciplines—as he notes, disconnecting the building of satellites, or aerial imagery vehicles, or unmanned aerial drones, from the actual needs of the end-user and the actual responsibility to produce imagery intelligence, leads to precisely what the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Commission Report of December 1999 noted as the major shortfall in national intelligence—close to a trillion spent on secret satellite collection, and nothing spent on tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED). The author specifically identifies \$6 billion in savings being achievable from the NRO budget over five years—savings that could be applied to enhancing analysis, creating competent clandestine collection capabilities, establishing global open source collection activities in each of the theaters, and creating a new national counterintelligence and homeland security intelligence program.

Platje, Wies et al, Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future

Intelligence, and predominantly open source information converted into intelligence easily shared with all parties, is the essence of peacekeeping—it helps get the mandate right, the force structure right, the campaign plan right, and the tactics right.

Riebling, Mark, WEDGE: From Pearl Harbor to 9-11—How the Secret War between the FBI and CIA Has Endangered National Security

The earlier version of this book focused on the decades of historical enmity between CIA and FBI—in the early years, Edgar J. Hoover was clearly to blame for a culture of hostility between the two agencies and between the FBI and military intelligence—in one instance he actually suppressed early knowledge of Japanese intentions on Pearl Harbor obtained from a German agent tasked to fulfill their targeting requirements. In later years the CIA took on more responsibility for shutting out the FBI, consistently refusing to brief them in to either internal counterintelligence failures, or foreign operations with a strong domestic counterintelligence matter. What the author has done in the aftermath of 9-11 is update the book and make it even more relevant to every citizen and every elected official and every bureaucrat.

Schoen, Gary, First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan

The book provides some extremely useful insights from the field with respect to Washington's failure to understand local politics and ground truth despite frequent detailed field appraisals from the Chief of Station, and the book makes it clear that Pakistan lobbied Washington strategically and ably to "sell" its plan for taking over Afghanistan with its own allies, against both Russian and US (and for that matter, Chinese) best interests. Contains five deep insights into flaws in U.S. military, including obsession with force protection and PAVE LOW not being able to talk to CIA on the ground in the final approach.

Sims, Jennifer, Transforming U.S. Intelligence

Valuable "must read" but not at all transformative. Overstates value of existing bureaucracies including FBI, understates failures and completely eschews migration toward multinational inter-agency information sharing.

Sullivan, John, Of Spies and Lies: A CIA Lie Detector Remembers Vietnam

The entire book is a gem. While I do not relish factual and temperate evidence that our clandestine operations in Viet-Nam were largely a sham; that we were the useful idiots to local authorities using us as a cash cow and tool of

vengeance on their personal enemies; that most of our officers were drunk or adulterous or incompetent or all three at once; that our top “recruited” agent really did not have the access he claimed to have but was simply a high-quality channel for his uncle to sell information collected from various local and mostly open sources—all this is depressing. It is also instructive. Other low points include the pettiness of Office of Security and Directorate of Operations (DO) officers, the excessive influence of selected prior military flag-level contract officers who manipulated or suppressed information; and the wholesale abdication of financial management at the local level to Vietnamese paramours who robbed us blind. High points in the author's story include Air America, which never let him down in getting him in and out of places so far forward toward danger I had no idea polygraphers operated that tactically; a few really great case officers who tried to do the right thing; and the basic decency of this one human being, whom I take to be the norm for agency employees world-wide rather than the exception. Viet-Nam brought out the worst in the CIA's operational service, and I have often thought to myself that Viet-Nam is where the DO learned to launder money, run drugs, and leave ethics at the door.

Turner, DCI and Admiral Stansfield, Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence

Extraordinary review by a former Director of Central Intelligence of the relations between past DCIs and their Presidents. Persuades, no doubt unintentionally, that intelligence should not be part of the Executive Branch at all, but rather like the Supreme Court, fully independent.

Turner, Michael, Why Secret Intelligence Fails

On balance I like this book for the general audience—the author has a reasonable amount of experience, he has a very fine structure for discussing the subject, and it is a good alternative to my current favorite, Lowenthal's *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*. This is, and I wish to be crystal clear here, a very fine option for undergraduate students. I strongly recommend this book for purchase by those with a limited knowledge of the world of intelligence, and for use as an undergraduate text. It fails to satisfy at the professional level for two reasons: a lack of adequate attention to professional-level publications, and a lack of discussion of nuances vital to future success.

Wiebes, Cees, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia 1992-1995 (Perspectives on Intelligence History)

This is the only book that I know of that fully integrates deliberate studies of UN intelligence; Western and NATO intelligence (which the author correctly notes does not exist); Dutch intelligence; and belligerent party intelligence. 1) The UN is dangerously devoid of intelligence qua decision-support. 2) The West failed in Bosnia in part because it became over-reliant on technical intelligence (which it could not process or analyze with sufficient speed and reliability), and did not have adequate numbers of competent clandestine Human Intelligence (HUMINT) or even ground-truth observers in the region. 3) Intelligence "liaison" or structured sharing across national boundaries, was an ungodly mess made worse by the inherent biases and rose-colored glasses worn by the Americans and the British on one side, and the French and the Germans on the other. "Wishful thinking" by policy makers interfered with proper assessments of the relative condition and intentions of the various belligerents. Much more in the Amazon review.

Leadership

Bradley, Senator Bill, Time Present, Time Past: A Memoir

The smartest guys do not get elected. Lambastes Congress and Executive for not working as they should, and laments the popular abdication of power to technocrats in government and corrupt corporations, both killing the middle class.

Brown, Juanita, The World Cafe: Shaping Our Futures Through Conversations That Matter

Context, hospitable spaces, questions that matter, encouraging everyone's contribution, cross-pollination of diverse perspectives, listening for patterns, cultivating collective intelligence and insight through dialog instead of debate—this book has it all. Wiki pages and human interfaces.

Buckman, Robert, Building a Knowledge-Driven Organization

1) Technology is the easy part—changing the culture is the hard part (from information hoarding to information sharing). 2) Command and control stovepipes are a big part of the problem—we have to nurture trust and responsibility in all levels by giving all levels access to all information (within reason). 3) Communications, computers, and library services as well as external business intelligence services all have to be rolled together under one executive that has "direct report" relationship with the CEO—it is the networking of humans and their knowledge that has value, not the hardware and software and hard-wired comms lines. 4) If you are not rolling over half your software and hardware each year, with nothing in your C4I system more than two years old at any one time, then you are losing capacity, productivity, and profit. 5) 85% of what you know cannot be captured in structured knowledge archives—only a living network can allow employees to provide just enough, just in time articulation of answers that can be created in real time—this allows a *dramatic* shortening of the business information answer cycle, from months to hours. 6) If the CEO does not get it, live it, and enforce it, it will not happen.

Burns, James MacGregor, Transforming Leadership: The Pursuit of Happiness

The author expands substantially on the very immature but promising field leadership analysis by discussing in detail the concepts and practices of "traits-based" or "value" leadership. ... The author is especially brutal when his ideas are applied to the charismatic or ideologically-purified forms of leadership that pass for Presidential politics today. "At best, charisma is a confusing and undemocratic form of leadership. At worst, it is a form of tyranny." 1) The minority is an absolutely essential part of collective learning and the great dialog that leads to sound decisions. Repressing the minority is a prescription for disaster. 2) The pursuit of happiness, rather than property, was very deliberately selected by the founding fathers in order to focus on human values and collective learning, rather than property rights. 3) Rebellion from time to time is a feature, not a fault. 4) The right to abolish the U.S. Government is specifically reserved to the American people. The author notes that absolutist ideas inspire revolt, crowds have immeasurable power, and narrow ideologies with ritual tests of orthodoxy are an invitation to popular revolution. ... He quotes others in emphasizing that men in fear or want are not free men; that technology and money is not the answer to poverty, only values and liberation

from fear and want, and--his final word, it the end it must be a "great people" rather than a "great man" that rises to the global challenge.

Christensen, Clayton et al, *The Innovator's Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth*

I was talking to a friend the other day about why major (multi-billion dollar a year) companies are not good at innovation, and he recommended this book. Wow! Looking at the companies I know and admire, it all became clear. Innovation *is* disruptive; the most promising marketplace is the opposite of their existing defense and intelligence clients—the people that do not get adequate intelligence support from the existing cash cow; and all of the middle and senior managers (Washington-based) are incrementalists who have succeeded at building bodies-for-hire accounts over decades. Three "litmus tests" that the authors put forward are very helpful to those seeking to monetize disruptive new ideas: 1) Is there a population of clients that has historically been under-funded, under-staffed, and have as a result **gone without**? 2) Is this group likely to appreciate lower cost "good enough" solutions? 3) Is it possible to be profitable while providing these clients lower cost good enough solutions (e.g. monitoring risk around the world, at the sub-state level, something the spies simply cannot do effectively despite their \$70 billion a year budget)? Another major lesson I drew from this book is that alternative channels can be phenomenally successful at relatively low cost. Google could displace most information aggregators including intermediate publishers and the bulk of national intelligence agencies, within five years.

Cohen, Eliot, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*

This is a first-class book and everything that it offers is laudable. Unfortunately, it completely isolates the civilian political to military professional relationship from ethics, intelligence, or the public. This is not to suggest that leadership cannot take place in the absence of intelligence—indeed, Churchill was at his greatest when he formed his private informal intelligence network to replace the static and myopic official intelligence channels that muddled along in the pre-war years. However, to discuss Viet-Nam, for example, and not acknowledge what George Allen has documented so well in *NONE SO BLIND: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam* (Dec, 2001), to wit, the consistent manner in which policy-makers in Washington refused to listen to

accurate intelligence estimates, while their Generals and Ambassadors in Saigon steadfastly "cooked the books," leaves the reader with a distorted understanding of how the policy-military-intelligence triad actually fails, more often than not, on the policy side rather than on the intelligence side. The manipulation of truth from the Saigon end, and the refusal to listen to truth on the Washington end, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian, and American, as well as allied nationalities. Ethics—and intelligence—matter, and no treatment of Supreme Command should fail to address how these two should be but often are not the foundation for the civilian-military relationship.

Diamond, Jared, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed

Deep inside this book, and finally summarized by the author, is a focus on the failure of decision making at all levels of society. A failure to anticipate, a failure to perceive, a failure to attempt remediation, or even if attempted, a failure to achieve remediation, are all failures of each group and its leadership. The author ends thoughtfully by noting that resolution of our imbalances will come one way or the other. The only choice we have is between peaceful planned sustainable changes, and catastrophic imposed "natural" corrections through war, famine, pestilence, and genocide.

Fritz, Robert, The Path of Least Resistance for Managers: Designing Organizations to Succeed

I get two core points out of this reading: first, strive to balance opposites rather than going to one extreme or the other; and second, don't focus on resistance, but rather on opportunities. In the military this known as "going for the gap"—instead of pouring your reserve forces into the weakest point in *your* line, that is at risk of collapsing, you focus instead on finding the "gap" in the enemy line, you pour through that, and whip their ass from behind. Much of this book is critical of both our current educational and our current managerial systems—both spend too much time teaching people what NOT to do, and very little time empowering people to think for themselves and create new "impossible" dreams. The book has direct application to today's national security environment, when it points out that "pre-emptive strikes" are a form of avoiding reality and being reactive in advance rather than proactive and integrative, or transformative. The emphasis on starting with the current reality

(what my world would call "commercial intelligence") may not be fully understood by most middle managers.

Inderfurth, Karl and Loch Johnson (eds), Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council

This is the original gold standard book on the National Security Council, now "replaced" but not fully so, by the new edition, *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council*, just published in February 2004. However, this original edition contains two sections, one on "Disorders" (of the NSC) and the other on "Remedies" (for NSC dysfunctionalities) that have not been fully migrated to the new book, and for that reason, I recommend that this version of the book also be bought, as a supporting element for the value of those two sections and a few other items of significant historical value in understanding the NSC.

Inderfurth, Karl and Loch Johnson (eds), Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council

This is an updated and improved version of the 1988 version, *Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council*, a book that remains, in its original form, a gold standard in the field. The new improved version is that—new and improved, with updated perspectives all the way into the first Bush Administration, recognizing the end of the Cold War and the new Global War on Terror, but it also drops two key sections on Disorder and on Remedies, such that both editions are recommended. There is no finer book available for orienting both undergraduate and graduate students—as well as mid-career adult students—with respect to the vital role that the National Security Council plays in orchestrating America's foreign and national security policies.

Maruska, Don, How Great Decisions Get Made: 10 Easy Steps for Reaching Agreement on Even the Toughest Issues

His ten easy steps merit listing here, not to rob the book of its punch, but to emphasize that each chapter on each of these steps is hugely sensible, implementable, and profitable: 1) enlist everyone including secretaries and maintenance folks; 2) discover shared hopes rather than differing problems; 3) uncover the real issues; 4) identify all options (in ignoring foreign opinion, the

US foregoes most really implementable options); 5) gather the right information, and all of it; 6) get everything on the table; 7) write down choices; 8) map the solutions; 9) look ahead; and 10) stay charged up.

Neff, Thomas, You're in Charge--Now What? The 8 Point Plan

I found this book most useful, and it quickly and immediately inspired me to prepare a succinct 100 day plan broken down into 10 day blocks, for a new \$2 billion a year agency. I recommend this book be read in conjunction with Robert Buckman's *Creating a Knowledge-Driven Organization*, Margaret Wheatley's *Leadership and the New Science* (which Buckman told me inspired his own work), and Clayton Christensen's *The Innovator's Solution* (or you can just read my short summative reviews of those three books).

Stoken, Dick, The Great Game of Politics: Why We Elect, Whom We Elect

The core idea is that America swings from left to right and back again—from a pro-business risk-taking conservative right position to a pro-people risk-reducing social concern left position. The author, who is evidently a very well-respected businessman and trader who is skilled at seeing business cycles, applies his skill to politics. Of the 43 presidents America has had to date, he identifies nine that were "paradigm movers:" George Washington (Federalists), Jefferson (Jeffersonian Democracy), Madison (New Nationalism), Jackson (New Democrats) Lincoln-McKinley (Transition), Roosevelt (New Progressives), Harding (New Era) and Reagan (New Economy). I view the book somewhat skeptically. It is certainly worthwhile, and I do not regret buying it nor absorbing the "nine political paradigms" that the author puts forward, but on balance I find it somewhat simplistic and out of touch with today's realities.

Watkins, Michael, The First 90 Days: Critical Success Strategies for New Leaders at All Levels

From my point of view as the reader, Neff & Citrin actually catalyzed me and inspired me into preparing a 100 day plan broken into 10 ten-day blocks, while Watkins is more of a manual with lots of useful checklists and suggested questions and so on, but between the two, Neff & Citrin actually drove me to the needed outcome: my own 100 day plan.

Wheatley, Margaret, A Simpler Way

Among the core ideas in this book: the absurdity of thinking that rigid ideas and identities will lead to anything other than rigid non-adjustable organizations. The author stresses the value of diversity, passion, connectedness, humanity and humanness, and tying it all together, the role of information and of ethics as facilitators for "being." There is a very useful discussion of bacteria and the manner in which human attempts to impose machine and medical solutions are ultimately defeated by bacteria.

Wheatley, Margaret, Leadership and the New Science: Learning About Organization from an Orderly Universe

Information is what defines who we are, what we can become, what we can perceive, what we are capable of achieving. Blocking or controlling information flows stunts our growth and virtually assures defeat if not death. Command and control are history, disorder in an opportunity. Seminal.

Wheatley, Margaret, Finding Our Way: Leadership for an Uncertain Time

"Independence is a political concept, not a biological concept." She focuses on two fundamentals: the need for all mankind to be free to experiment, and in experimenting, create unlimited diversity; and the need to enhance and expand relationships with others as part of that diversity and sustainable mutually beneficial wealth creation. Translating that into meaning for organizational leaders, she stresses self-organization, listening, embracing all inputs, and striving to create self-identity, information-sharing, and relationships that in turn generate discovery, sharing, and fulfillment.

Methods

Albrecht, Katherine, Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track Your Every Move with RFID

This is a tremendous, absolutely superb example of what "citizen intelligence" can mean in the world today. Two individuals have come together to thoroughly investigate the RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) marketplace,

and they have published a book that is nothing short of brilliant in its detail, its notes, its photos, and its objectives. They have even embedded in the book the fundamentals of mass psychology, and found two "hooks" for spreading fear of RFID among Jews (calling it the modern equivalent of the Yellow Star, which makes light of the Holocaust in this context) and fundamentalist Christians (calling it the Mark of the Beast that precedes the Apocalypse, also a step too far, in my view). My goodness—a two-woman CIA/Special Operations PSYOP unit! On balance, the book is a superb technical review of what is possible and what is planned, and it is also seriously oversold and out of context. There is no question but that many companies, aided by the US Government, are planning for very intrusive tracking of individuals and their purchases. At the same time, the book ignores what is called a "path loss" obstacle (need for short-range transmitter to plugged in receiver), they ignore the ready availability of counter-measures (including aluminum foil, which they do mention in passing), and they fail to understand the severe challenges to massive data mining in real-time.

Barabasi, Alberto-Laszlo, Linked: The New Science of Networks

Contrary to the prevailing wisdom about networks being equally distributed and thus largely invulnerable to catastrophic meltdown, the author does a fine job of documenting the importance of selected "hubs," so important that their removal ultimately breaks the network down into isolated pieces. The functionality of the network, its strength, is also its weakness—vulnerability to deliberate attack against the hubs (the author does not mention the Internet domain directories except in passing while discussing a table error, but MAYEAST and MAYWEST would be two obvious directory hubs that could be better protected through replication). The author inadvertently makes a vital contribution to our understanding of how to defend America against terrorism—discussing why no single authority can close down the Internet by fiat, he notes "The underlying network has become so distributed, decentralized and locally guarded that even such an ordinary task as getting a central map of it has become virtually impossible." LOCALLY GUARDED—this is the key phrase. Federalizing counter-terrorism, and using federal agents and computers at the state and local levels, will not be effective against terrorists in civilian guise within the homeland—only a complete extension of counterintelligence and counterterrorism methods to the state & local level—teaching them to fish for terrorists, rather than trying to catch the terrorists with federal trawlers, is the way to go.

Beckwith, Harry, Selling the Invisible: A Field Guide to Modern Marketing

A few of the author's well-discussed and well-illustrated ideas are offered here to complement the many other favorable reviews: 1) Simplify access to your work! [Learn how to create executive summaries, tables of contents, hyperlinks, etc.—don't assume that everyone knows your value and is willing to spend time digging into your work.] 2) Quality, speed, and price are **not** in competition, they must be offered simultaneously and at full value. 3) What is your promise or value proposition? Are you just showing up, or does every day offer a chance for you to show your value in a specific way? 4) Don't just be the best in your given vocation, **change it** for the better and redefine what "best" means! 5) Sell your relationship (and your understanding of the other person's needs), not just your expertise in isolation. Your boss or client has three choices and you are the last: to do nothing, to do it themselves, or to use you. Focus on being the first choice every time. 6) Execute with passion—and if you are a super-geek or nerd that does not have a high social IQ, form a partnership with a super-popular person and put them in front. There are many other useful thoughts in this book. **IO NOTE:** If you want to know how to sell the invisible, the intangible, the value propositions that revolve around knowledge and insight instead of bending metal and assembling things, this is absolutely the best book one could ask for. Nicely presented.

Beinhart, Larry, Fog Facts: Searching for Truth in the Land of Spin

"Fog facts" are facts that are out in the open, but "invisible" in the sense that no one acts on them. The stolen Florida election—30,000 plus disenfranchised blacks **and** "overcount" votes where Al Gore was both checked and written, rejected as invalid instead of returned for verification—the specious claims against Iraq; the 9-11 Commission apologia; the list goes on. For myself, the most interesting fog facts dealt with the number of terrorists caught and jailed by France and other nations, at a tiny fraction of the cost of invading Afghanistan and Iraq [and with little to show for these occupations except casualties, including significant numbers of US amputees being concealed from the public]. The author gets the jump on the current scandal of the disappearing billions in Iraq—not just the billions for Halliburton in sole source contracts, but the outright theft and squandering of the \$19 billion in Iraqi bank credits that Paul Bremer managed to fritter away—and they still do not have running water or electricity. On page 82 he repeats what is now perhaps the most

famous quote to come out of the Bush Junior White House, where an arrogant aide dismisses a "reality-based" person and says that the U.S. is an empire now, and makes its own reality. The author concludes that there is a war today, not between civilizations, but between faith-based and reality-based communities.

Burwell, Helen, *Online Competitive Intelligence: Increase Your Profits Using Cyber-Intelligence*

This is the first of three basic guides by Facts on Demand press that I am very happy to have in my collection and to recommend to others. Helen Burwell is the "grand dame" among information brokers, along with several other great ladies, and I continue to use and treasure her *Burwell World Directory of Information Brokers*. While some may be disappointed if this is their area of expertise, I've seen a lot of these guides and this one is just fine as starting point. If you can afford to buy two books for the "mechanics," buy this one and *Finding It Online*.

Carr, Caleb, *The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians*

There is major aspect of this book that I applaud, and it takes it from 3 to 4 stars: it is the single most effective statement I have seen that denounces U.S. "precision" warfare as not so precision after all, because of the pre-planned (i.e. pre-meditated and culpable) deaths of tens of thousands of civilians as acceptable "collateral damage." Although "total war" certainly applies to state on state warfare, the author correctly notes that killing civilians is neither beneficial nor acceptable when making war on dictators or terrorists. That has to be "man on man" and America is simply not capable of doing that—the military-industrial complex would cease to exist as we know it if we actually focused on funding ground truth intelligence at the neighborhood level, and the ability to send invisible snake-eater in and out to do justice on the basis of "one man, one bullet," something I have long advocated. There is nothing in this book helpful to crafting a new grand strategy balancing military, diplomatic, intelligence, cultural, and economic initiatives to "close the gap" (see my review of Thomas Barnett's *The Pentagon's New Map*).

Cialdini, Robert, Influence: Science and Practice (4th Edition)

While intended for students of psychology and for practitioners of the black art of marketing (selling over-priced unnecessary "stuff" to the unwitting), I regard this text as a very helpful reference for the new warriors, the practitioners of Information Operations and within that larger discipline, Strategic Communication & Public Diplomacy. The six "principles" of influence, reciprocation, consistency, social proof (e.g. canned laughter), liking, authority, and scarcity, each receive their own chapter with anecdotes and study questions. Most interesting to me would be an international variation of this book, one that discussed the nuances of influence in other cultures, inclusive of family ties and prevalent stereotypes. This book is applicable to business, evangelism, foreign affairs, defense, homeland security, and just about any field where interaction with humans is called for, and the mission demands the elicitation of collaborative behavior from others. **IO NOTE:** This is a basic primer for Strategic Communication, very valuable.

Daalder, Ivo, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo

In my view, this book is essential reading together with the following four books, all of which I have favorably reviewed here at Amazon: first, Kristan Wheaton, on *The Warning Solution: Intelligent Analysis in the Age of Information Overload*, Cees Wiebes, *Intelligence in Bosnia, 1992-1995*, Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War*, and Eliot Cohen, *Supreme Command*. These four books cover what this book does not: 1) a full explanation of why "inconvenient warning" fails time and again; 2) a full explanation of the complete inadequacy of Western intelligence in relation to historical, cultural, and current indigenous intelligence as well as small arms interdiction in lower-tier unstable regions; 3) a useful itemization of the weaknesses of both NATO and the US military in responding to unconventional challenges in tough terrain distant from the center of Europe; and 4) how "supreme command" is most often exercised without regard to intelligence.

DeLong, General Michael, Inside CentCom: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq

There are exactly two gems in this book. The first deals with the problems we had in supporting our Special Forces in Afghanistan above the 12,000 foot level (actually, anything above 6,000 feet challenges our aviation). I ask myself in

the margin, "why on earth don't we have at least one squadron of helicopters optimized for high-altitude combat operations?" The Special Air Force may claim they do, but I don't believe it. We need a high-altitude unit capable of sustained long-haul operations at the 12,000 foot level, not just a few modified Chinooks and brave Chief Warrant Officers that "make do." The second gem in the book is a recounted discussion on the concept of Arab honor and how US troops in Iraq should have a special liaison unit that approached the families of each person killed "inadvertently" to offer a profound and sincere apology and an "accidental killing fee." This resonates with me, and I was disappointed to see no further discussion—evidently the general heard and remembered this good idea, but did nothing to implement it.

Denning, Stephen, *The Springboard: How Storytelling Ignites Action in Knowledge-Era Organizations* (KMCI Press)

The book accomplished three things with me, and I am a very hard person to please: 1) it compellingly demonstrated the inadequacy of the industry standard briefing, consisting of complex slides with complex ideas outlined in excruciating detail; 2) it demonstrated how a story-telling approach can accomplish two miracles: a) explain complex ideas in a visual short-hand that causes even the most jaded skeptic to "get it," and b) do this in such a way that the audience rather than the speaker "fills in the blanks" and in so doing becomes a stakeholder in the vision for change; and 3) finally, provides several useful appendices that will help anyone craft a "story" with an action-inducing effect.

Ellis, Susan, *The Volunteer Recruitment (and Membership Development) Book*

There are two aspects of this manual by Susan Ellis that I did not see in the other books: first, her emphasis on casting a wide net and reaching as many potential volunteers as possible....("Most people do not say 'no'; they simply never knew you wanted them to say 'yes'.") While I am skeptical of wasteful advertising programs in this time of diminishing leisure hours, there is something to this. The other vital chapter that this manual offers is the one addressing the importance of image, i.e. the public perception of the organization seeking volunteers, the reputation that it can specifically draw on as a resource. **IO NOTE:** These techniques apply to getting others to accept the message and pass it on.

Ellsberg, Daniel, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers

The author does an effective job of bringing forward the lessons of history, not only from Truman and Eisenhower forward, but from the Japanese and French occupations of Indochina. We failed to learn from history, and even our own experts, such as Lansdale showing McNamara the rough equipment that the Vietnamese would defeat us with because of their "will to win," were sidelined. The author provides valuable insights into how quickly "ground truth" can be established; on how the U.S. Government is not structured to learn; on how the best answers emerge when there is not a lead agency and multiple inputs are solicited simultaneously; and most importantly, on how private truths spoken in secrecy are not effective within any Administration. The author stresses that Americans must understand what Presidents are doing in their name, and not be accomplices to war crimes or other misdeeds. He does a brilliant job of demonstrating why we cannot let the Executive Branch dictate what we need to know. Interwoven with the author's balanced discussion of how to get ground truth right is his searing and intimate discussion of the pathology of secrecy as an enabler for bad and sometimes criminal foreign policy, carried out without public debate or Congressional oversight. The author adds new insights, beyond those in Morton Halperin's superb primer on *Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy*, regarding the multiple levels of understanding created by multiple levels of classification; the falseness of many written records in an environment where truth may often only be spoken verbally, without witnesses; the fact that the Department of Defense created false records to conceal its illegal bombings in Laos and Cambodia, at the same time that the White House created false secret cables, used Acting Director of the FBI Patrick Gray to destroy evidence, and sought to bribe a judge with the offer of the FBI directorship. The author presents a compelling portrait of an Executive Branch—regardless of incumbent party—likely to make major foreign policy miscalculations because of the pathology of secret compartmentation, while also being able to conceal those miscalculations, and the cost to the public, because of Executive secrecy. He is especially strong on the weakness of secret information. As he lectured to Kissinger: "The danger is, you'll become like a moron. You'll become incapable of learning from most people in the world, no matter how much experience they have in their particular areas that may be much greater than yours" [because of your blind faith in the value of your narrow and often incorrect secret information.] P. 236.

Emerson, Steven, American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us

Although perhaps not intended by the author, his insights are helpful in identifying four specific strategic psychological operations (PsyOp) or "cultural outreach" themes that the US should have been pursuing these many years since the Soviets left Afghanistan: 1) Arab-Afghans isolated and despised; 2) Arab arrogance in relegating all Pakistani's to "untouchable" nonentity status; 3) Oneness of umma fanatically pursued actually attacks and undermines the many varied Muslim cultures, especially non-Arab Muslim cultures; and 4) US has made mistakes—in crime, in morality, in support for repressive regimes—and seeks to change in the true spirit of the Koran. **IO NOTE:** Also listed in Threats with different review information.

Fleisher, Craig and Babette Bensoussan, Strategic and Competitive Analysis: Methods and Techniques for Analyzing Business Competition

Rather than outline the wonderful aspects of this book, which other reviewers have done so ably, I will just say that I rank the authors up there with Ben Gilad (Israel), Mats Bjore (Sweden), and Jan Herring, Dick Klavens/Brad Ashton, and Leonard Fuld (USA), and we have made this book "the" text for the annual government all-source analysis training that centers on Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). This book, in combination with Ben Gilad's *Early Warning*, the Leonard Fuld's *New Competitor Intelligence*, Dick Klavens and Brad Ashton's *Keeping Abreast of Science & Technology*, and Mats Bjore's forthcoming book, *Commercial Intelligence*, are the essential five books for any business intelligence professional or anyone seeking to understand best in class business intelligence.

Gilad, Benjamin, Early Warning: Using Competitive Intelligence to Anticipate Market Shifts, Control Risk, and Create Powerful Strategies

I regard this book as being primarily for the manager of the business enterprise rather than the business intelligence professional, largely because it is very helpful in breaking through old mind-sets and suggesting that very specific attitudes and activities must characterize those endeavors that wish to avoid costly surprises. I would say that this book, together with Yale business author Jeffrey Gerten's book, *The Politics of Fortune: A New Agenda for Business Leaders*, are "must reads" for the senior executive who desires to not just survive but to excel in the 21st Century. The author, who has a solid

understanding of the history of surprise in military or national security circles, makes the point that surprise does not occur for lack of signs that can be detected, but for lack of a culture and mind-set open to seeing and understanding those signals. The book combines survey results from professionals attending the Academy of Competitive Intelligence (the single best offering in the world) with real-world accounts, "gray box" supplementals, and "manager's checklists" at the end of each chapter that are in essence an executive summary of the chapter.

Godin, Seth, Unleashing the Ideavirus

There are two competing ideas in the book, both worthy of note—first, that the public attention span is so limited that most of the money is made in the first release/first sales period, and then one should move on; and second, that persistence pays and the real money is to be had from the post-branding streams of revenue. I believe this stems from the juxtaposition of how companies make money if they have the wherewithal to churn the market with a lot of new offerings; and how individuals make money by establishing personal brand names—in general the author is strongest when dealing with what single individuals can and should do to take what they are really good at, package it, put it out (free), and then systematically reap residual financial benefits.

Godson, Roy, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action & Counterintelligence

With this book, written and published prior to 9-11, Godson provides both a historical and a prescriptive treatment of the two most neglected and mis-managed elements of U.S. national intelligence: covert action (concealed influence) and counterintelligence (protecting our secrets by catching their spies and agents of influence). While 9-11 demonstrated our incapacity in both these vital areas that comprise the black art side of national power, there is no other book and no other expert that has done more to itemize the details that must be contemplated (and are not now being contemplated) by those responsible for devising homeland security defenses. The author's appreciation for pre-emptive "offensive" counterintelligence and covert action, and his understanding of terrorism and criminal and other nonstate actors (one should include rogue corporations, of which there are many), make him particularly well-qualified to advise the Administration and Congress as we move toward what must be a draconian reconstitution and revitalization of national intelligence.

Godson, Roy, Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge

This is a really excellent collection of advanced reading on strategic denial and deception, and it makes the vital point that denial and deception are at the core of 4th generation warfare and asymmetric offense and defense strategy. ... Two perennial lessons learned are that policy makers do not want to hear about possible hostile denial and deception--they want to stick with their own preconceptions (which of course make denial and deception easier to accomplish against us); and second, that intelligence experts tend to be under great pressure to cook the books in favor of policy preconceptions, while also being generally unwilling to believe the enemy can deceive them or accomplish slights of hand that are undetectable.

Hammond, Susan, Congressional Caucuses in National Policymaking

Caucuses, in the author's investigative report, exist primarily to help Members deal with complex issues that are either multi-jurisdictional in nature, not covered adequately by existing Committee assignments, or lacking in political support or attention for various reasons—the High Altitude Caucus, to keep environmental regulations designed for sea-level from being too silly at high altitudes, is a good example of the latter. Caucuses are primarily information collection and sharing vehicles, followed by agenda and policy setting tools. They serve as valuable forums for orienting new Members or helping Members across various Committee jurisdictions focus on shared concerns.

Havel, Vaclav, Disturbing the Peace: A Conversation with Karel Huizdala (Vintage)

On a more positive note, the author offers up, in the course of a long series of interviews, a number of ideas that are relevant to America today, as well as to any other emerging or re-emergent democracies in the making. 1) Model of behavior. 2) Popular coalitions. 3) Informal networks. 4) Man versus Machine. 5) Neighborhoods, Politics "From Below". 6) Small Numbers Can Make a Difference. 7) Art and theater matter. 8) Absurdity is a warning. 9) Truth can be misappropriated. 10) Great men doubt themselves. 11) Writers live to tell the truth. 12) Change the atmosphere. 13) Role of the intellectual. See the much longer review at Amazon for detailed comments applicable to nurturing emerging democracies.

Heinberg, Richard, *Powerdown: Options and Actions for a Post-Carbon World*

The author puts the end of cheap oil in the larger context of other depleting resources (water, ocean fisheries, agricultural resources such as topsoil); population growth; declining food production, global climate change and ecocide; unsustainable levels of US debt; and international political instability. Across the book the author takes great care to cite the work of others and point the reader to useful resources. On pages 94-95 he gives us the key seven needs in a powerdown scenario: 1) Stabilize human population; 2) Increase resource efficiency; 3) Shift economics from production to services (including full employment); 4) Reduce pollution; 5) Divert capital to food production (one might add, basic food production like beans, instead of frivolous food production like exotic mushrooms and out of season fruits); 6) Shift agriculture to a sustainable model; and 7) Improve the design of all hard goods to make them durable and repairable.

Herz, J.C., *Joystick Nation: How Videogames Ate Our Quarters, Won Our Hearts, and Rewired Our Minds*

Relevant to Department of Defense and Homeland Security: on page 35 there is a discussion that confirms my long-held belief that while DoD investments in very expensive earlier generations of computers helped spawn the consumer industry, the time has come for DoD to get out of the unilateral C4I business, and concentrate on improving security and functionality for the generic whole. We must depart from secret unilateral expensive C4I systems, toward open (but secure) generic inexpensive systems that can be thrown away easily while the data is ported over. This merits emphasis—on page 77 the author stresses that as hardware and software get fancier, they actually make it *harder and more expensive* to port data forward, and the author suggests that the true test of a new system should be FIRST, its ease of "reach back" to old data, and ONLY then, its ability to excel with new data. This is an extremely important point that I am fairly certain neither CIA nor DoD nor JFCOM take seriously.

Hoffman, Susanna, *Catastrophe & Culture: The Anthropology of Disaster (School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series)*

What most engaged me about this book, apart from its outstanding attention to the relationship between cultures of inattention or distraction and major

catastrophic events (the book makes clear that catastrophe's don't have to happen—they make the jump from disasters when the over-all system of first responders and related parties fails to act quickly and correctly in harmony, precisely because of their past culture), is its focus on the total system, on every feature of society in relation to the environment. The editors write: "One of the common sources of the policy-practice defect is its construction on culturally bound assumptions. In disaster contexts, aid often gets delivered in inappropriate forms and according to unsuited principles." The book excels at looking at the uneven record of disaster preparedness, and the lack of understanding to local contexts that often help turn disasters into catastrophes. ... The message of the book is so important it merits emphasis—no amount of money is going to prevent catastrophe—absent a commitment to creating a culture of attention and interoperability and information sharing, we will create our own catastrophes each time we are challenged by what could have been nothing more than a localized disaster.

Johnston, CAPT Douglas (USN, Ret.), Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik

With a foreword by no less than The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, today a leader of the 9-11 Commission, the book drives a stake in the heart of secular "objective" negotiation and focuses on how faith (not zealotry, but earnest faith) can alter the spiral of violence in such places as Sudan, Kashmir, and the Middle East. The editor and contributing author has assembled a multi-national and multi-religion cast of experts whose work in the aggregate completely supports the premise of the book: that the 21st Century will be about religion instead of ideology, and that what hopes we might have for reconciling "irreconcilable differences" lie in the balanced integration of religious dialog and conflict prevention, rather than in pre-emptive military action and unilateralist bullying. I found two core concepts especially relevant to national security: the first is that we need an Office of Religious and Cultural Intelligence within the Central Intelligence Agency, and we need, as the authors suggest, to put religious attaches into every Embassy. The second, and this is a truly core concept, is "The price of freedom is cultural engagement—taking the time to learn how others view the world, to understand what is important to them, and to determine what can realistically be done to help them realize their legitimate aspirations." This is a brilliant, scholarly, practical, world-changing book. **IO NOTE:** If I could get every IO officer to read just one book relevant to engaging the Muslim world, it would be this one.

Kaplan, Robert, Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground

Documents lack of true transformation within DoD combined with deep admiration for the front line troops including Special Forces and the National Guard. Top-down intelligence is not working, bottom-up collection is. Force protection mania is handicapping the front line.

Lee. Kent, Terrain Analysis of Afghanistan

I have known Kent Lee and East View Cartographic since 1995, when they were instrumental in supporting me in a competitive exercise to demonstrate all that could be done with "open sources" of information, versus narrowly-focused classified capabilities. The ability of this individual and this organization to acquire and then exploit Russian, Chinese, and other third-nation source material has made them the single most important geospatial entity in the world after the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. I understand that similar books are in the works for Iraq and other countries where terrain analysis is a vital element of reducing costs and increasing profits and operational successes. This book is both essential to prior planning, and essential to on-going operations. More the point, it illustrates the detailed ground truth that the commercial sector can provide that the national intelligence agencies refuse to.

Lehman, Ingrid, Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire (Cass Series on Peacekeeping, 5)

1) Information Operations must be in the mandate and must be a major focus of effort from day one. Although the author has a limited focus, on information as public affairs or public diplomacy, her points are all relevant to the larger appreciation of Information Operations as inclusive of decision-support and tactical-operational Peacekeeping Intelligence, as well as the larger concept of Information Peacekeeping. 2) Secretary General's Special Representative (SGSR), the military force commander, and the police force commander must agree on unified public information operations and an integrated staff with a single coherent message. 3) Standing staffs and normal tour lengths are essential to success. The somewhat common practice of Member states rotating people in and out in 30-90 day cycles is simply not professional and ultimately undermines the mission. 4) Considerable numbers of language-qualified translators and interpreters are required.

Lehmann, Ingrid, Public Information Campaigns in Peacekeeping: The UN Experience in Haiti

The author's primary focus is on what some would call "public diplomacy" or "public affairs" information, that is, the message that goes out from the United Nations force (civil, military, police) to all concerned—the world at large, the participating governments, the Member governments not participating, all other NGOs and organizational participants, the host government, and the indigenous belligerents and bystanders (many of them refugees). The author's two core points are that information operations must be in the UN mandate or it will be unlikely to be addressed as a coherent unified program by the leaders on the ground; and that the information program **must** be unified—there cannot be separate SGSR, force commander, and police commander messages and programs.

Little, Helen, Volunteers: How to Get Them, How to Keep Them

While others have outlined volunteer "needs" and how to address them, Helen Little does it best. The 12 basic needs--applicable to neighborhood mobilization, regional political campaigns, and teen-ager "work for respect" programs--are very well and concisely listed: 1) specific manageable task; 2) task that matches motivation; 3) good reason for doing the task; 4) written instructions; 5) reasonable deadline; 6) freedom to complete the task; 7) everything necessary to complete the task; 8) adequate training; 9) safe, comfortable, friendly environment; 10) follow-up; 11) opportunity (for the volunteer) to provide feed-back; and 12) appreciation, recognition, and rewards. As I read this thoughtful book, comparing what volunteers need at each step of the way--and the more advanced comments by the author on how to plan for succession at every level of the organization from neighborhood to national, I kept thinking to myself: "traditional political parties are dead." Both the Democratic and Republican parties are violating every single tenet of this excellent work on how to attract, motivate, and activate citizen-voters. It remains to be seen if our neighborhoods might yet self-organize. This would be a good book for anyone thinking about organizing any endeavor of free spirits, at any level of play. **IO NOTE:** Read this as if it were a primer on outreach to foreign publics.

McKenna, Regis, Real Time: Preparing for the Age of the Never Satisfied Customer

This may be one of the top three books I've read in the last couple of years. It is simply packed with insights that are applicable to both the classified intelligence community as well as the larger national information community. The following is a tiny taste from this very deep pool: "Instead of fruitlessly trying to predict the future course of a competitive or market trend, customer behavior or demand, managers should be trying to find and deploy all the tools that will enable them, in some sense, to be ever-present, ever-vigilant, and ever-ready in the brave new marketplace in gestation, where information and knowledge are ceaselessly exchanged." ... In 1994, attending the French national conference on information, we heard one of the leaders of the French steel industry discussing a multi-million dollar business intelligence endeavor (in France this includes business espionage and government espionage in support of business) against steel industries around the world. The punch line, however, was stunning. At the end of it all, he said, they failed because they focused only on the steel industry. In the end, the plastics industry ate their lunch because it was able to develop very good plastic substitutes for automobile parts, including automobile under-carriage parts, and this hurt the French steel industry badly. It was from this occasion that we crafted Rule 003 (Book 2, Chapter 15) on the importance of Global Coverage, whose sub-title could be "cast a wide net." McKenna has the basics right.

Morville, Peter, Ambient Findability

Halfway through the book I was torn by a sense of anguish (the U.S. Intelligence Community and the beltway bandits that suck money out of the taxpayers pocket through them have no idea how to implement the ideas in this book) and joy (beyond Google, through Wikis and other collective intelligence endeavors facilitated by open source software, relevant findability is possible). This is a truly gripping book that addresses what may be the most important challenge of this century in a compelling, easy to read, yet intellectually deep and elegant manner. The author is a true guru who understands that in the age of a mega-information-explosion (not just in quantity, but in languages, mediums, and nuances) the creation of wealth is going to depend on information being useful, usable, desirable, findable, accessible, credible, and valuable (page 109). Especially important in the first half of the book are the

author's focus on Mooers (not to be confused with Moores) who said in 1959 that users will make do with what information they have when it becomes too inconvenient to go after better information. This is key. At the same time, he focuses on the difference between precision and recall, and provides devastating documentation of the failure of recall (1 in 5 at best) when systems scale up, as well as the diminution of precision. Bottom line: all these beltway bandits planning exobyte and petabyte databases have absolutely no idea how to actually help the end-user find the needle in the haystack. This author does. The book is without question "Ref A" for the content side of Information Operations. On page 61 I am just ripped out of my chair and on to my feet by the author's discussion of Marcia Bates and her focus on an integrated model of information seeking that integrates aesthetic, biological, historical, psychological, social, and "even" spiritual layers of understanding. This is bleeding edge good stuff. There is a solid discussion of geocoding and locationally-aware devices, and I am very pleased to see the author recognize the work of four of my personal heroes, Stewart Brand, Bruce Sterling, Kevin Kelly, and Howard Rheingold. Halfway through the book he discusses the capture of life experiences, and the real possibility that beyond today's information explosion might lie an exo-explosion of digital data coming from wired individuals feeding what they see and hear and feel into "the web". The opportunities for psycho-social diagnosis and remediation, and cross-cultural communication, are just astounding.

Nye, Joseph, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*

Among the strategic thoughts that I found most valuable were these: 1) a plenitude of information leads to a poverty of attention; 2) in the absence of time or means to actually review real-world information, politics becomes a contest of competitive credibility (with the Internet changing the rules of the game somewhat); 3) Japan has vital lessons to teach Islamic nations--that one can adapt to the new world while maintaining a unique culture; 4) we are failing to adapt our democratic processes to the challenges of the Earth as well as the opportunities of the Internet.

Pink, Daniel, *A Whole New Mind: Moving from the Information Age to the Conceptual Age*

It is a "must read" for any knowledge worker, and I am particularly recommending it to the new breed of warrior in the U.S. Government, the Information Operations specialist. A ****major**** part of our government's failure at foreign policy and national security--including its failure at homeland security and its mis-steps in the global war on terror, going back to the Viet-Nam era, can be traced to a combination of excessive reliance on "metrics" (remember the "body counts?") diluted by ideological preferences absent historical or cultural contexts. This book, while simplistic, is a superb overview of the alternative methods of ****perception****, integration, understanding, and outreach--empathy and strategic communication to others in terms they can "receive," and for that reason I consider it a "must read." The six senses, Design, Story-Telling (see Steve Dunning), Symphony, Empathy (none to be found in this White House), Play (intertwing work and play, mixing it up to energize both), and Meaning, are well covered by this book, and in a way that makes sense, where the value is clear to the reader.

Priest, Dana, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*

Unlike the articles, which focused on the questionable use of Special Forces to train forces within repressive regimes around the world, from Colombia to Indonesia to Central Asia, the book more properly focuses on the complete lack of a US inter-agency planning process, the complete lack of a US means of coordinating actions and spending by all US agencies, and consequently, the complete lack of a US national security and global engagement strategy that is so vital to protecting America from attack and protecting American interests in a coherent and sensible fashion. While many critics read the book as if it were a glorification of the theater Commanders-in-Chief (CINC), and complain about the militarization of US foreign policy, a proper reading of this book clearly documents that the militarization occurs by default, as a consequence of the abject failure of the White House and the Department of State, neither of which, under either Clinton or Bush, are serious about global engagement.

Rosenfeld, Louis and Peter Morville, *Information Architecture for the World Wide Web: Designing Large-Scale Web Sites*

As the world gets ready to move toward exobyte scales of information sharing, at machine speed, this book becomes very relevant. While the authors are careful to point out the fallacies in cost calculations for information access design flaws, I for one find the factors compelling—the cost of finding information, of not finding information, the value of rapid access, visualization and integration, the value of ease of use. I find the rough figure of \$100 per employee per year to be a conservative estimate of opportunity costs—I think it is close to \$1000 and in some instances \$10,000. Over-all I found this to be a superb reference for self-study, one that breaks down complex issues like different kinds of navigation systems, and one that also shows the value of offering end-users multiple means of access, both search and browsing. Chapter 19 was especially valuable to me, for getting a sense of the challenge when thinking of the scale of say Google, where thousands of hits are returned and thousands of relevant documents are NOT found. Google is great, but in this context, Google is in the second or third grade, at best. I like this book, which does not claim to make anyone an information architect, because it helped me see, in a logical easy to read manner, just how **much** is involved in making tons of information accessible and usable in time lapses and at costs that both people and organizations can afford.

Sankey, Michael, *Public Records Online: The National Guide to Private & Government Online Sources of Public Records*

This is the third of three basic guides by Facts on Demand press that I am very happy to have in my collection and to recommend to others. This one focuses, as its title suggests, on Public Records Online, going down to the county level, state by state. It is not a tutorial in how to search public records, but it does include helpful introductory chapters and the bottom line is that using this book is cheaper than out-sourcing the work, so if you have a need to search public records online, this book is certainly a valuable and cost-effective place to start. **IO NOTE:** USNORTHCOM and others still think that you cannot use open sources nor exploit open sources to track terrorists, charities, and others in the USA. This is quite simply in error, and one phone call to USDI will answer the question: open sources can be used on anyone in the US. Period.

Schlein, Alan, Find It Online, Fourth Edition: The Complete Guide to Online Research (Find It Online: The Complete Guide to Online Research)

Some really top-notch information brokers contributed to this book, and it is a superb reference, well-organized, that lacks a CD-ROM with clickable links or an Online Version to which access can be gained for a fee or from a password in the printed version. This book is extremely well-developed to the point that it can meet the needs of a first-time researcher eager to become quickly familiar with the ins and outs of the Internet, as well as the more experienced professional that wants a handy reference work to suggest new sources and methods.

Simpkin, Brigadier Richard (UK), Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare

Brigadier Simpson was one of the first, and is still among the best, to focus on the role that both C4I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) as well as rotary wing capabilities (including vertical short take off and landing) would play in placing eyes on target, boots on the ground, and in strategic, operational, and tactical mobility. He notes that secret C4I is largely counterproductive. He also focuses on the dramatic implications for force structure as well as intelligence of "out of area" (OoA) operations becoming the norm. The United States and the rest of the world are, for example, completely unprepared for no-notice asymmetric and tribal warfare in Africa, where the United Nations is trying to deal with five complex emergencies as this is written (Burundi, Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Sudan). **IO NOTE:** SPEED matters—we need a long-haul Air Force that can do two Berlin Airlifts at once, one with organic transports, the other with conscripted and hired transports. There is no better IO message than clean water, food, medicine, and shelter within 24 hours of a disaster—and there will be many more.

Sunstein, Cass, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment

The bottom line on this book is clear: our governance of risk to the public tends to be managed by political gut reaction rather than informed investigation; there is no clear doctrine for studying and articulating risk (for example, distinguishing between high risks to a few and low but sustained risks to the many, or between three levels of cost-benefit analysis so that choices can be made); and the best form of risk management may be through the effective

communication of risk information to the public rather than imposed costs on private sector enterprises.

Vass, Jerry, Soft Selling in a Hard World: Plain Talk on the Art of Persuasion

I have taken the executive sales training course that this book summarizes, essentially a "CEO to CEO" sales course but applicable at any level of direct sales, and I cannot say enough good things about the author, the book, or the training—my last twenty years literally passed before my eyes as I understood his key points: purchase decisions are made by individuals on an emotional "what's in it for me" basis, and then justified on a rational "what's in it for the organization" basis. Any sales effort that attempts to stress features and capabilities, as 99% of all of us have been doing, is destined to be lethargic and hit or miss. The author and his team have a formula and it is a formula that is already working for me: listen instead of talk, solve instead of sell, and a few others that are only offered in the course not the book. The author is devastating in critiquing what he calls "puffery", all those now meaningless phrases about "best in class" and so on.

Vineyard, Sue, Best Practices for Volunteer Programs

Among its positive points are its distinction among the five generations from which volunteers are drawn, and the unique strategies that must be adapted to each generation's distinct needs and expectations; its focus on the importance of understanding the differences between staff and volunteers and how to devise strategies that play to the strengths of each in collaborative ways; its direct discussion of "mandated volunteers" who have been sentenced to community service or must perform community service as part of early retirement programs; and its specific attention to how short-term volunteer tasks can be used to attract and evaluate potential longer-term volunteers.

Weiss, Michael, The Clustered World: How We Live, What We Buy, and What It All Means About Who We Are

When Howard Dean used the shorthand expression "guys with confederate flags on their pick-ups" he was actually talking about what some call "NASCAR dads" and Michael Weiss calls the "Shotguns & Pickups" cluster (number 29 in his first book, number 43 in this advanced and improved

edition). Although others have written about the nine nations of North America (Joel Garreau), various "tribes" across the nation, and demographics in general, Michael Weiss stands head and shoulders above all of them in providing the definitive reference work that is also a form of novel about America. With this book he also begins the process of extending his ideas to the world, showing how neighborhoods in 19 countries can be classified into 14 common lifestyles, the bottom three being Lower Income Elderly, Hardened Dependency, and Shack & Shanty....billions of people disenfranchised by amoral capitalism, whose desperate circumstances have not quite made themselves felt, yet, in America.

Pathology

Albright, Madeline, Madam Secretary: A Memoir

Most troubling to me is the chapter on terrorism, chapter 22, titled "A Special Kind of Evil." In exactly 17 pages (.03 of 512 text pages), Albright manages to gloss over the fact that she deliberately and repeatedly sided with Sandy Burger in constantly suppressing intelligence that warned suicidal terrorism was on the rise, and took a back seat—or no seat—on the subject of devising a national grand strategy for counter-terrorism. She is proudest of getting \$1 billion for turning our Embassies into bunkers, something 9-11 demonstrated to be inconsequential. ... I find it quite noteworthy that "intelligence" does not appear in the index as a term. For this Secretary, intelligence was something to be suppressed, not listened to. This is a book about travel and personal meetings, which is how Clinton's national security team spent its time when they were not ignoring Dick Clarke.

Anonymous, Terrorist Hunter: The Extraordinary Story of a Woman Who Went Undercover to Infiltrate the Radical Islamic Groups Operating in America

This book is an excellent companion to Steven Emerson's book, *AMERICAN JIHAD: The Terrorists Living Among Us*. See Amazon review for 13 key points. As I finished the book, I agreed completely with the author's basic premise, to the effect that open source information about US terrorist and charity ties, properly validated, should be posted to the Internet for all to see.

This appears to be the only proper response to continuing federal ineptitude. The author is compelling in stating that in the years since 9-11, very little has improved. The FBI continues to refuse to share, the State Department continues to be incompetent at screening terrorists out (and in one instance, allowed the Agency for International Development to offer funding to a known terrorist organization), the list goes on.

Baer, Robert, *Sleeping With the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude*

Former spy Robert Baer, author of *SEE NO EVIL: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism*, makes the leap from intelligence reformist to national mentor with his new book, *SLEEPING WITH THE DEVIL: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude*. Indeed, his last sentence has the White House laying in the moonlight with its legs spread, lustfully eyeing the Saudi wallet on the bureau. This is an extraordinary compelling work, not least because it provides detailed and documented discovery not previously available, of how the U.S. government has over the course of several administrations made a deliberate decision to a) not spy on the Arab countries, b) not collect and read open sources in Arabic, c) not attempt to understand the sub-state actors such as the Muslim brotherhood, despite a long history in which these groups commit suicide to achieve their objectives, including the murder of several heads of state. Baer's most brutal points should make every American shudder: it is America itself that is subsidizing terrorism, as well as the corruption of the Saudi royal family. Baer's documented estimate is that \$1 dollar from every barrel of petroleum is spent on Saudi royal family sexual misbehavior, and \$1.50 of every barrel of petroleum bought by America ultimately ends up funding extremist schools, foundations, and terrorist groups.

Bamford, James, *A Pretext for War: 9-11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies*

This is the ideal book for any citizen who wants a professional "once over" tour of the various intelligence and policy pieces that broke down and allowed 9-11 to happen, and then allowed the entire "balance of powers" construct from our Founding Fathers to fly out the window. If you want to go deeper, see my fifteen Lists and 600+ other reviews of national security non-fiction. The book is especially strong on the Rendon Group being used to illegally propagandize American citizens with U.S. taxpayer funds, on the abject failure of George

Tenet in revitalizing U.S. clandestine operations, on the failure (treated more kindly) of Mike Hayden to bring the National Security Agency into the 21st Century, and on the very unhealthy merger of the U.S. neoconservatives that captured the White House, and well-funded Zionists in both America and Israel who essentially bought themselves an invasion of Iraq—a remarkable coincidence of interests: Jews paying to invade Iraq, Iranians using Chalabi to feed lies to the neo-cons so they would be deceived into thinking Iraq would be a cake-walk, and Bin Laden never daring to dream the entire U.S. population and all arms of government—including a passive media—would "sleep walk" into what this book suggests is one of the dumbest and most costly strategic errors in the national security history of the USA.

Berkowitz, Bruce, *The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century*

This book is also not about the future of war, unless one is a prisoner of (or funded sycophant to) those in the Pentagon that think that "information superiority" is still about expensive secret intelligence satellites, expensive unilateral secret communications links, and using very very expensive B-2 bombers to go after guys in caves. There are four future wars that will be fought over 100 years on six fronts: big wars with conventional armies (e.g. between India and Pakistan), small wars and criminal man-hunts around the world; nature wars including the wars against disease, water scarcity, mass migration, and trade in women and children as well as piracy and ethnic crime; and electronic wars, where states, corporations, and individuals will all vie for some form of advantage in the electronic environment that we have created and that is, because of Microsoft, a national catastrophe waiting to happen. On the latter, the author gets 4 stars. On the former, zero. I hold the author blameless for the lousy title. This is about not how war is going to be fought in the 21st Century—it is about what the beltway bureaucracy is trying to sell to the Pentagon, at taxpayer expense, and it covers just 10% of the future needs and capabilities.

Brookner, Janine, *Piercing the Veil of Secrecy: Litigation Against U.S. Intelligence*

This book is an instant classic and reference manual in two ways: 1) When "management" decides to railroad someone, they have unlimited power to do so, and most people cannot fight back. I was myself rail-roaded by a man, a real

mediocrity, a small man with a Napoleon complex, and it took me years to get the system to clean up the mess he made. I was not smart enough to fight back legally at the time—today he would be toast, in part because of what Janine Brookner has done. This book empowers the many people who have been set to "Fitness for Duty" physicals (emphasis on showing them to be nuts, or scaring them into resigning for fear of being officially classified as nuts and barred from further federal employment). I know several such people, both analysts and operators, and in every single case it was management that was nuts or derelict in its duty, not the officers. The officers were all out-spoken, deeply in love with their profession and proud of their work, and loath to see the system break down as it has (and as we all knew it would from about 1985 onwards). Had the "nuts" been listened to in the 1980's and 1990's, 9-11 would not have happened and George Tenet would not be making excuses for having failed to unscrew the Directorate of Operations in the past seven years, only to tell the 9-11 Commission he needs another five years, with the same fools in charge? Please. 2) The other area where this book is vital is in outlining in terms that any Senator or Representative (most of them lawyers) can understand—there needs to be a legal section in the National Security Act that is inevitably making its way toward passage. I used to think that a FISA Court Ombudsman—someone we all trust, like Ken Bass, one of the twelve masters of the court, or Janine Brookner herself, was the solution. What this book had demonstrated to me is that there are both too many problems (and more remedies than I realized), and someone has to codify a body of law that remediates the dysfunctionality of personnel protections within an archipelago of secret fiefdoms. This book is relevant to both the lawyers and the serving professionals in each of the seven tribes of intelligent work: national, military, law enforcement, business, academia, NGO-investigative journalism, and citizen-labor-religions, because all organizations in the last ten years have been moving toward what one early critic of the CIA called "the cult of secrecy."

Brown, Dan, The Da Vinci Code

The Da Vinci Code is most interesting, not because of its bashing of Opus Dei, but because it addresses what may be the core injustice in Catholicism (I was raised a Jesuit Catholic in Colombia, with roots in Spain): the concealment of the normal sexuality of Jesus, his marriage, and the fact that until the mid-1800's, the Church did not dare to claim that the Pope was infallible, and that all that preceded that claim was based merely on a man's prophecies. Jesus, in other words, can not lay any greater claim to our faith than Mohammed. Most

relevant to me, as I consider the need for elevating women to positions of power because they are more intuitive, more integrative, and less confrontational than men, was the book's discussion of the origins of paganism (not satanic at all, but rather worshipping Mother Earth and specifically the human female mothers from whom life obviously emerged) and the manner in which the Catholic Church deliberately set out to slander Mary Magdalene, making her out to be a whore rather than the spouse of Jesus (from whom issue came), and murdering five million women in a witch-hunt and global psychological operations against women that has been mirrored by Islam in many ways, and that must, if we are to survive, be reversed by thoughtful people willing to think for themselves

Buchanan, Patrick, *Where the Right Went Wrong: How Neoconservatives Subverted the Reagan Revolution and Hijacked the Bush Presidency*

The most shocking aspect of this book, in a positive "eye-opening" sense, is that Pat Buchanan seems to be more in touch with what I as a moderate Republican believe, than anyone associated with the current Bush-Cheney Administration. Although he has some extremist views that I do not agree with, notably a desire to set back attempts to achieve racial equality, on balance his focus on avoiding elective wars, on eliminating the deficit, on reducing the size of government, on restoring state rights, and on putting the Supreme Court back in its place, all strike me as more "representative" than the views of the neo-conservatives, whom he attacks with eloquence and force. Over-all the book is a litany of ills associated with an extremist Republican party run amok, funding Chinese weapons development at the same time that it exports jobs, funds the debt of loser nations while running up our own debt, etc. The author provides several lists of poor policy decisions that provide food for thought. Most troubling is the degree to which the USA is hostage to others for 72% of its medicines, 70% of its computer equipment, etc. This is one of the few books I have encountered that covers both economic issues--the author is blistering on how "free" trade is not free, with fulsome detail on how we need *fair* trade—and national security issues. The author clearly understands that we are not winning the war on terrorism, only minor battles, and—in a phrase that especially moved me—that you cannot defeat a faith without a faith of your own. "To defeat a faith you need a faith." I would refer the readers to Doug Johnson's *Faith-Based Diplomacy* as well as Jonathan Schell's *Unconquerable World*.

Buchanan, Patrick, *The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilization*

Most interestingly to me, Patrick Buchanan and Lee Kuan Yew, former Premier of Singapore, perhaps the most intelligent man in Asia, are in total—and I do mean total—agreement on the vital importance of the family as the foundation of civilization and continuity. I grew up in Singapore, and have extremely deep feelings of respect for Lee Kuan Yew, and what I see here is two men, as far apart as the earth and philosophy might separate them, who agree on the one core value apart from religion (it does not matter which religion, only that one respect within a religion): FAMILY. Family is the root of cultural continuity and civil sustainability, and if we allow the traditional nuclear family to enter into minority non-replenishment status, we are in fact destroying the Nation. ... The author also alludes to the growing separation between the federal government, which is agreeing to supra-national deals that hurt the states and the population at large--or refusing to sign off on deals (e.g. the Kyoto Treaty) that would actually benefit future generations. One is left with the feeling that we have three different Americas—the federal bureaucracy, the state-level authorities, and the people, and somewhere in here our methods of governance are failing to reconcile the behavior of the first two with the values of the third--in part because the people are all over the lot in terms of values, and we have lost our social cohesion.

Byrd, Senator Robert, *Losing America: Confronting a Reckless and Arrogant Presidency*

The book offers up some real gems, including a devastating "character" analysis of George W. Bush (p. 19, p. 107, p. 146), a useful comparison between Herbert Hoover who helped bring on the Great Depression, and George W. Bush (pp. 30-31), a helpful comparison of how Congress tries to balance the Executive while having only 31,033 employees versus 2,673,100), a brutally accurate comparison of how John Ashcroft chose to spend his time, avoiding testimony, substituting news conferences calling on Congress to pass the law without review (p. 47), the return of the multi-billion dollar Presidential slush fund (p. 68), the importance of independent information to Congress in confronting deceitful Executive officers (p. 70), a troubling catalog of the billions in funding for homeland security that the Executive has refused, seemingly wanting to "starve the beast." (pp. 10-114); special reference to Eisenhower, his warnings of the military-industrial complex, and a very

troubling page of what the trade-offs are, such as buying a single destroyer versus building new homes for 8,000 people (pp. 141-142), an examination of Don Rumsfeld's prevarication when being questioned about the bio-chemical weapons that Rumsfeld helped supply to Iraq during the Reagan Administration (p. 149), and an absolutely BRUTAL, RIVETING comparison of the billions the current Administration has asked to spend in Iraq, where Halliburton can steal it, versus in the US for the same kinds of things: \$4.6 billion for Iraqi water and sanitation, only \$3.1 billion for the USA--the list goes on and it is DAMNING (p. 202). Despite the author's clear fury over the misbehavior of the Executive, he gives George W. Bush credit where credit is due, and particularly in relation to the inaugural and the national appearances in the immediate aftermath of 9-11.

Carville, James, Had Enough?: A Handbook for Fighting Back

Carville manages to do in one book what none of the Democratic candidates—not Dean, not Gephardt—have done: he breaks George W. Bush's back with six strokes of the rod: 1) provide for the common defense (homeland insecurity, screwed up military and foreign policy); 2) provide for the general welfare (deficits and debts matter a lot, tax cuts are a huge lie); 3) secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity (education, environment and energy, health care--and notice the emphasis in the Constitution on *posterity*, which is the opposite of carpet-bagging); 4) Establish justice (campaign finance reform, corporate governance, myth of tort reform); 5) insure domestic tranquility (why entitlements matter, notes on lying, the religious right, and friends); and finally, 6) form a more perfect union.

Chomsky, Noam, Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance (The American Empire Project)

Chomsky brilliantly brings forth a theme first articulated in recent times by Jonathan Schell (*Unconquerable World*) by pointing out that the *only* "superpower" capable of containing the neo-conservative, neo-totalitarian, neo-Nazi militarism and unilateralism of the current Bush Administration is "the planet's public." Chomsky updates his work with both excellent and well-balanced footnotes and an orderly itemization of the arrogance, militarism, contempt for international law, arbitrary aggression, and—Bible thumpers take note--proven track record for supporting dictators, Israeli genocide against Palestinians, and US troop participation in—directly as well as indirectly—

what will inevitably be judged by history to be a continuing pattern of war crimes. Chomsky, past master of the topic of "manufacturing consent" now turns his attention to the manner in which the Bush Administration is attempting to establish "new norms" that, if permitted to stand, will reverse 50 years of human progress in seeking the legitimization of governance, respect for human rights, and collective decision-making and security. He is especially strong on documenting the manner in which US aid grows in direct relation to the degree to which the recipient country is guilty of genocidal atrocities, with Colombia and Turkey being prime examples. The case can be made, and Chomsky makes it, that the US arms industry, and US policies on the selling and granting of arms world-wide, are in fact a direct US commitment to repression, genocide, and terrorism sponsored by one big state: the US. He is most interesting when he discusses the new US approach to repression, the privatization of actions against the underclasses of the world.

Chomsky, Noam, The Umbrella of U.S. Power: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy (The Open Media Pamphlet Series, 9)

This is one of Noam Chomsky's most interesting pamphlets (actually a quarter-size booklet of 78 pages). It has a special relevance and importance to citizens in the aftermath of 9-11 because he directly links our corporate criminality ("Justice Department estimates the cost of corporate crime as 7 to 25 times as high as street crime") to our national policies against human rights (poverty pays, for the corporate class that strives to liquidate Third World nations in their predatory roving of the planet). He pointedly identifies the U.S. arms industry as being among the worst violators, but even more importantly, points out that U.S. policies favoring our arms dealers are opposed by 96% of the U.S. population. While that number might be high, I believe there is no question but that Washington is being instructed by corporations rather than its citizens on this vital point of policy. It is time for citizens to take the power back. Chomsky notes that in 1996 the World Health Organization characterized extreme poverty as the world's most ruthless killer and the greatest cause of suffering on earth. This ties in with the United Nations finding that human suffering is now a legitimate basis for intervention, and with George Soro's observation in *The Washington Post* of 24 February 2002, that "We can't be successful in fighting terrorism, unless we fight that other axis of evil--poverty, disease and ignorance." This little gem of a book also includes well-footnoted observations about how nations seek to carry out trade negotiations in secrecy, in part

because they are agreeing to overlook if not actively participate in the looting of poor countries as a condition for prosperous trade among the already developed nations. The book begins and ends with thoughts from Chomsky on the intellectual discipline he founded, the relationship between linguistics, ethics, and action. He begins with pointed observations on how the most horrible crimes are allowed to go without comment because of *self* censorship, and ends by noting that our citizens do not need to be forbidden to speak of these monstrous deeds that our corporations and government are secretly agreeing to perpetuate, because we have chosen to remain ignorant and silent. U.S. policy today is *not* founded on moral values, and it is *not* representative of the will of the people in so far as it is carried out in secret collaboration with major corporations and in opposition to the minimal mandatory needs of developing nations for water, food, disease, and economic security. This is not about political ideology--Ralph Nader, the ultimate spoiler, has one thing right: the parties are irrelevant, this is now about the people versus the corporations. Absent a huge popular turn-out *prior* to each election, to make it clear to candidates that they will be held accountable by the people for keeping all trade and other negotiations in the public domain, and for voting on issues mindful of the will of the people rather than their corporate Enron-like paymasters, then we are the ones ultimately responsible for U.S. policy's misdirection. IO NOTE: Entire review included here--this is a concise summary of what many would consider to be our weak underbelly.

Clarke, Richard, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror

Clarke begins by pointing out that four US Presidents, not one, are responsible for the over-all failure. Clarke strikes out at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, throughout the book. Clarke confirms both all the reports of CIA failing to tell FBI, FBI leaders ignoring their own field reports and consequently failing to tell the White House clearing house on terrorism, of any and all the indicators and warnings received from June 2001 to September 10 2001. Clarke confirms that as of January 2001, despite a decade or more of Al Qaeda activism, "most senior officials in the administration did not know the term." Clarke lists four strategic mistakes: 1) CIA becoming overly dependent on the Pakistani intelligence service; 2) CIA importation to the Afghanistan jihad of Arab extremists it did not understand; 3) USG's quick pull-out from Afghanistan without flooding them with water, food, medicine, and security first; and 4) US ignorance of and failure to help Pakistan stabilize itself and survive the deadly

mix of millions of Afghan refugees and thousands of radicalized Arab Muslims. The Saudi government's sponsorship of Bin Laden as a religious revolutionary with a global mission beginning in 1989 cannot be denied. The book documents what we knew and when we knew it, and how we chose to ignore it. There are many other important points raised by this book, including specific recommendations for addressing our global vulnerability to terrorism, and they will not be listed here. Buy the book.

Collins, Aukai, *My Jihad: The True Story of An American Mujahid's Amazing Journey from Usama Bin Laden's Training Camps to Counterterrorism with the FBI and CIA*

It's time for the U.S. public to get a grip on international reality, because the U.S. government is deliberately avoiding public discussion of the harsh realities of the real world that make it highly unlikely our grand-children will enjoy anything near our level of prosperity and security, marginal as it is for many of us. This book is from a guy just like any American with a blue-collar job—he's been there, he's lost a leg to combat wounds, he's lost his livelihood to FBI and CIA incompetence, he has a great deal to teach all of us about the narrow slice of life that he has experienced on our behalf. This is a very fine book, and I recommend it without reservation.

Coram, Robert, *Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War*

On the theory of war, on the original contributions of John Boyd, the book renders a huge service to all military professionals by dramatically expanding what can be known and understood about the Energy-Maneuverability Theory and the nuances of the OODA Loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act--for the real Tigers, Observe-Act--a faster loop). Two things stuck out, apart from the heroic manner in which Boyd pursued the intellectual side of combat aviation: first, Boyd consistently had his priorities right: people first, ideas second, hardware last--this is the opposite of the existing Pentagon priorities; and second, truth matters--the book has some extraordinary examples of how both the Air Force and the Army falsified numbers, with disastrous results, while also selecting numbers (e.g. choosing to list an aircraft's weight without fuel or missiles, rather than fully loaded, a distortion that will kill aviators later when the aircraft fails under stress). On the practical side, the insights into Pentagon (and specifically Air Force) careerism and corruption, as well as contractor corruption and cheating of the government, are detailed and disturbing.

Cousins, Norman, The Pathology of Power

This book richly merits republication, and it is fortunate that so many copies are still available. Consider the author's opening statement: "Connected to the tendency of power to corrupt are yet other tendencies that emerge from the pages of the historians: * The tendency of power to drive intelligence underground; * The tendency of power to become a theology, admitting no other gods before it; * The tendency of power to distort and damage the traditions and institutions it was designed to protect; * The tendency of power to create a language of its own, making other forms of communication incoherent and irrelevant; * The tendency of power to spawn imitators, leading to volatile competition; * The tendency of power to set the stage for its own use. This is simply a brilliant, reasoned, well-documented and well-structured look at the greatest threat to any Republic's national security and prosperity: absolute power with its attendant absolute corruption. All that the author has to say over his 13 chapters, from why Hiroshima to the reality of General Macarthur to General and President Eisenhower's prophetic emphasis on "true" security rather than the "cooked books" false security of the military-industrial complex, every bit of this is directly applicable to the national security challenges--and the internal ethical challenges--facing the American people are their largely corrupt national political system at the dawn of the 21st Century. Of course it applies to all other nations as well, but as the Americans are the largest bull, they do the most damage to themselves as well as to others. The author concludes with some "first principles" that are alone worth the price of the book, these are abbreviated here: * security of the human commonwealth above security of the state * well-being of mankind above well-being of any one nation * needs of future generations above the needs of current generation. * rights of man over the rights of the state * private conscience over public edict * ordeal of peace over easy drift of prosperity His final sentence will not be understood by those who "do not do nuances." He says: "The challenge, therefore, is to recognize that national security depends on a wide range of factors, some of them nonmilitary in nature." He goes on to list the freedoms and well-being of the society itself, the focus on making human development the highest national security priority; the selection of creative transformative rather than manipulative leaders; the articulation of national goals that win foreign support on their merits; the strengthening of international institutions; and finally, the recognition that governance must be focused on the common good, not on retaining power. To lead properly is to be free of corruption.

Anything else is pathological and undermines national security. **IO NOTE:** This is the entire review.

Ehrenreich, Barbara, Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America

I had no idea just how irrelevant the "poverty" line as a measure of true poverty—nor did I realize how constrained people are, the 60% of America that earns less than \$15 to \$20 an hour, in seeking out other options. The author does a really effective job of investigating and communicating the horrible realities of life where...managers and corporate regulations and plain meanness deprive hundreds of thousands of people of things many of us take for granted: the right to go to the bathroom, to pause for a few minutes, even to sit down quietly for a few minutes in a clean room. Especially admirable is her focus on rent and the conditions that are imposed on the poor and lower working class (between minimum wage and \$15 an hour)—not having enough money for a deposit, being forced to pay outrageous rents for decrepit motel rooms rented by the week, having to spend a precious working day finding a place to stay, etcetera.

Fallows, James, NATIONAL DEFENSE

NOTHING HAS CHANGED since this book was published in 1981. If anything, it has gotten worse. One page (43) really jumped out at me, as it contains a chart showing how many planes can be bought for the same amount of money (1000 F-5s, 500 F-4s, 250 F-15s) and then now many sorties per day they can do because of complex logistics and other constraints (2.5/day for F-5's, 1.5 per day for F-4s, 1 per day for F-15s), finally concluding on the "real force" numbers: 2,500 for the F-5, 750 for the F-4, and 250 for the F-15. In this book, the author gets the "constants" right, and they are still with us. First, he focuses on the rapidly changing nature of external threats, and the importance of having a military—we do not—that is agile and able to surge in varied directions. The Cold War "one size fits all" military simply will not do. The author also documents the need for an independent test authority, because the US military services have proven over and over again that they are corrupt when it comes to weapon acquisition. Whether it is the Navy or the Air Force or the Army is irrelevant—they all fail to do proper requirements analysis and concept development before jumping into bigger more expensive weapons systems that are both not needed for the kinds of threats we have today (America spends as much on national security as the next *twenty* countries,

including Russia and China, *combined*), and that do not work as advertised. **IO NOTE:** The more we waste on heavy metal, the less there is for IO.

Franken, Al, *Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them: A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right*

It is a good thing to see this book ranking at this time as #1 in Amazon sales. America *needs* to read this book because the Republic has lost its soul--only by reading about reality and then voting accordingly, can this Republic be saved. I recommend the book be read together with *Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq*, and the much older but seminal work by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. The bottom line is clear: there is a constellation of power in America that integrates the incumbents of the White House right now, the mass media, and the major corporate interests--oil, electrical and water utilities, finance, fast food and military systems--that is both corrupt and using blatant lies to get their way with the public. **IO NOTE:** I have chosen to not include a number of books in this genre that were published during the early 2000 years, but this one is unusual for the author's use of transcripts to lay out "hard fact" documentation with solid the endnotes. The satirical stuff distracted from the value. There is a disturbing trend in which "unreality" communicated by IO methods can swamp "reality."

Frum, David, *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror*

This is an extremely useful catalog of both the good and the bad of the neo-conservative viewpoint. There are thirteen good points detailed in the longer review at Amazon, and an equivalent number of bad points. The book does not present a strategy.

Gordon, Andrew, *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command*

There are four major points in this book that neither the publicity prose nor the earlier reviewers emphasize, and I focus on these because they are the heart of the book and the core of its value: 1) Peacetime breeds officers, systems, and doctrine that are unlikely to stand the empirical test of war. As the author notes, every incompetent in war has previously been promoted to his or her high rank in peacetime. Systems are adopted without serious battle testing or

interoperability (and intelligence) supportability being assured, and doctrine takes a back seat to protocol and keeping up appearances. 2) Technologists are especially pernicious and dangerous to future warfighting capability when they are allowed to promulgate new technology under ideal peacetime conditions, and not forced to stand the test of battle-like degradation and the friction of real-world conditions. 3) Doctrine based on the lessons of history rather than the pomp of peacetime is the ultimate insurance policy. 4) Robust—even intrusive and pervasive--communications (signaling) in peacetime is almost certain to denigrate healthy doctrinal development, has multiple pernicious effects on the initiative and development of individual commanders, and can have catastrophic consequences when it is severely degraded in wartime and the necessary doctrinal foundation and command initiative are lacking.

Halberstam, David, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals

The overall impression that one draws of the Washington foreign policy and national security establishment is one of inattention alternating with craven back-stabbing. This is not an environment that is operating at peak efficiency, nor can it be trusted to act in the best interests of the voter and taxpayer. Another theme, and this impressed/depressed me tremendously, is that of journalism and open sources of information getting it right early, only to be ignored. Joining the insights of journalists was the ignorance of history by politicians—Halberstam comments particularly on the lack of European understanding of just how recognition of Croatia was the opening of a Pandora's Box of genocide. I was especially struck, throughout Halberstam's accounting, as to how crafty the Balkan players were, how able they were at deception and distraction, and how inept the Americans and the Europeans were at interpreting the situation and the ploys--with massive genocidal consequences. There were a number of recurring points across the whole book, points where I ended up making annotations: 1) Civilian-military relationships are not marked by trust 2) Presidential teams tend to lack depth, have no bench 3) Washington promotes the least offensive, not the most talented 4) Bush Sr. got no bounce from Gulf War--this is suggestive today, as the son follows the father's path. 5) Satellite imagery was used to detect Haitians building boats—this struck me as so symbolic of all that is wrong with the US intelligence community—rather than someone walking the beaches and seeing and sensing directly, we use satellites in outer space, at great cost, to do remote viewing. 6) Trust, Truth, and Morality—Halberstam may not mean to say this,

but my reading of his book, influenced by Joe Nye's book on *The Paradox of American Power*, was just this: all the money and all the military hardware in the world will not win a conflict in the absence of trust among the civilian-military players; truth about the fundamentals on the ground; and a morality that empowers tough decisions early enough to prevent genocide.

Halperin, Morton, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy

Part II, the heart of the book, dissects the many strategies for manipulating decisions within the bureaucracy. The "rules of the game" include the manipulation of which agency gets the lead (tending to suppress all dissenting opinions from other agencies) to which staffer in the White House has the lead (pre-determining the outcome), to means of using foreign officials, the press, and business leaders to present supporting opinions, to manipulating the President.

Hirsh, Michael, At War With Ourselves: Why America Is Squandering Its Chance to Build a Better World

The author has provided a very informed and well-documented view of the competing "axis of thinking" (unilateralism versus multilateral realism) and "axis of feeling" (isolationism versus engagement). The two together create the matrix upon which a multitude of ideological, special interest, and academic or "objective" constituencies may be plotted. The endorsement of the book by the Managing Editor of *Foreign Affairs* is a very subtle but telling indictment of the unilateralist bullying that has characterized American foreign policy since 2000--indeed, the author of the book coins the term "ideological blowback" as part of devastatingly disturbing account of all the things that have been done "in our name" on the basis of either blind faith or neo-conservative presumption. America must engage the real world, in a multilateral fashion. The author of this book differs from other authors in that he explicitly recognizes, in his preface and then throughout the book, the fact that a coherent U.S. foreign policy cannot be achieved without the U.S. public's first understanding what is at stake, and then making its voice heard. See longer review at Amazon.

Johnson, Chalmers, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* [The American Empire Project]

This double-spaced book is an indictment of American militarism and unilateralism, and it merits reading by every citizen. It loses one star to a lack of structure and sufficient references to a broader range of supporting literature, and to the author's tendency to go "a bridge too far" in blaming the CIA for everything and in assuming that our troops and their families are somehow enjoying their "luxurious" overseas deployments. It may be best to begin the review where the author ends, by agreeing with the case he makes for the potential collapse of America if the people fail to take back the power and restore integrity and participatory democracy to the Congress. Absent a radical reverse, four really bad things will happen to America: 1) it will be in a state of perpetual war, inspiring more terrorism than it can defeat in passing; 2) there will be a loss of democracy and constitutional rights; 3) truthfulness in public discourse will be replaced by propaganda and disinformation; and 4) we will be bankrupt. On pages 100-101 he draws on a number of authoritative sources to note that the casualty rate for the first Gulf War was close to 31% (THIRTY-ONE PERCENT) due to the exposure of the 696,778 veterans serving there being exposed to depleted uranium rounds and other toxic conditions *of our own making*, with 262,586 of these consequently falling ill and being *officially* declared to be disabled by the Veteran's Administration. I have no doubt that there will be an additional 100,000 or more disabled veteran's coming out of Gulf War II. These disabilities are multi-generational. Veterans disabled in the Gulf have higher possibilities of spawning children with deformities "including missing eyes, blood infections, respiratory problems, and fused fingers." The author also excels in discussing both the collapse of US diplomacy (today the Pentagon manages 93% of the international relations budget, the Department of State just 7%), and the rise of private military companies that he carefully lists on page 140—Halliburton, Kellogg Brown and Root, Vinnell, Military Professional Resources, DynCorp, Science Applications Corporation, BDM (now TRW), Armor Holdings, Cubic, DFI, International Charter. There are more—they are all "out of control" in terms of not being subject to Congressional oversight, military justice and discipline, or taxpayer loyalty. Among the strongest sections of the book is the detailed discussion of America's love affair with ruthless dictators (and Muslim dictators at that) in Central Asia, all in pursuit of cheap oil our privilege elite think they can control. Of special interest to me is the author's delicate dissection of the vulnerability of any Central Asian energy strategy, and his enumeration of all

the vulnerabilities that our elite are glossing over or ignoring. Summing it all up, the author attributes US militarism and the Bush fils "doctrine" to "oil, Israel, and domestic politics", and he bluntly condemns it all as "irrational in terms of any cost-benefit analysis." Quoting Stanley Hoffmann, an acclaimed international relations theorist, he condemns Bush's "strategy" (as do I) as "breathhtakingly unrealistic", as "morally reckless", and as "eerily reminiscent of the disastrously wishful thinking of the Vietnam War."

Judis, John, *The Folly of Empire: What George W. Bush Could Learn from Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson*

This is a balanced book, well-grounded in history, with an objective air and a very pleasing integration of specific quotes from both the past and the present. It strips away the false airs of the neo-cons, and with trenchant scholarship shows how deeply ignorant America's neo-conservatives and their leading light are of the lessons of history. The early portion of the book provides an excellent overview, concise, documented, easy to absorb, of the origins of American imperialism in the early century of Christian millennialism followed by civil millennialism. The chart on page 17 is useful, covering the seven periods of various styles of American imperialism or avoidance thereof. The middle portion of the book provides a non-judgmental review of how America was lured into imperialism for largely economic reasons, including a fear of losing access to China as well as coaling stations for a global navy. At the same time, there is a recurring theme throughout the book of the arrogance and ignorance of white Protestants, who believed—as the Spanish did when they began the genocide in the Americas—that the heathen are savages that must be either absorbed or exterminated. The book concludes with some thoughtful assertions on the perils of empire, the legitimate historical and current grievances of the Muslims at large, and the urgency of returning to an American foreign policy that relies on collective security, a collective conscience, and a restoration of America's commitment to the rights of individuals to self-determination.

Krugman, Paul, *The Great Unraveling: Losing Our Way in the New Century*

The Preface has three core ideas: 1) the elites are ruling badly and not beneficially for the majority of the population including all the voters and most of the stockholders; 2) politicians and corporation chiefs are getting away with

blatant lies to the public because of a media that avoids critical inquiry; and 3) open sources of information--all that lies in the public domain--are more than adequate for anyone to get a grip on reality. The Introduction is a bit scarier and more pointed. The author joins Mark Hertsgaard, author of *The Eagle's Shadow: Why America Fascinates and Infuriates the World* in suggesting that the radical right is creating nothing less than a Reichstag in America. In the author's view, and he quotes Kissinger in chilling terms, the radical right is a revolutionary power that is very deliberately and with malice at all times, rejecting and undermining the democratic rules of the game.

Lapham, Lewis, Gag Rule: On the Suppression of Dissent and Stifling of Democracy

Steeped in history and the relationship of dissent to democracy, the author provides a down-to-earth yet erudite condemnation of the ease with which America was led to war on Iraq by a small group of individual who were able to silence Congress, the media, and all other public interest organizations. Two comparisons are drawn by the author between the Bush Administration's abuse of the law and their control, and the past: the American past, when the Sedition Act was used to jail dissenters and subvert new immigrant voters; and the German past, when Hitler and Goering pulled off a gradual castration of free voice and vote with incremental steps, all done gradually, incrementally, inconspicuously, until suddenly a state of totalitarian rule existed. As the White House officially considered postponing the Presidential election of 2004, perhaps canceling it all together, one's bones can only feel the chill of these two examples, both discussed calmly and carefully by the author. There is a solid strain of economic thinking woven throughout the book, and one can only conclude that the concentration of wealth and the crimes against the working poor now being perpetuated, can only lead to a Great Depression as the labor economy collapses and the technology economy is attacked by the combined ills of overdue break-down, deliberate sabotage, and a withdrawal of foreign credit. The author makes the point on page 85 that America has elevated capital above humans—capital votes in America, humans do not, in the one place where it really matters: the crafting of legislation that transfers wealth from the individual working poor to the privileged elite that own the military-industrial-prison complex.

Moore, Michael, Stupid White Men: And Other Sorry Excuses for the State of the Nation

If I had not read Greg Palast's investigative journalism book first (*The Best Democracy Money Can Buy*), I might not have taken this book as seriously as it merits. The author opens the book with a recap of what is now *known* about the theft of the U.S. Presidential election through the deliberate removal of over 50,000 predominantly black and democratic voters from the Florida voting rolls. The author captures a sense of public outrage that I have not seen in the media, and that I long to see emerge in the forthcoming Congressional elections—what kind of Nation allows its highest office to be stolen like this, with nothing said in any state? We just let it happen and life goes on? This says something about our lack of ethics and our lack of spine as individual citizens. The entire book is full of common sense—"in your face" common sense delivered with a very fine mix of humor and outrage. This is not a book that should be taken lightly--more conventional books such as those by Ted Halstead and Michael Lind (*The Radical Center*), Allan Bloom (*The Closing of the American Mind*), William Greider (*Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of American Democracy*), or Lionel Tiger (*The Manufacture of Evil: Ethics, Evolution and the Industrial System*) are all in deep harmony with the key points the author is making. Among them: 1) The privileged elite, the "white boys" from Ivy League schools who have, despite C averages, overcome their mediocrity and lack of ethics through family connections and incestuous business relationships, are at the root of most of our problems as a Nation. They have, in short, looted the commonwealth and prevented democratic investments in education, public health, and other "common" values. 2) The poor state of education among the masses that cannot afford private schools is the other side of the problem--the author would suggest that our Congressional representatives have replaced our teachers as "the best of the servant class" and that it is the ignorance of our Congressional representatives, most of whom know nothing of the real world beyond their own districts, and the lack of Congressional support for a truly national educational system that stabilizes investments based on quality needed rather than local real estate values, is the core deficiency holding us back as a people.

Mumford, Stephen, *The Life and Death of NSSM 200: How the Destruction of Political Will Doomed a U.S. Population Policy*

For me, the book is important in two ways. First, it tells me there is a person out there who really understands all this stuff in detail, and can help me rethink our national policy when the time comes that we have a sane White House willing to be serious about this vital long-term matter. Second, it lists up front the various areas that impact on population policy (drawing on the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future) and is worth the price of the book for this superb list (each with a paragraph about the sub-policy area): Population Education; Sex Education; Child Care; Children Born Out of Wedlock; Adoption; Equal Rights for Women; Contraception and the Law; Contraception and Minors; Voluntary Sterilization; Abortion; Methods of Fertility Control; Fertility-Related Health Services; Personnel Training and Delivery of Services; Family Planning Services; Services for Teenagers; Population Stabilization; Illegal Aliens; Immigration; National Distribution and Migration Policies; Guiding Urban Expansion; Racial Minorities and the Poor; Depressed Rural Areas; Institutional Responses; Population Statistics and Research; Vital Statistical Data; Enumeration of Special Groups; International Migration; Current Population Survey; Statistical Reporting of Family Planning Services; National Survey of Family Growth; Distribution of Government Data; Mid-Decade Census; Statistical Use of Administrative Records; Intercensal Population Estimates; Social and Behavioral Research; Research Program in Population Distribution; Federal Government Population Research; Support for Professional Training; Organizational Changes; Office of Population Affairs in the Department of Health, National Institute of Population Sciences; Department of Community Development; Office of Population Growth and Distribution; Council of Social Advisors; Joint Committee on Population; State Population Agencies and Commissions; Private Efforts and Population Policy. The author makes a very strong case for how, as his subtitle suggests, US population policy has been doomed by a lack of political will and the inappropriate influence of the Catholic Church and Mexico, in addition to strong private sector interests seeking low-wage workers while avoiding any associated social costs that are put on to the taxpayer.

Nader, Ralph, *Crashing the Party: How to Tell the Truth and Still Run for President*

1) This is the only book that addresses the totality of the challenges and threats to America in a sensible balanced way, without platitudes and upon a foundation of fact. 2) This is the only book representing the new political paradigm in which the citizen-voters take back the power by wiping out the ability of corporations to buy politicians. 3) This is the only book that thoughtfully and convincingly demonstrates that the Democrats have morphed into shadow Republicans, and both parties have completely lost their ethical and popular foundation. 4) This is the only book that bluntly confronts the fact that we get the government we deserve—democracy is hard work and demands citizen time and thought. **IO NOTE:** Books like this are in here because Sun Tzu had it right: we have to understand ourselves, and our own weaknesses, before we can be effective elsewhere.

O'Neill, John, *Unfit for Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry*

There are two bottom lines here: morality matters as a fundamental aspect of character and consistency; and there are no secrets anymore whenever more than one person is engaged in acts that are ultimately not in the public interest. As we go into the election, we have more than one evil to contend with. Kerry is unfit to command; Bush picked or got hijacked by some truly dangerous neo-conservatives and inherently dishonest corporate cronies; and the Republican and Democratic party leaderships have both conspired to keep the best men (John McCain and Howard Dean) away from the candidacy, while illegally blocking the Green and Reform Presidential candidates from sharing the debate forum on television (see my reviews of three books: *Running on Empty*, *Doing Democracy*, and *Gag Rule*). This book is a form of "capstone" that represents rock-bottom in American politics.

Palast, Greg, *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy: An Investigative Reporter Exposes the Truth about Globalization, Corporate Cons, and High Finance Fraudsters*

The most distressing aspect of this book, written by an American expatriate publishing largely through newspapers in the United Kingdom, is that all of this information should have been published in U.S. newspapers in time to make a

difference--to inform the voting public—but was not. One can only speculate how corrupt our media have become—how beholden to their owners and advertisers—if we cannot get front page coverage of the Florida government's disenfranchisement of over 50,000 predominantly black and democratic voters, prior to the presidential election; or of the raw attacks on our best interests by the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and others linked in a "trigger" network where taking money from one demands all sorts of poverty-inducing and wealth theft conditions. Even more timely are his stories about the current Administration continuing a practice of the former Administration, spiking, curtailing, forbidding intelligence investigations into Saudi Arabian government funding of bin Laden's terrorism as well as Pakistani production of the "Islamic" atomic bomb. His exposes of corporate misdeeds, some criminal, some simply unethical, all costing the U.S. taxpayer dearly, are shocking, in part because of their sleaziness, in part because our own newspapers do not dare to fulfill their role as envisioned by the Founding Fathers, of informing and educating the people of this Nation upon which the government depends for both its revenue and its legitimacy.

Peterson, Peter, *Running on Empty: How the Democratic and Republican Parties Are Bankrupting Our Future and What Americans Can Do About It*

The author, Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, is balanced, focused, deliberative, and earnest. He carefully explains how both the "mainstream" political parties have completely abdicated all responsibility, and completely betrayed the public interest in their eagerness to sell legislation to the highest corporate bidders. Focusing on the twin deficits (debt and trade) he concludes that neither party can be trusted with our future.

Prestowitz, Clyde, *Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions*

In ten thoughtful chapters, all well-sourced and well-indexed, and complemented by a *superb* five page list of additional recommended reading, the author (a moderate Republican who served in the Reagan Administration) lays out, with objective precision and a clear love of country extant throughout, why American unilateralism and all we have done since 2000 has been "stupidity, arrogance and ignorance in the exercise of power." His early use of Webster's definition of "Rogue" as "deviant, having an abnormally savage or

unpredictable disposition" not only suits the unilateralist Bush team perfectly, but makes it clear that in objective terms, as perceived by the rest of the world--not just the Middle East, but the responsible Asian powers as well as what Rumsfeld revealingly denigrates as "old Europe"--the USA is indeed a "rogue nation." ... The author is especially strong on documenting the inconsistencies and incoherence of the over-all US national security strategy, and brings his special competency in international economic strategy to bear. He says, "An important aspect of the American empire is that because Americans don't see it as such, few look at the totality or thinking about where it is going and what it needs, and certainly no one is in charge. This inattention creates neglect and incoherent, often contradictory policy initiatives."

Rothkopf, David, *Running The World: the Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*

Dysfunctionality of each Administration's National Security Council, regardless of ideology; institutionalized dysfunctionality between State and Defense and between Defense and Intelligence; and the irrelevance of secret intelligence to most national security decisions, are recurring themes. Focuses on the white boys club in the White House, disregards all other players (foreign, corporate, NGO, religions, etc.)

Rubin, Robert, *In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall Street to Washington*

1) Rubin does a fine job of documenting and explaining why markets, which are relatively autonomous beasts, and at least as important as governments and government policies, in setting the economic security environment. 2) A corollary to the above is Rubin's detailed articulation of how U.S. politics and US policy mechanisms are not now well-suited to coping with the new risks of the global economy. The speed and reach of the marketplace is now such that the industrial-era government bureaucracies and 1970's information technology stovepipes are completely inadequate--however well-intentioned a President might be, the current structure and current approaches to establishing economic strategies and policies are NOT OKAY. 3) Rubin is quite excellent in explaining in a very understandable manner how specific fiscal policies toward other states (e.g. Mexico) can be directly related to consequences in terms of illegal immigration (surging if Mexico is allowed to collapse), illegal drugs and crime, and trade. 4) Especially helpful in this book is its emphasis on the

importance of educating the American public as a pre-requisite to the politics of making the right economic decisions for America. Rubin quotes Clinton as saying that one of his (President Clinton's) greatest lessons learned from his two-term Presidency was the need to do the public education (political strategy) before the public politics and deal-making. 5) Rubin excels at documenting the direct relationship between poverty and inner-city distress and poor education of important segments of America's population, and its economic well-being. He extends this analysis internationally, focusing on how vital it is to extend the fruits of prosperity across all nations and peoples, if the US is itself to have sustainable economic stability and prosperity. Many more points at the longer Amazon review.

Sclosser, Eric, Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American Meal

What I find so dazzling about this work is its thoughtful integration and explanation of how fast food not only increases the gap between the rich and the poor by killing family farms and skilled labor as fast food corporations take over both farms and animal food chains so as to de-skill them and extract every penny of profit possible, but is increasing the prospects for deadly disease entering the national bloodstream. If Microsoft is a "Dutch Elm disease" threat to national security in cyberspace (a view published in *ComputerWorld* by Paul Strassman recently after leaving his post as Director of Defense Information), then McDonalds and the other fast food companies are a threat to national security in multiple ways—by destroying diversity among farms and in eating habits that support unique food chains, by increasing the numbers of people in poverty, by creating massive means by which several different nation-wide epidemics could occur.

Sharpton, Reverend Al, Al on America

1) Reverend Sharpton is strongest in his articulation of the hypocrisy of America, its lip service to slogans. I take him at face value when he speaks of the need to unite the country again around its values, and when he speaks of the emerging black/Latino coalition that resonates on the street level. 2) He lists some of his role models, and it merits comment that three of the four are pioneers of non-violence: Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Nelson Mandela, and Mahatma Ghandi. 4) He is powerful and convincing when he addresses the prison-industrial complex, a complex as threatening to America's long-term security and prosperity as the more well known military-industrial complex. As

he points out, prisons are big business, and politicians on pay-offs have every incentive to keep pumping out contracts for major construction and related services including guard employment. 5) Reverend Sharpton is intellectual and emotional dynamite when he describes the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) as an anti-Rainbow Coalition organization, and Bill Clinton (and by extension, Joe Lieberman) as rich boys eager to stay to the right and reap the benefits, rather than true Democrats committed to delivering people from poverty. In brief, Al Sharpton has to run for President precisely because neither the DLC nor Dean are unwilling to reach out to and represent black America in the truest sense of the word. 6) Reverend Sharpton impresses me on the foreign policy front. Reverend Sharpton gets it: America has made many deals with the devil, with dictators like Saddam Hussein, with terrorists like bin Laden, and the American people do not realize that 9-11 is in fact the beginning of payback for decades of official US hypocrisy in its international relations.

Shipler, David, *The Working Poor: Invisible in America*

Invisible indeed. How America treats its working poor--people working *very* hard and being kept in conditions that border on genocidal labor camps, is our greatest shame. The most important point made in this book, a point made over and over in relation to a wide variety of "case studies", is that one cannot break out of poverty unless the **entire** system works flawlessly. To hard work one must add public transportation, safe public housing, adequate schooling and child care, effective parenting, effective job training, fundamental budgeting and arithmetic skills, and honest banks, credit card companies and tax preparation brokers, as well as sympathetic or at least observant employers. The author is coherent and compelling in making the point that a break or flaw in any one of these key links in the chain can break a family. The author documents both the jobs leaving the US, and the fact that new jobs pay less. As Paul O'Neil, former Secretary of the Treasury has noted, we have two economies in America: one embraces automation (and kills jobs), the other requires expert labor (not the working poor). We have a double-whammy here that is totally against the lower half of the economic spectrum, and it is being aggravated by an incoherent immigration policy that feeds the beast. On page 139 the author just blew me away with documentation to the effect that 37 percent of American adults cannot figure a 10% discount on a price, even with a calculator, nor can this same percentage read a bus schedule or write a letter about a credit card error. He goes on, citing the National Adult Literacy Survey from the Department of Education, to note that 14% of adult Americans cannot

total a deposit slip, locate an intersection on a map, understand an appliance warranty, or determine the correct dosage of a medicine. I had no idea!!! This reality comprises a "sucking chest wound" in the economic body of America, and it is not a chest wound that can be healed as things now stand. There are many other daunting "facts of life" in this book about the working poor, and they all add up to a complete failure of both the national and state leaderships to be serious about long-term sustainable economic prosperity.

Shoob, Michael, Bush's Brain DVD

Over the course of the movie, one learns that Rove is a master of playing the political "game" (only his version actually kills people) at three levels: 1) Disciplined overt politics--staying on message; 2) Underlying messages that are legal but misdirecting; 3) Underlying dirty tricks that are out and out unethical. Over-all the movie suggests that Rove has brought politics to a new low in ethics, and a new high in efficiency. Rove is a killing machine. He turned 9-11, and the war on Iraq, into political devices, and suggests that Rove, who has never served in uniform or in combat (nor have Cheney, Rice, or Wolfowitz), is essentially sacrificing American lives to keep his candidate in power. As a moderate Republican of long-standing (infantry officers and clandestine case officers tend to be conservative), I am appalled at what was done to John McCain by his own "tribe," and never want to be associated with that kind of unethical anti-American behavior. The Democrats are no better, they are simply less capable. America needs the kind of honest government that people like John McCain and Sam Nunn stand for—moderate Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats should consider coming together to start fresh with a new party, a Progressive Party.

Smith, I. C., Inside: A Top G-Man Exposes Spies, Lies, and Bureaucratic Bungling in the FBI

We all know now that Al Qaeda was never operating in secret, and even today, is not operating in secret. We are simply incompetent at looking at open sources in foreign languages. IC Smith conveys this perfectly early on in his book, on page 7, when he repeats something he said that was published in the media, to wit "These guys were not superhuman, but they were playing in a system that was more inept than they were." If there is one word that summarizes this book's message, beyond incompetency, it is "corruption." IC Smith tells it like it is when he discusses Congressional corruption, refusing to fix known

problems in the Intelligence Community; Presidential corruption in abusing power and covering up those abuses; state-level corruption across Arkansas; intelligence community management corruption and malfeasance--some would even say treason, although IC avoids this word.

Soros, George, *The Bubble of American Supremacy: Correcting the Misuse of American Power*

If there is one person who brings together global knowledge, moral capitalism, an appreciation for open society principles, an understanding of how dangerous supremacist ideologies can be, and the money with which to save the world by leading the broader public to have an "aha" experience, it is George Soros. I try to read and review everything he writes. His early analysis in the book, on the dangers of supremacist ideologies and the curious alliance between religious fundamentalists (zealots who know nothing of the real world) and market fundamentalists (immoral capitalists who care nothing of the real world) is spot on. He is articulate and effective in writing about the manner in which this extremist ideology, "we are always right, they are always wrong", in endangering not just American ideals, but American survival. He touches on but fails to capitalize on the urgency of splitting the moderate Republicans (I am one of them) from the extremist base, perhaps by funding the foundation of a new party, the Fiscal Conservatives (moderate Republicans and Southern conservative Democrats). His chapter on the "war" on terror and his condemnation of treating terrorism as a war, with the wrong tools, wrong approach, and wrong effects from our well-intentioned but uninformed behavior is also powerful in its common sense.

Spinney, Chuck, *Defense Facts of Life: The Plans/Reality Mismatch*

Chuck Spinney, who made the cover of TIME in the 1980's as a whistle-blower on defense waste and mismanagement, has in this book presented a readable, well-documented and well-illustrated account of how virtually every single weapons and mobility system now in the Pentagon system is over-priced, overweight, over-budget, and not able to perform as advertised. Although out-of-print, there are hundreds of copies of this book that can be obtained via Amazon's used book channels, and the author is writing a sequel that will be easier to understand if this book is digested first. In addressing the plans reality mismatch, the author is very effectively demonstrating that doctrine, technology and the budget are completely divorced from both real world

threats, and real world logistics. **IO NOTE:** I may have been inspired by Chuck in conceptualizing reality-based budgeting. If one cross-walks the Pentagon and U.S. Government budgets against what we actually face in the way of real-world threats, it quickly shows that we are spending \$500B a year on 10% of the threat (state on state warfare) and completely neglecting everything else.

Suskind, Ron, *The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill*

This book is a fine summary of the shortfalls in the ideological exercise of power that chooses to disregard reality for forgo bi-partisan compromise. The author, an award-winning Wall Street journalist, makes three points in his brief introduction: 1) the greatest threat to national security is that of *bad analysis* (not just secret analysis but bad policy analysis); 2) the book is not a kiss and tell memoir as much as an eye-opening warning of what happens when ideology is substituted for policy analysis; and 3) the book is based on nineteen thousand documents--virtually every document the protagonist O'Neil touched--and hundreds of hours of interviews with people who by their very consent to be interviewed were validating O'Neil's account. This book is a classic, and the moderate Republican counter-part to Morton Halperin's similarly revelatory *Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign Affairs*.

Vidal, Gore, *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*

This book should be read in conjunction with Greg Palast's *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy*. Vidal's book should be subtitled "you get the government you deserve." I cannot think of a book that has depressed me more. There are three underlying issues that make this book vitally important to anyone who cares to claim the title of "citizen:" 1) Citizens need to understand what their government is doing in the name of America, to the rest of the world. 2) Citizens need to probe more deeply for how often the federal government (and many state and local governments) abuse their powers. 3) More subtly, the author explores some "information" issues, using the McVeigh case (the Oklahoma bombing) as a case in point. He starkly questions whether the government has honestly and fully investigated the larger group that helped McVeigh, at the same time that he suggests that the government has withheld information from the people in order to give greater credence to the government's proposition that McVeigh was a lone madman rather than a

valiant soldier representing a broader group of grass-rooted Americans. I will only comment that in the aftermath of both Oklahoma and 9-11, I have constantly been surprised and made thoughtful by the number of middle-class Americans across America who tell me they do not trust the federal government or its agencies, and would no more think of giving them leads than of harming a loved one.

Wallach, Lori, The WTO (Open Media Pamphlet Series)

Lori Wallach has got to be on her way to a Nobel Prize. She has hit an exposed nerve of the corporate system, and illuminated it in a manner that moves tens of thousands. This book, a very short version of a much longer study, is very cogent and well-documented. The bottom line is clear: the WTO operates in secrecy, for the convenience of corporations, and is systematically undermining and overturning higher standards of protections and sanctions related to the protection of children, public safety, and the environment. It merits comment that Wallach (and her lesser known co-author, Michelle Sforza) would never have reached as many people with their thinking in the absence of the Open Media Pamphlet Series. This series is addictive, brilliant, and consistently cuts to the heart of major issues.

Weiner, Tim, Blank Check: The Pentagon's Black Budget

This book remains very, very important because the Pentagon is in the process of reconstituting the "Yellow Fruit" organization, with the same blank check black budget, and the same mind-sets that previously led to enormous ineffectiveness, waste, and some outright corruption and theft of government funds. Known as Gray Fox, this new incarnation of Yellow Fruit has Richard Secord, one of the leaders of the Iran-Contra scandal for which several top personalities were indicted and some convicted, as a primary player.

Wheeler, Winslow, Wastrels of Defense: How Congress Sabotages U.S. Security

The most interesting "thread" within the book has to do with information--what information gets where, who sees it, what do they do with it. At the end, the author concludes, most Members are not doing their homework, and most staffs are too busy focused on inserting partisan advantage and localized pork to actually serve the people of the United States in an effective manner. The book

is unusual in being focused on national security and defense, where the author spent his entire career, and what jumped out at me is that Congress has no grand strategy--Congress, like the Executive, is fragmented into stovepipes and is not able to make thoughtful trade-offs at the big picture level between Diplomacy Information Military Economic (DIME) instruments of national power.

Woodward, Bob, Bush at War

There is an Alice in Wonderland quality to this book--or more properly stated, to the conversations that are quoted among the principals. Their wandering short-hand conversations, the degree to which the President is mis-led about our capabilities, the inability of the Secretary of Defense to answer a direct question, always having to go back to his office for an answer--the entire book is, as one reviewer suggests, practically a recount of a handful of recollections about scattered conversations, as if the center of the world were one room in the White House, and nothing outside those walls really mattered.

Perception

Chadha, Gurinder, Bride and Prejudice DVD

This movie is so extraordinarily clever, at all levels, that I have watched it twice with undivided attention, and have it playing on background now. It does nothing less than remake US views of India. I spend a lot of time thinking about both reality and perception. The US has blown it when it comes to the billions of poor—not just the Arab fundamentalists, but the non-violent individuals who see us occupying their countries and looting their natural resources. If America could produce a movie like this, one that reflected the best of America, the ideals of the original Republic, it would have more of an impact than the billions of dollars we are spending on a heavy-metal military.

Chasse, Betsy, What the Bleep Do We Know!? DVD

Multiple realities exist side by side across time and space; Major problem in our culture today is that children are not learning to think or imagine broadly; Much of what we are taught to think is not true; Modern materialism and most

religions have stripped individuals of their ability to see that they are both responsible, and capable, for affecting their environment; New model says that internal reality is more important than external reality, and it does impact on the environment; Brains do not know difference between what one sees and what one imagines....and lots more.

Cramer, Richard Ben, How Israel Lost: The Four Questions

This book wanders a bit but renders a valuable service in speaking truth to power and considering, from a prize-winning investigative journalism perspective, "the story" of how Israel moved so far from its roots as a home for Jews, to a fanatical almost fascist and certainly zealot state concerned with its own survival. I recommend that the review by Mohamed F. El-Hewie, the New Jersey man with the Islam point of view be read in conjunction with this review. The author opens with an examination of how the "story of Israel" has gone from core reality (a place so barren it makes the Congo look good, Palestinians kicked off their land after Israeli terrorists expelled the British occupying power) to a "land of milk and honey" with deserts made prosperous by Israeli industry--he neglects to mention that Israeli agriculture contributes 3% of the GDP while using 50% of the water, and that most of the water is being stolen by Israeli from underneath land outside Israeli territory. From an "information operations" perspective, this is a really fascinating and well-told story of how Israel created several myths that sold not only in the USA but all over the world. I write in the margin, "Israel is the ultimate Potemkin village." The author is also good at exploring the early signs that these myths are being exploded, the world is catching on, and US support for Israel perhaps being on the verge (within five to seven years) of being withdrawn.

Dallaire, General Romeo, Shake Hands with the Devil

General Dallaire concludes his excruciatingly detailed book, a book with enormous credibility stemming from the meticulous manner in which he documents what happened, when it happened, and what everyone knew when (including advance warning of the genocide from the "third force" that the UN leadership refused to take seriously), with two thoughts, one running throughout the book, the second in the conclusion only: First, and perhaps because of the mental toll he himself paid for this mission, there are frequent references throughout the book to the urgency of understanding the psychology of groups, tribes, and cultures. This is not something any Western intelligence

agency is capable of today. The closest I have seen to this is Dr. Marc Sageman's book on *Understanding Terror Networks*. We urgently need a global "survey", with specific reference to the countries plagued by ethnic conflict and other sources of instability, and we need to start taking "psychological intelligence" very seriously. We need to UNDERSTAND. Second, he concludes the book by emphasizing the urgency of understanding and then correcting the sources of the utter RAGE that characterizes hundreds of thousands if not millions of young men around the world, all of whom he says have access to guns and many of whom he says will ultimately and unavoidably have access to weapons of mass destruction.

Friedman, Tom, Longitudes and Attitudes: Exploring the World After September 11

Although the entire book is rife with gems of insight, it is page 300 that richly rewards the reader who accepts some of the inevitable repetition between the columns and the diary to complete the book: "The Israeli army terrorism experts confided...(that) you can have the best intelligence network in the world, but there is no way that Israelis will ever be able to penetrate Palestinian society better than Palestinians. .. Only the host society can penetrate itself enough to effectively restrain or delegitimize its own suicide bombers. Outsiders can't." ... Across many columns, the author hits again and again at the basics: "we have been allowing a double game to go on with our Middle East allies for years, and that has to stop." Either they cease supporting terrorists in return for a dubious poverty-ridden peace at home, or they join the target list; we must invest heavily in both a Marshall Plan and a Voice of America *in Arabic* that consistently and constantly counters all of the lies about America and against America that the Arab regimes permit as part of their strategy for peace at home; lastly, more subtly, we must get serious about standing up for our values and not allowing rogue governments to abuse our friendship and tolerance while fostering hatred of America among their repressed, using America as the opiate of the down-trodden. The author seems to agree with Ralph Peters, author of *Beyond Terror* and *Fighting for the Future* in focusing on the importance of the Muslim outlands from Pakistan and India down through Malaysia and Indonesia, and he is especially strong at documenting the severe misunderstandings and misimpressions of America that persist across the Muslim world but especially in Arabia--otherwise serious people who really believe that bin Laden is good, 9-11 was justified, and everything will get better if America stops supporting Israel. ... Toward the end

of the book, quoting the deputy editor of New Izvestia in Moscow, the author hits the final nail on the head: "It is not East versus West anymore. It is the stable versus unstable worlds..." China, Russia, Islam, water, disease, crime--terrorism, I conclude, is a very small part of the threat, and our greatest challenge right now is to devise a holistic national security strategy that does not lose sight of the forest for the one burning bush. Overall, the author has provided as fine a net assessment as any President could ask for.

Goffman, Ken, *Counterculture Through the Ages: From Abraham to Acid House*

Across the ages, the common currency of any counter-culture is the will to live free of constraints, limiting the impositions of authority. Indeed, it is very hard not to put this book down with an altered appreciation for hippies, war protesters and civil rights activists, for the book makes it clear that they are direct intellectual, cultural, and emotional descendants of both Socrates and the Founding Fathers, especially Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson. From Socrates to Taoism, Zen, Sufis, Troubadours, the Enlightenment, the Americans, Bohemian Paris, and into the 1950's through the 1970's, the author's broad brush review of the history of counter-culture in all its forms is helpful to anyone interested in how the next twenty years might play out. The bottom line is clear: we need the counter-culture, and it is time for this century's culture hackers—of whom Stewart Brand may be the first—along with the author—to rise from their slumber.

Mamdani, Mahmood, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*

The main weakness of this book is the author's lack of strong criticism of Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, and of other states that are corrupt, repressive, and therefore a huge part of the problem. Having said that, here are some of the key points: - "West" pioneered genocide, expulsions, and religious wars, with Spanish genocide of Indians in Americas, and Spanish expulsion of first the Jews and then the Muslims as critical starting points in understanding Muslim rage today - America adopted terrorism as a preferred means of fighting proxy wars in both Central America and Africa, when Reagan began "rollback" with the same neo-conservative advisors that guide Bush II today. - West has four dogmas as summed up by Edward Said (who is admired by the author): 1) that Orient is aberrant, undeveloped and inferior; 2) that Orient is

inflexibly tied to old religions texts, unable to adapt; 3) that Orient is inflexibly uniform and unable to do nuances; and 4) Orient is either to be feared (Green or Yellow or Brown Peril) or controlled. - Fundamentalism actually started in the US among the Christians seeking to insert religion into the state's business and ultimately demanding faith and loyalty as the litmus tests for acceptance. - Earlier generations of Islamic reformists disavowed violence, but ended up adopting violence after being in state prisons (e.g. Egypt). - Earlier incarnations of a Muslim revival were in the open literature in the 1920's and then in the 1960's, and lastly in the 1980's to date--our national "intelligence" agencies appear to have missed the importance of all three. [MANY other key points in the longer Amazon review.] The author concludes, without sounding inflammatory, that America was built on two monumental crimes: the genocide of the Native Americans, and the enslavement of African Americans. His point: the US is in denial over this reality, while the rest of the world is completely aware of it. He agrees with Jonathan Schell, concluding as Schell does in *Unconquerable World*, that the challenge of our times is in "how to subdue and hold accountable the awesome power that the United States built up during the Cold War." The last sentence is quite powerful: "America cannot occupy the world. It has to learn to live in it."

Noor, Queen, Leap of Faith: Memoirs of an Unexpected Life

The value of the book for me is in the author's credible discussion of what she calls "a fundamental lack of understanding in the West, especially in the United States, of Middle Eastern culture and the Muslim faith." I took the entire book on faith myself—while rabid Jews may not agree, I am prepared to believe that Queen Noor has not been brainwashed, and that she is offering all readers a personal perspective on Arabs, Muslims, Israel, the Gulf War, the impact of US policies in creating millions of refugees and tens of thousands of dead, and so on. If anything, the book, one of hundreds I have read in the past several years, confirms my growing sense of ignorance. Every additional book I read in this area seems to confirm how little any one person can know, and how duplicitous and misleading most official accounts, or media stories, are. We have a long way to go in truly understanding one another, and we can all start by a) reading and b) discussing. Attacking this book, and this Queen, is not helpful. Although I was somewhat aware of the fact that Israel is in violation of United Nations resolutions calling for a separate and equal Palestine state, as well as compensation to the Palestinians driven from their lands and also are of the somewhat rocky start in the area from British mandates and Israeli terrorism

utilized to drive the British from the area, I was unaware of Mahatma Ghandi's statement, "Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French. At the end of the book, and this no doubt explains the hysterical Jewish attacks against this Queen, mother, and author, I was persuaded of three things: 1) the US public and the US government does not have a good grip on Arab politics, culture, or needs; 2) the combination of Jewish power within US policy; Arab inattention to playing US politics from within; and the Zionist "myths" that take on a life of their own, are a major reason why US policy is ineffective and unsustainable in the long run within this vital area; and 3) Queen Noor was as good a queen as the Jordanian people could have hoped for, given the circumstances.

Noujaim, Jehane, Control Room DVD

This is a very worthy and serious documentary. As one who spends a lot of time thinking about "strategic communication" and public diplomacy and public perception, I cannot think of a more important reference point for any US official interested in understanding where we are going wrong in the Arab and Muslim worlds. There are some spectacular flashes of insight in this documentary. My favorite is when one of the Al Jazeera editors says that the US cannot have it both ways—it cannot be the most powerful nation in the world, exercising that power (implicitly, capriciously and dangerously and harmfully) and at the same time expect the world to love it for doing so.

Revel, Jean-Francois, Anti-Americanism

I recommend this book be read in conjunction with Lee Harris, *Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage of History*. Jean-Francois Revel helps us see the history of the past as we should: America with warts, but triumphant. Lee Harris helps us see the history of the future as we should: America at risk, unless it becomes ruthless at the same time that it faces reality. This book has forced me to re-evaluate a great deal of what I took to be "scholarship" that I now realize needs to be subjected to much closer scrutiny. We need more facts on the public table. This book is a good starting point for all of us. **IO NOTE:** It is not in the Blow-Back section because it is a very strong defense of America and all that is good in America, and provides a play-book for fighting back against mis-perceptions of America that are common among those who are critical.

Scheuer, Michael (previously Anonymous), Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror

What we need to do, according to Bin Laden: 1) End US aid to Israel and support a Palestinian state 2) Withdraw US/Western military forces (not business) from the Arabian Peninsula and all Muslim countries worldwide 3) ad US engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq 4) End US support for oppression of Muslims by Chinese, Russian, Indian, and other governments (e.g. Philippines) 5) End US manipulation of oil prices through corrupt dictators 6) End US support for corrupt Muslim regimes.

Stearns, Peter, Global Outrage: The Impact of World Opinion on Contemporary History

Among the gems that made the purchase and the effort worthwhile: 1) World opinion, when it does mobilize, is generally right. 2) World opinion is insufficient to deter a great power such as the USA from its chosen course, but it can impose great and lasting costs on that power as time goes on. 3) World opinion is equally helpless against local customs and conditions, including the economic need for child labor and the deep cultural attachment to female mutilation in some regions. 4) World opinion is a force that rises and ebbs, whose tools and techniques change across issues and times, but it is a constant force in that it exists and it can have an impact. 5) World opinion has been reduced in force by the demise of the U.S. Information Agency and the once powerful labor unions who's AFL-CIO did so much to nurture labor rights around the globe. I had two thoughts as I contemplated this observation: first, that the US and the multinationals were short-sighted in ending the one and crushing the other--it is only now that we appreciate the intangible power for good they both represented; and second, as we grapple with the needs of Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, it is clear we need to reinvent both. 6) The book excels at pointing out across several examples that world opinion is powered by information sharing. The most important information sharing is from the bottom up--from those who are persecuted to the outside world, and then back again in the form of petitions, letters, emails, etc. Information sharing is also important across national and cultural boundaries, helping raises expectations and standards as well as the costs of non-compliance with expectations. 7) Finally, "world opinion" is put forth by the author as the means by which humanity agrees on common standards and expectations that co-exist

with regional and cultural differences, and provide a shared vision for humanity.

Propaganda

Chomsky, Noam, Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on the Post-9/11 World [American Empire Project] (American Empire Project)

As a long-time reader of Chomsky, I found some delight in his recollection of the beginnings of propaganda (in England, with the stated intent "to direct the thought of most of the world") and I learned for the first time that Chomsky credits Walter Lippman with the phrase "manufacturing consent" that Chomsky used as the title of his most famous co-authored work. Chomsky offers some fascinating geopolitical insights with his suggestion that the Trans-Siberian Railway might be extended to run down through North Korean into South Korea, and his views that ASEAN plus 3 (China, Korea, Japan) might rise to super-power status. I am especially taken with his view that China might be the power that saves America from itself, orchestrating a balance of power and sanity arrangement from that side of the world. Chomsky returns to a familiar theme in this book, that of war crimes and the US being a very guilty party, but for the first time, I see Chomsky forgiving of the soldiers on the front lines, and even of their general officers, and placing all of the blame on the civilians that direct the military from the White House and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This is new. I fully expect Americans to be brought up on war crime charges in the next ten years, and I expect the American public to support this when the evidence is presented in graphic terms. Chomsky also returns to his theme of the US harboring terrorists and hence not being able to claim the high ground against other nations. I was impressed by how the Cubans gathered evidence on the Florida-based assassins and violators of US law, and how elegantly the Cubans presented this evidence to the FBI. I was dismayed but not surprised to find the FBI arresting the Cuban infiltrators rather than the assassins

Gibson, William, Pattern Recognition

I have raised it to 4 stars because of the gems, such as the loss of the future on page 57, good description of digital watermarking, the enormous distrust of

false advertising and false impressions leading to false relations (p 85), the final denouncement of the loss of time and human intimacy (p. 302-303), and—overall—the portrayal of web-life, the sympathetic portrayal of Usenet-type groups and their members, the idea of cool ideas and "cool hunter", and the overall representation of mobile information and its vulnerabilities to interception.

Herman, Edward and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consen : The Political Economy of the Mass Media

It is quite significant, in my view, that today as I write this Al Franken, *Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them: A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right* is #2 at Amazon, and Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, *Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq* is #114 at Amazon. Not only are the people awakening to the truth, which is that they have been had through a combination of inattention and manipulation, but these two books and several others in this genre are validating what Chomsky was telling us all in the past 25 years. The ability to set the agenda and determine what is talked about and how it is talked about is at the root of hidden power in the pseudo-democratic society. Chomsky was decades ahead of his time in studying both the power of language and the power of controlling the media message. Today, as we recall that so-called mainstream news media *refused* fully-funded anti-war advertisements that challenged the White House lies (62 of which have been documented with full sourcing in various blogs, notably Stephen Perry's Bush at War blog), we must come to grips with the fact that America is at risk.

Rampton, Sheldon, Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq

Do not be deceived by the cover of this book, whose cartoon may suggest that this is light reading or comic level stuff. It is not. This book is a professionally-prepared, well-documented catalog of the "platform of lies" that the incumbent (2000-2004) US Administration has pressed upon the public in the course of executing six wars (two public) and two occupations, both of which are going badly, at great expense. **IO NOTE:** I was tempted to put in the entire two-page review but will simply say that this one book is as solid a critique as can be found of "old" PSYOP, and will be helpful to anyone attempting to do "new IO" as truth-telling vice manipulation.

Reality

Garrett, Laurie, Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health

I commend the book for its content and do not recommend it as avocational reading. There are some very important points that the book brings out, and I will itemize these in order of importance: 1) Public health is about detection and prevention, medicine is about remediation. In the long run, investments in public health are vastly cheaper and more effective than after-the-fact medical intervention; 2) The insurance industry in the developing world has failed to support public health investments, and in a remarkable collusion with the pharmaceutical, hospital and managed health care industries, has created a very expensive and increasingly ineffective system focused on drugs (to which diseases are increasingly resistant) and hospitals; 3) Hospitals are no longer reliable in terms of protecting patients from both error and secondary infection from other patients. People are coming out of hospitals, in many cases, with more diseases than when they went in; 4) The health of our nation depends on the health of all other nations-not only does a collapse of public health in Africa lead to failed states and forced migrations, but it also is but an airline flight away from infecting Kansas; 5) Clean drinking water, uninfected food, and good environmental and occupational health conditions are at risk in many parts of the United States and Europe, not only in Russia and the rest of the world; 6) The United Nations, and the World Health Organization in particular, are in disarray and ineffective-in large part because of a lack of support from member nations-at dealing with the public health commons. There is no question but that the author has hit a "home run" in terms of describing the harsh reality of epidemics in India and Africa, the collapse of public health in Russia, the rapid migration of many diseases from Russia through Germany to the rest of Europe and the U.S., and the severe costs in the U.S. of a retreat from the collective good with respect to public health.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence.

The general proposition is clear-cut: environmental scarcity has social effects that lead to violent conflict. However, the author takes a side road in exploring "human ingenuity" as an ameliorating factor, and while he makes reference to crass corporate and elitist carpet-bagging and the social structures of repression, he fails to draw out more fully and explicitly the inherent association between

repressive corrupt regimes with extreme concentrations of wealth and power, scarcity, and violence. For myself, I found two gems within this book: the first, a passing comment on the crucial role that unfettered urbanization plays in exacerbating scarcity and all that comes with it (migration, disease, crime); the second, the author's prescriptive emphasis, extremely importance, on the prevention of scarcity rather than adaptation or amelioration of scarcity.

Pelton, Robert Young, Robert Young Pelton's The World's Most Dangerous Places: 5th Edition

I have learned two important lessons from this book, and from its author Robert Young Pelton: First, trust no source that has not actually been there. He is not the first to point out that most journalists are "hotel warriors", but his veracity, courage, and insights provide compelling evidence of what journalism could be if it were done properly. Government sources are even worse—it was not until I heard him speak candidly about certain situations that I realized that most of our Embassy reporting—both secret and open—is largely worthless because it is third hand, not direct. Second, I have learned from this book and the author that sometimes the most important reason for visiting a war zone is to learn about what is NOT happening. His accounts of Chechnya, and his personal first-hand testimony that the Russians were terrorizing their Muslims in the *absence* of any uprising or provocation, are very disturbing. His book offers other accounts of internal terrorism that are being officially ignored by the U.S. Government, and I am most impressed by the value of his work as an alternative source of "national intelligence" and "ground truth". ... What most readers may not realize until they read this book is that one does not have to travel to these places to be threatened by them—what is happening there today, and what the U.S. government does or does not do about developments in these places, today, will haunt this generation and many generations to follow. I strongly recommend this book to anyone who cares to contemplate the real world right now.

Pelton, Robert Young, The Hunter, The Hammer, and Heaven: Journeys to Three Worlds Gone Mad

He has chosen three representative renditions of hell on earth—one dealing with the greed and corruption of diamond mining in Sierra Leone; another dealing with religious intolerance and government terrorism in Chechnya; and the third dealing with massive environmental as well as economic issues in Papua New

Guinea. Each of the three stories combines a rather matter of fact but most interesting story of exactly how he gets in and out of places and who he sees and what they say; with his insights on where the various parties are clashing and how they are doing. Each of these "case studies" is distinct, but taken together, they give one the sense of despair that comes from reading Robert Kaplan, or William Shawcross, or Ralph Peters. Robert Young Pelton is as close as I have found to a true global "intelligence minuteman" capable of getting at ground truth using only legal and ethical methods.

Pennell, T. L., Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier

In the absence of any information at all about the book on its web page, one has to actually buy it to learn that it was first published in the early 1900's and actually deals with the sixteen years travel in Afghanistan of a British medical missionary. Having said that, I recommend the book highly. Any analyst or operator planning to spend time on the ground in Afghanistan will benefit from reading this book. Published in India, it does take time to obtain (three months in my case), but the wait is worth it. I would recommend that this book be read first, for atmospheric and historical cultural constancy, before moving on to some of the other works of more recent vintage.

Price-Smith, Andrew, The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and Development

Although the Central Intelligence Agency got this right in the 1970's, clearly warning U.S. policymakers that AIDS and related diseases were "the" catastrophic threat to national security and regional stability in the closing quarter of the 20th century, and although the United Nations and its various agencies have clearly understood the relationship between disease, environmental degradation, and instability--with all that instability brings in terms of crime, forced migration, and so on, the author gets five stars for doing an absolutely brilliant job of putting all of this knowledge--and his own original contributions--into a readable volume that can be understood by the most loosely-educated policymakers we have, as well as the voting public. The author has done a fine job of documenting how "human-induced worldwide environmental destruction" is both releasing pathogens from their hiding places in rain forests, launching new microbes that wreak havoc on aquatic life, and proliferating resistant strains of microbial terrorists we do not understand.

Bacteria, in brief, are a thousand to a million times more deadly than any terrorist gang, and we would be wise to get our priorities straight as we set about pretending to govern.

Rees, Martin, *Our Final Hour: A Scientist's Warning: How Terror, Error, and Environmental Disaster Threaten Humankind's Future In This Century--On Earth and Beyond*

This is a good book. If E.O. Wilson had not published *The Future of Life* or J. F. Rischard *High Noon: 20 Global Problems, 20 Years to Solve Them*, or Brian Czech, *Shoveling Fuel for a Runaway Train*, then this would be a great book. The book could not have a more distinguished author or more erudite arguments--it suffers from a boring presentation, including an unreadable choice of colors by the publishers for the back cover. If this is an area of professional interest, the book is absolutely essential. If this is an area of personal interest, and you can afford five books, this book definitely deserves to be in that number. If you can only afford one or two books, buy *High Noon*, followed by *Future of Life*.

Reza Nasr, Seyyed, *The Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power (Religion and Global Politics)*

I recommend it because it provides two reasoned case studies on how two different states, Malaysia and Pakistan, used the intensity of Islam to legitimize their governments and states. In the end, both had to control their fanatics.

Rischard, Jean-Francois, *HIGH NOON: 20 Global Problems, 20 Years to Solve Them*

Having read perhaps 20 of the best books on global issues and environmental sustainability, water scarcity, ocean problems, etc, over the past few years (most reviewed here on Amazon) I was prepared for a superficial summary, political posturing, and unrealistic claims. Not this book—this book is one of the finest, most intelligent, most easily understood programs for action I have ever seen. The book as a whole, and the 20 problem statements specifically, are concise, illustrated, and sensible. The author breaks the 20 issues into 3 groups. Group one (sharing our planet) includes global warming; biodiversity and ecosystem losses, fisheries depletion, deforestation, water deficits, and maritime safety and pollution. Group two (sharing our humanity) includes

massive step-up in the fight against poverty, peacekeeping-conflict prevention-combating terrorism, education for all, global infectious diseases, digital divide, and natural disaster prevention and mitigation. Group three (sharing our rule book) includes reinventing taxation for the 21st century, biotechnology rules, global financial architecture, illegal drugs, trade-investment-competition rules, intellectual property rights, e-commerce rules, and international labor and migration rules.

Schor, Juliet, *A Sustainable Economy for the 21st Century (Open Media Pamphlet Series, 7)*

Her reasoned and logical discussion of basic premises (sustainability, democratic control, egalitarianism), of key issues in the relations between workers and their corporate employers, of how to achieve environmental as well as social balance, and of the larger global issues including needed changes in federal law, provide the single best primer I have ever seen for anyone—at any level of understanding—who wishes to invest time in understanding what needs to be done to protect future generations who have no one to represent them other than the people.

Manwaring, Max, et al., *Environmental Security and Global Stability: Problems and Responses: Problems and Responses*

This book is very original and very helpful in exploring an area of national security conceptualization and doctrine that has been long neglected--that of the relationship between environmental security and stability, and all the bad things that happen when this is lost—ultimately causing poverty, mass migrations, disease, crime, and war. The contributing editor, Dr. Max Manwaring (Col USA Ret) uses an interview with General Anthony Zinni, then Commander-in-Chief of the Central Command, to examine key issues such as the desperate need for inter-agency coordination and information sharing, the looming catastrophic problems with rain forests, seabed resources, and inland water scarcity, ending with the urgent need for a national security "game plan" for dealing with this non-traditional threat over time and across all nations including the 32 failed states where many of the problems will not be addressed without outside intervention. All eight of the chapters, the last being a conclusion by the contributing editor, make provocative, documented cases for the urgency of this non-traditional threat. Throughout the book it is clear that the US Department of Defense has some extremely bright uniformed and

retired (teaching) officers who are thinking great thoughts, and it is equally clear that they are not being listened to. This book is probably ten years ahead of its time.

Science

Branscomb, Lewis (ed.), *Investing in Innovation: Creating a Research and Innovation Policy That Works*

This book assumes an honest process and strives to recommend the best possible approach to government policy toward science. It was put together during the Clinton years, and its prescriptions have been largely ignored by both the public and the current (Bush) Administration. Of the four, it is the most practical and least controversial. It is US-centric, leaving unaddressed the possibilities for multinational consortiums working together on “Manhattan Projects” against the really big problems.

Greenberg, Daniel, *Science, Money, and Politics: Political Triumph and Ethical Erosion*

This is the best of the four books I chose to look into this topic, easily the most comprehensive and balanced, with a strong ethical component; it shows how the competition for money, rather than scientific progress, is diverting scarce resources and frustrating needed advances. If you buy only one book, buy this one—but you will be missing important alternative thoughts from the other three.

Mooney, Chris, *The Republican War on Science*

This is the best snap-shot of the ugly baby called US Science, a baby that is on the one hand coddled and spoiled by a politicized program, and on the other straight-jacketed and abused by those same political hand-cuffs. Of the four books I have reviewed on this important topic, this is the one that is the most compelling on the perversions of the extremist Republicans (I am a moderate Republican). It does not, however, provide a complete picture. It is also the one that persuaded me that Science, like Justice and Intelligence, needs its own “Supreme Court” impervious to the corruption that characterizes both the

Executive and Congress. Information needs to be free of political manipulation!

Sarewitz, Daniel, *Frontiers of Illusion: Science, Technology, and the Politics of Progress*

This is the best starting point for skeptics who wonder if science is all it is cracked up to be, or for cheerleaders of science too prone to claim science will solve all our problems. I want to stress that this book is an off-set, but should not be read alone. It raises some very important ethical and common sense political prioritization issues, but viewed alone, is too negative. If you buy only one book, buy Greenberg's.

Strategy

Babbin, Jed, *Inside the Asylum: Why the United Nations and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think*

The author is dramatically and compellingly sensible when he addresses the insanity of letting a bunch of left of center poor nations, each led by fat-cat corrupt bureaucrats living high on the hog and stealing their own countries blind, "out vote" the bill-payer—the USA—and saddle the USA with all kinds of costly and often ludicrous program demands. He is also compelling in condemning United Nations tolerance of terrorism and of corruption. While the US continues to support 44 dictators--something that is addressed by Ambassador Mark Palmer in his superb book on "The Real Axis of Evil" and therefore something we have to stop before we can credibly criticize the United Nations, the author makes a strong case for dumping the UN and moving toward a new form of organization that is comprised of only the democratic nations that are not corrupt and that can pay their bills. The author arouses fury, at least in me, when he points out that Russia and China have manipulated the system and avoided their responsibilities by paying, in 2003, \$18.6 million for Russia and \$23.7 million for China, this at a time when the US is paying 22% of the entire United Nations system budget. ENOUGH!!

Barnett, Thomas, The Pentagon's New Map

Idea #1: World can be divided into a Functioning Core and a Non-Integrating Gap. The disconnected gap is bad for business (risky) and the US military can protect its budget by getting into the business of exporting security so that Wall Street can do more business safely. Idea #2: Connectivity or disconnectedness are the essential means of defining and influencing which countries are able to move into the Functioning Core and which remain in the Non-Integrating Gap [too state-centric for my taste, but a good point--my 1990's call for Digital Marshal Plan remains valid.] Idea #3: Economic relationships have replaced military power as the essential attribute of relations among nations--for example, we cannot deal with China as a military power without first having a comprehensive economic strategy and tools with which to influence them.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership

Zbigniew Brzezinski is considered by the Chinese to be one of America's top strategists (along with Steve Metz from the Army War College), and that is entirely his due. He is brilliant when it comes to state-centric strategy, but falls short with respect to emerging threats, sub-state threats, intelligence reform, and the roles of non-governmental organizations including religions, and civil networks instead of government-driven "command and control." The book ends somewhat quietly, suggesting a transatlantic convention and what one other reviewer very appropriately called "baby steps." My bottom line: Brzezinski is a solid citizen with a big mind and an old framework. He **must** be consulted for his wisdom as we move forward, but it falls to others now to define the bold new steps—faith-based diplomacy, ecological economics, public intelligence, global accountability of leaders—that are essential if we are to save the world for our children.

Clark, General Wesley (USA Ret), Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire

1) He understands that reconstruction cannot be successful unless internal security, stability, and legitimacy are established first. 2) He emphasizes the urgency of operating with other nations in strong alliances, not only to be successful in unilateral operations, but in avoiding competing crises elsewhere. 3) He is very critical of the manner in which the Bush Administration represses

participatory democratic discussion of the threat and the new strategy. America was "shut out" from both the facts and the discussion in the path to war on Iraq. 4) He is sensitive to the enormous damage that America's arrogance (as reflected in the actions being done "in our name") is doing to our interests abroad. He notes, interestingly, that there is a huge difference between the messages carried by the US versus the international media (and implicitly, in our public's unawareness of that difference).

Coll, Steve, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*

The most important point in the book is not one the author intended to make. He inadvertently but most helpfully points to the fact that at no time did the U.S. government, in lacking a policy on Afghanistan across several Administrations, think about the strategic implications of "big money movements." I refer to Saudi Oil, Afghan Drugs, and CIA Cash. Iran plays heavily in the book, and that is one of the book's strong points. As we reflect on Iran's enormous success in 2002-2004 in using Chalabi to deceive the Bush Administration into wiping out Saddam Hussein and opening Iraq for Iranian capture, at a cost to the US taxpayer of over \$400 billion dollars, we can only compare Iran to the leadership of North Viet-Nam. Iran has a strategic culture, the US does not. The greatest failure of the CIA comes across throughout early in the book: the CIA missed the radicalization of Islam and its implications for global destabilization. It did so for three reasons: 1) CIA obsession with hard targets to the detriment of global coverage; 2) CIA obsession with technical secrets rather than human overt and covert information; and 3) CIA laziness and political naiveté in relying on foreign liaison, and especially on Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

Diamond, Larry, *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*

The bottom line is this book is on page 290: "We never listened to the Iraqi people, or to the figures in the country that they respected. The U.S. Army, both before the war and in the post-reconstruction period—and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army—come out of this book looking very professional. The Army got it right, both in its pre-war estimates of what would be needed, and in its post-war recommendations." **IO NOTE:** IO will not succeed unless it first understands what is already believed and perceived among those whom

we seek to address. Of course it helps to have ethical leaders willing to devise a national strategy on the basis of reality rather than ideological fantasy and special interest corruption—which is where IO comes in: public intelligence can drive public policy. It is LEGAL to inform the U.S. public about reality!

Dobbs, Lou, *Exporting America: Why Corporate Greed Is Shipping American Jobs Overseas*

Dobbs helps us understand that we do not have a proper trade strategy nor a related demographic and employment strategy. To those who would say "let the free market do its work" I would point out that the free market would not raise national armies, collect taxes, or provide social security. Some things have to be done by the Nation and its State governments, and one of those "duties" is to conserve and enhance national power from "the bottom up", meaning the population's ability to produce and to fight. There is a related concern: when goods are created by foreign workers earning \$1 per hour, instead of US workers earning \$15 per hour (as discussed on page 11), two bad things happen: the first is that the goods tend to be less lasting in nature--more throw-away products that thus consume precious metal, plastic, etc (this is less applicable in IT, where Indian programmers cost 1/10th and are as good or better than US programmers); and second, they have to be transported, using tons of oil and other fuels. These are called "trade-offs." I'm not an economist, but I do believe that in a limited growth natural environment, and in an unstable world, it makes sense to localize or regionalize as much of your agricultural, light manufacturing, and energy production as possible. Sustainable environments range from local to global, but they start with the local.

Flynn, Stephen, *America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism*

Some will say this book aids the enemy, pointing out with shocking clarity the extreme vulnerabilities of our transportation, communications, and other core systems. I happen to agree with the author's core point, as Thomas Jefferson would agree: politicians will continue to ignore these vulnerabilities and lie to the public until the public achieves its own appreciation of the threat. THE fundamental point of this book, and one that I happily endorse on the basis of my hundreds of other reviews of national security non-fiction, is that how we spend the federal tax dollar is completely out of balance. We are spending \$500 billion on a "hard power" military that can barely contain terrorism, crime,

genocide, revolution, and war between states, while we are letting our states and cities go begging, and refuse to fund just 16,000 Customs inspectors, among other vital initiatives. This is the single best book I have found that points out that in the era of asymmetric warfare, where non-state actors have both explosive and nuclear-biological-chemical power at their disposal, it is the "soft targets", the non-military infrastructure targets, which will be most attractive to the "sleeper" agents of Al Qaeda and others. Washington continues to deceive America about its vulnerability, and about Washington's feckless irresponsibility in failing to redirect funds from hard power only relevant to fighting major states, to a combination of homeland defense of soft targets, which is this book's focus, and soft power projection such as Joe Nye recommends in his various books, but especially "The Paradox of American Power."

Franks, General Tommy (USA Ret), American Soldier

The author is justifiably proud of being able to take down Iraq with half the troops and half the armor and artillery needed in Gulf I. If you read this book in conjunction with Stephen Flynn's book on "America the Vulnerable," where he cries out for 16,000 more Customs inspectors, you can see US national security is "inside out & upside down"—in the 21st Century we need half the uniformed military troops and half the military "hard power" acquisition, but we have failed to understand that we need ten times the manpower and ten times the acquisition within homeland security—we are still lying to America about this contradiction, one reason why I chose to tie these two books together with complementary reviews—Flynn is nothing short of brilliant as a counterpart to Franks. Franks is brilliant in his creation of a Lines of Operations versus Target Slices conceptualization, this is the single best page in the book, a real keeper. Page 339, illustrated 340. Franks fell for the myth that money will buy loyalty and action among the tribes of both Afghanistan and Iraq, a completely erroneous view. Page 332. He also fails to mention that Rumsfeld allowed 3,000 Taliban and Al Qaeda to be evacuated from the Tora Bora trap by Pakistan, with Rumsfeld's active permission (out of naiveté). Page 377. Regional commanders-in-chief need to manage U.S. Intelligence Collection requirements, priorities, and capabilities. This one hit me with "wow" force. I actually agree, provided that the regional CINCs become inter-agency in nature. Page 234. Later on he alludes to the need for CINC budgets, and I agree—we need to change Title 10, and strike a better balance between acquisition and budget authority for type and regional commanders. Page 397.

Friedman, Thomas, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century

The core idea in this book, that individuals are now empowered and able to practice "C2C" (consumer to consumer or citizen to citizen), is not new. Most of us have been focusing on it since the mid-1990's when we started to tell the Pentagon that top-down command and control based on secret sources and unilateral action was history, being replaced by multilateral bottom up consensus based on open sources. The following sentence, on page 283, is alone worth the price of the book: "If President Bush made energy independence his moon shot, in one fell sweep he would dry up revenue for terrorism, force Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia onto the path of reform--which they will never do with \$50-a-barrel oil—strengthen the dollar, and improve his own standing in Europe by doing something huge to reduce global warming."

Gingrich, Congressman Newt, Winning The Future: A 21st Century Contract with America

When he writes so clearly about how we need to monitor all knowledge being created worldwide, with virtual real-time translations services, a Google for science & technology, and no publication overseas going more than ninety days without being translated into English, I am just blown away. This is what the national Open Source Agency recommended by the 9-11 Commission is supposed to do, but CIA is trying to "capture" that mission, which they have consistently screwed over since the end of World War II. Where it really matters, Newt Gingrich not only gets it, he is leading us. He also focuses on our lack of participation in global knowledge forums across all domains, and he champions nothing less than a global presence and global monitoring of all knowledge. This is **powerful** stuff.

Hammes, Col Thomas (USMC Ret), The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century

This is an excellent book over-all. His two key points are clear: 4th Generation Wars take decades, not months as the Pentagon likes to fight; and only 4th Generation Wars have defeated super-powers--the US losing three times, Russia in Afghanistan, France in Viet-Nam, etc. The author offers solid critiques of the Pentagon's mediocre strategy (Joint Vision 20XX) and its

preference for technology over people, an excellent short list of key players in world affairs, interesting lists and a discussion of insurgent versus coalition force strengths and weaknesses in Iraq, and a brutal—positively brutal—comparison of the pathetic performance of "secret" imagery taking days or weeks to order up, versus, "good enough" commercial imagery that can be gotten in hours.

Klare, Michael, *Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum (The American Empire Project)*

There is, and Klare documents this beautifully in relation to petroleum, a very pathological cycle that could be easily stopped. We insist on cheap oil, this leads to bloodshed and high oil prices; this comes back to lower quality of life for the workers, etc. As Klare points out, the pipelines (and I would add the pipe to ship portals) cannot be protected. American policy makers are deceiving the public when they suggest they can stabilize the Middle East and protect cheap oil. Not only can the pipelines not be protected, but on America's current consumption path, according to Klare, the Gulf States would have to DOUBLE production to keep up with American demand. Klare is also intellectually powerful in painting a future picture when China, Russia, and Europe are in armed competition with the USA for energy from Central Asia, Latin America, under the Spratley Islands, etcetera. As I read Klare's book, I was just shaking my head. Our policies on energy are delusional and destructive, and Klare is among the few that is providing an objective report to the public on this reality. Fool's gold at high moral cost. Klare makes it clear that if we do not heal ourselves from inside out, that no amount of guns, blood, or destruction will save us from the inevitable implosion of the unstable places where oil is to be found.

Lewis, Michael, *Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game*

This is a really excellent book. If we managed the national security budget the way Billy Bean managed the Oakland A's, we'd have faster better cheaper military hardware, and a lot more plowshares. I was also impressed by the way in which Billy Bean built a team, in which players who might not have been individual stars excelled at setting up others in a true team effort where the group as a whole is stronger than the sum of the parts. Others have written better reviews from a baseball fans point of view—as a non-baseball fan, I can

attest to this book's being an "aha" experience. Statistical lecture any stud can understand.

Luttwak, Edward, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace

My own discovery of how the threat changes depending on the levels of analysis would not have occurred without this brilliant book by Edward Luttwak. It was his careful and reasoned discussion of how specific capabilities and policies might not make sense at one level of analysis, but do when combined with others, that helped me understand why US (and other) intelligence communities continue to get so much wrong. First to credit Luttwak: anti-tank weapons make no sense in isolation (tactical level), but if they slow the tank down enough to allow artillery and close air support to have an impact (operational level), they might close gaps and win victories (strategic level). Bottom line: nothing in war can be considered in isolation (including, one might add, the post-war needs that enable an exit strategy). It was from Luttwak's work that the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (today the Marine Corps Intelligence Command) developed the new model for analysis that distinguished between the four levels of analysis (strategic, operational, tactical, and technical), combined that with the three major domains (military, geographic, and civil), and then cross-walked that against every single mission area (infantry, artillery, tanks, aviation, etcetera).

Macgregor, Douglas, Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights

The underlying theme in this book is that the Chief of Staff of the Army will not succeed until he breaks the back of the cultural mafia that persists--like the horse cavalry of old--in focusing on big units and expensive platforms. Perhaps the most revolutionary underlying theme in this book is that of how to deal with information. The author may well be the most intelligent helpful commentator I have read in this respect. On page 102 he focuses on the fact that "Command centers where information is collected and transmitted should not be information monopolies," and he focuses throughout on the urgent need to use "commander's intent" (a concept of operations pioneered by Marine Corps Commandant Al Gray) and fluid lateral information sharing to increase situational awareness and agility at the tactical level.

Manwaring, Max et al, *The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*

Divided into three parts, the book first addresses the Global Security Environment (2 chapters), then discusses elements of a grand or total strategy (5 chapters), and concludes with a prescription (2 chapters). Every chapter is good. ... Chapters 3-7 are each little gems. In Chapter 3 Max Manwaring suggests that our existing assumptions about geopolitics and military power are obsolete, and we are in great danger if Americans cannot change their way of thinking about national security issues. He suggests five remedies, the most important of which is the establishment of a coherent inter-agency planning and operational control process for leveraging all sources of national power—political, diplomatic, economic, military, and informational--simultaneously and in balance. In Chapter 4 Edwin Corr and Max Manwaring offer a fine discourse on why legitimate governance around the world must be "the" end that we seek as a means of assuring American security and prosperity in the face of globalization. Chapter 5 by Leif Rosenberger addresses the economic threats inherent in globalization, including free flows of capital, concluding that fixed exchange rates divorce countries from reality, and that the US must sponsor a global early warning system dedicated to the financial arena. Chapter 5 by Dennis Rempe is good but too short. He clearly identifies information power as being the equal of diplomacy, economics, and military power, going so far as to suggest an "International Information Agency" that could eventually become a public good as well as an objective arbiter of "ground truth." ... See the longer review at Amazon.

Marten, Kimberly Zisk, *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past*

On balance, I find the book worthy in so far as it draws parallels between the imperial occupations of the past and those of the present that focus on winning the war but pay no attention to winning the peace. Unfortunately, the book stops precisely where I was hoping it would start: it fails to address the two biggest aspects of winning the peace: a) inter-agency operations that mobilize *all* sources of national power and b) a deliberate concept, doctrine, manning, funding, and capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction, such as the Defense Science Board has recommended and the US Department of Defense is now implementing.

Miller, Matthew, *The Two Percent Solution: Fixing America's Problems in Ways Liberals and Conservatives Can Love*

This book is politically and economically *explosive*. It joins *The Radical Center* (Halstead & Lind) and *Cultural Creatives* (Ray & Anderson) as one of my "top three" in domestic US political economics, and it *also* joins *The Soul of Capitalism* (William Greider) and *Rogue Nation* (Clyde Prestowitz) in my "top three" for international political economics. This is a cross-over, transformative book that should be meaningful to everyone in the world, but especially to those Americans who wish to break out of the vicious downward spiral caused by partisan politics and voodoo economics—by elected politicians corrupted by special interests and consistently selecting short-term fraudulent "solutions" at the expense of long-term *sustainable* solutions. ... By "2% solution" the author means 2 cents of every dollar in the national budget, or roughly what we have already wasted or committed to waste on the misbegotten Iraq invasion and occupation. The author crafts a viable proposition for thinking really big and coming to grips, in time to avert the looming disaster of the baby boomer pensions and the collapse of health care and education, with the four biggest issues threatening the national security and prosperity of the United States of America: universal health care; equal education for all, a living wage for all, and sustainable reliable pensions for all. He sums it up in a gripping fashion: if we don't fund smart well-educated kids across the entire country, then we will not have the productivity we need to expand our pension funds and care for the boomers when they hit retirement. Smart kids now, safe retirement for today's adults. Any questions?

Nye, Joseph, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (Longman Classics Series), Fourth Edition*

This is a five-star tutorial on international relations that has been most recently updated after 9-11. If I were to recommend only two books on international relations, for any adult including nominally sophisticated world travelers, this would be the first book; the second would be Shultz, Godson, & Quester's wonderful edited work, *Security Studies for the 21st Century*. Each chapter has a very satisfactory mix of figures, maps, chronologies, and photos—a special value is a block chart showing the causes for major wars or periods of conflict at the three levels of analysis--international system, national, and key individual personalities, and I found these quite original and helpful.

Olsen, Edward, US National Defense for the Twenty-First Century: The Grand Exit Strategy

This book is worth buying for its documentation of one really superb point, to wit, that the U.S. is in fact entangled in too many alliances requiring too much money and too much manpower to support, all of which in the aggregate handcuff the Nation and drain its resources. Right on—we should start with getting out of Korea and cutting all military assistance funds to the Middle Eastern nations.

Ornstein, Robert, New World New Mind: Moving Toward Conscious Evolution

1) The evolution of our brains and our ability to sense cataclysmic change that takes place over long periods of time is simply not going fast enough--the only thing that can make a difference is accelerated cultural evolution, which I find quite fascinating, because cultural evolution as the authors describe it harkens to noosphere, World Brain, co-intelligence, and what the Swedes are calling M4 IS: multinational, multiagency, multidisciplinary, multidomain information sharing--what I think of as Open Source Intelligence—personal, public, & political. 2) One of the more compelling points the authors make is that not only are politicians being elected and rewarded on the basis of short-term decisions that are by many measures intellectually, morally, and financially corrupt, but the so-called knowledge workers—the scientists, engineers, and others who should be "blowing the whistle," are so specialized that there is a real lack of integrative knowledge. I realized toward the end of the book, page 248 exactly, that Knowledge Integration & Information Sharing must become the new norm. **IO NOTE:** Its about integration, not fragmentation.

Peters, Ralph, New Glory: Expanding America's Global Supremacy

Blistering review of the flaws of Islamic civilization, the collapse of Europe, and the potential of Africa, Latin America, and South Asia, which the U.S. fails to engage properly. A grand strategic overview, sees no conflict with China brewing because of their dependence on U.S. consumption. Condemns contractors as traitors to America, misdirecting scarce resources needed for asymmetric options.

Peters, Ralph, Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World

The author is caustically critical of the corruption in the U.S. as well as other governments that stem from oil company fortunes in bribery and illegitimate influence; he is brutally on the mark when criticizing the useless and very expensive military systems we procure with the taxpayer dollar, only to see them irrelevant in the war on terrorism; and he is chillingly prescient when he foresees the growing gap between the American people and their own government, a government unwilling to make available to the people all of the information it has in hand with respect to terrorism and what we need to do to root out terrorism—including terrorism funded by Saudi Arabian rulers desperately holding on to power with American support. Among his most brilliant pieces are those on hucksters in uniform, on the black art of intelligence, and on the greatest threat to all mankind, the diverse manner in which information will be available or exploited or ignored by distinct cultures and social classes.

Prestowitz, Clyde, Three Billion New Capitalists: The Great Shift of Wealth and Power to the East

His most important point is made in one line: America does not have a strategy. America does not have a strategy for winning the global war on terror, it does not have an energy strategy, it does not have an education strategy, it does not have an economic or competitiveness strategy. The government is being run on assertion and ideology rather than evidence and thought. The author makes two important points early on in the books: first, that information is the currency of this age, replacing money, labor, and physical resources; and second, that the best innovation comes from the right mix of sound education across the board, heavy investment in research & development, and a co-located manufacturing bases that can tinker with R&D and have a back and forth effect. America lacks all three of the latter, and is not yet serious about investing in global coverage of all languages, 24/7.

Schell, Jonathan, The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People

Across 13 chapters in four parts, the author provides a balanced overview of historical philosophy and practice at both the national level "relations among nations" and the local level ("relations among beings"). His bottom line: that

the separation of church and state, and the divorce of social responsibility from both state and corporate actions, have so corrupted the political and economic governance architectures as to make them pathologically dangerous. His entire book discusses how people can come together, non-violently, to restore both their power over capital and over circumstances, and the social meaning and values that have been abandoned by "objective" corporations and governments. The book has applicability to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places where the US is foolishly confusing military power with political power. As he says early on, it is the public *will* that must be gained, the public *consent* to a new order. ... A quote from the middle of the book captures its thesis perfectly: "Violence is a method by which the ruthless few can subdue the passive many. Nonviolence is a means by which the active many can overcome the ruthless few." Taking off from the above, the author elaborates on three sub-themes: First, that cooperative power is much greater, less expensive, and more lasting than coercive power. Second, that capitalism today is a scourge on humanity, inflicting far greater damage--deaths, disease, poverty, etcetera--than military power, even the "shock and awe" power unleashed against Afghanistan and Iraq without public debate. Third, and he draws heavily on Hannah Arendt, here a quote that should shame the current US Administration because it is so contradictory to their belief in "noble lies"--lies that Hitler and Goering would have admired. She says, "Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities." Toward the end of the book the author addresses the dysfunctionality of the current "absolute sovereignty" model and concludes that in an era of globalization, not only must the US respect regional and international sovereignty as an over-lapping authority, but that we must (as Richard Falk recommended in the 1970's) begin to recognize people's or nations as distinct entities with culturally-sovereign rights that over-lap the states within which the people's reside--this would certainly apply to the Kurds, spread across several states, and it should also apply to the Jews and to the Palestinians, among many others. **IO NOTE:** This extract is longer than usual because of the importance of this book to the IO professional. Our message will not be effective unless we embody that message in our behavior in every clime and place.

Stewart, Thomas, Intellectual Capital: The New Wealth of Organizations

The most important point in this book is that the value is no longer found in collecting just-in-case knowledge, but rather in connecting dots to dots, dots to people, and (the highest value) people to people. It's about connecting, not collecting. Based on this book I drew my own value triangle, VALUE appearing in the middle of the triangle, with Context being the lower left corner, Content being the lower right corner, and CONNECTION being the apex of the triangle--further refined as connecting customers, connecting contributing talents, and connecting sub-contracted sources, softwares, and services. No one is doing this today in the manner that meets the emerging needs of the marketplace. **IO NOTE:** The ultimate IO strategy is to substitute IO for violence while using it to create wealth across the globe.

Stewart, Thomas, The Wealth of Knowledge: Intellectual Capital and the 21st Century Organization

Too many people will miss the core message of this book, which is about paying attention to truth and seeking out truth in the context of networks of trust, rather than about managing the process of internal knowledge. Training must be a priority—organizational legal and management precepts are all wrong (industrial era) as is government taxation (on things vice ideas). The bottom line of this truly inspired and original book comes in the concluding chapters when the author very ably discusses how it is not knowledge per se that creates the value, but rather the leadership, the culture, and infrastructure (one infers a networked infrastructure, not a hard-wired bunker).

Zinni General Tony (USMC Ret), Battle Ready

With Tom Clancy. There are some tremendous gems in this book, some of which I summarize here. 1) Zinni is impressive in his grasp of grand strategy, of the urgency of understanding the threat, devising a full approach that mixes and matches *all* instruments of national strategy, and that focuses--as Zinni learned to focus in Viet-Nam, on the hearts and minds of the people rather than the force on force battles (a means to an end, not an end in themselves). [See longer review at Amazon.] 4) Within the center of the book, there are rich lessons about war-fighting and peace-making that will stand the test of time. Most impressive is Zinni's focus on pre-emptive relationship building across the region. a) Relationships matter, and relationships forged in advance go a very

long way in avoiding misunderstanding and defusing crises. If you have to fight, relationships are the single best means of reducing the fog of war and assuring good integration of effort across cultures, nations, and armies. b) at Amazon. c) Non-state entities, both tribal threats and non-governmental organizations, are the heart of the new battle. Repeatedly Zinni comments on how poorly we do in terms of thinking about strategy, operations, and tactics for the sub-state war, and how badly we do at intelligence about tribes, and at coordinating with non-governmental organizations. Zinni finally discovered the true value of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations as a flag officer, and ended up nurturing the creation of Civil Military Operations Centers, and a new language, such as "Humanitarian Relief Sectors" instead of "kill zone." [Other key points at Amazon.] Zinni's final observations deal with ethics and the obligation to avoid spin and always speak the truth. Zinni is smarter than many military leaders, who mistake loyalty to specific individuals with loyalty to the Constitution. He also differs from them in understanding that Operations Other than War (OOTW) is where it is at and will be for the foreseeable future.

Technology

Arnold, Stephen, *The Google Legacy: How Google's Internet Search is Transforming Application Software*

This is a truly extraordinary book, well worth the \$180 cost for softcopy and the additional \$20-100 cost for black and white or color reproduction. It is a collector's item, and perhaps the single most important and useful book needed to understand how everything is about to change as Google displaced Microsoft, ORACLE, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Among the author's revolutionary findings are that Google is actually a globally distributed super-computer, not just a search engine; that Google's "rack cost" is one third the price of its nearest competitor (Dell), and that Google's optimization of its own version of LINUX has given it ten times the performance at global search & retrieval, at half the price, of any commercial provider. It has solved the back-up issues, and eliminated configuration management issues as well. It's racks and even entire data centers are plug and play, and instantly in service.

Garreau, Joel, *Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies -- and What It Means to Be Human*

The author focuses on four technologies abbreviated as GRIN: Genetics, Robotics, Information, and Nano. Others have focused on the integration of Nano, Information, Bio-Technology and Cognitive Science (NIBC), and I would have been happier with this book if it focused more on the thinking side of the future rather than the bio-mechanical side. The author talks about the implications for human transformation in all of this, but missing from his schema is the moral dimension.

Gold, Beth and Bill Ruh, *Enterprise Integration: The Essential Guide to Integration Solutions* (Addison-Wesley Information Technology Series)

If you are a manager to whom information technologists report, or a manager that employs technical advisors who in turn help oversee varied IT procurements and implementations, then this book is an ideal primer. It can also be scary, because I will wager that in 7 out of 10 cases, the technical experts are not pursuing the enterprise integration fundamentals that this book outlines. I recommend this book for managers in part because the book itself is quite clear on the fact that information technology by itself, no matter how much money is thrown at it, will not achieve enterprise information integration. Management mind-sets, management metrics, management enforcement of standards and compliance with the strategic direction implied by enterprise integration, are all required.

Kurzweil, Ray, *The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology*

Genius discusses robotics, genetics, and nano-technologies as information-based technologies that will change everything and allow humans to surpass their bodies. While technically brilliant, is culturally blind, and avoids engaging harsh realities of corrupt governments and profiteering corporations as well as possibilities of these technologies becoming the new weapons of mass disruption if not destruction.

Perrow, Charles, *Normal Accidents*

It is relevant, for example, to the matter of whether we should try to use nuclear bombs on Iraq--most Americans do not realize that there has never (ever) been an operational test of a US nuclear missile from a working missile silo. Everything has been tested by the vendors or by operational test authorities that

have a proven track record of falsifying test results or making the tests so unrealistic as to be meaningless. This book is also relevant to the world of software. As the Y2K panic suggested, the "maze" of software upon which vital national life support systems depend—including financial, power, communications, and transportation software—has become very obscure as well as vulnerable. Had those creating these softwares been more conscious of the warnings and suggestions that the author provides in this book, America as well as other nations would be much less vulnerable to terrorism and other "acts of man" for which our insurance industry has not planned.

Smith, Charles Martin, The Snow Walker DVD

This is an extraordinarily deep and pleasing look at what happens when technology fails, and man's only salvation is another person who is still in touch with nature. I was moved by this movie, and found it to be nuanced and elegant. Not only does the pilot survive, but in doing so, he returns to the land, he returns to "the people of the land" (the Eskimos), and he overcomes the falsely-rooted prejudices of those who fall prey to the fools' gold that is found in technology, and scorn those who remain close to the land.

Threat

Abuza, Zachary, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror

Across the board, from his narrative to his footnotes to his bibliography to his index, this book is as good as it gets. This is a world-class contribution to our understanding in three areas: 1) what can be known about terrorism and militant Islam from open sources of information (but is being largely ignored by the so-called professional intelligence agencies that are obsessing on secret sources and methods; 2) what governments in Southeast Asia are and are not doing about it (in many cases, abusing American naiveté or being put off by American arrogance; and 3) where militant Islam is going in this area—be afraid, be very afraid. If all academics were this good, we would not need spies. This book and this author represent the very best scholarship that one could ask for.

Benjamin, Daniel, *The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right*

While it lacks the intimate detail and the passion of Richard Clarke's book, *Against All Enemies*, it is the first book I have found in the years since 9-11 that satisfactorily reviews the bidding, provides a polite but hard-hitting critique of all we are doing wrong, and ends with reasonable recommendations for future action--recommendations that will most certainly not be adopted by the current Administration. Most gripping, on page 159 of the book, is a quote from a *TIME* article in 2003 that I missed back then, but that today I find compelling—a quote that likens Al Qaeda and its off-shoots not to a snake, the analogy popular with the Administration, but to mold—toxic mold one might add. The authors are to be commended for both their recognition that it is disruption, not destruction, that will cause the most pain to the West; and that most of our wounds are self-inflicted. "Intelligence" *qua* spies and secrecy and espionage does not play in this book. Indeed, in a footnote, the authors wonder if future adversaries will have any respect at all for U.S. intelligence, and with good reason. The irrelevance of secret intelligence to this larger conflict lends added weight to the common-sense open source information observations of the authors.

Bodansky, Yossef, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America*

The book is a hard read, but if one desires to understand the murky inter-relationships among the *governments* of Pakistan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, among others, the businesses and charities working actively to channel government and private funds to terrorists, and the global loosely-knit network of "fellow travelers" and jihadists, then this book is "Ref A." ... The Conclusion, appropriately Chapter 13, is titled "What Next." The book is worthy of purchase and recurring reference for this chapter alone. Especially troubling is the documentation of how many terrorists are moving around the world on legitimate passports from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Turkey, Kuwait, Algeria, Albania, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and other countries. The book adds confirmation to the many other references I have seen (many posted to OSS.Net news and reference section) regarding the active involvement of the Pakistani intelligence service in funding and training and facilitating travel for bin Laden personally, for his top lieutenants, and for terrorists in general. **IO NOTE:** This book was first published in 1999 and was completely ignored, as were the 1994 warnings by Steve Emerson, who

broadcast on PBS a one-hour documentary on Immans preaching on U.S. soil calling for the murder of Americans.

Bunker, Robert et al, Non-State Threats and Future Wars

Phil Williams, a top academic with superb law enforcement and national security connections at the working level, provides a preface that is concise and useful. He begins by pointing out that Clinton as well as Bush to date have ignored non-state threats, specifically including terrorism, and failed to understand the gravity and imminence of the asymmetrical threat. He lists five realities and three solutions: Reality #1: International security is more complex. It is not sufficient to focus only on states. Reality #2: Distinction between foreign and domestic security is gone--one cannot have homeland security in isolation from global security, and vice versa. Reality #3: States are not what they were--the balance of power now requires that states, corporations, and organizations find new means of coordinating policies, capabilities, and actions. Reality #4: Non-state enemies are everything that states--and especially the USA—are not. They are networked, transitional, flexible, learn from their mistakes, can embed themselves invisibly into existing financial and other communities, and possess a capacity for regeneration that national policy-makers simply do not appreciate. Reality #5: Globalization has down and dark sides. It is imposing costs that lead to "blowback" and it is diffusing technologies and capabilities to non-state actors to the point that the complexity of Western infrastructures is now the greatest vulnerabilities of all of these state-based societies. He concludes with three solutions: get intelligence right (a draconian challenge); change mind-sets (an equally draconian challenge); and revitalize and revamp the entire institutional archipelago through which national security policy, acquisitions, and operations are planned and executed (also a draconian challenge).

Chua, Amy, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability

What I found most interesting, having spent much of my life in Asia and Latin America, and been close to some Chinese elements in Singapore, was that much of the author's case is based on Chinese examples, not American. This makes the book especially valuable to Americans, because when she speaks of a world on fire and the dangers of ethnic conflict coming out from under market-dominant minorities, she is speaking about Chinese examples, not

American examples. As the Godfather would say, "This is not personal, this is business."

Dershowitz, Alan, Why Terrorism Works

First off, of all the books I have read on terrorism, most by either researchers or investigators of former spies, this is the one whose author is, by any standard, the most educated, most logical, most grounded in the precepts of rational law, and most articulate on why governments need to have firm and constant policies for dealing with terrorism in such a way as to "discourage others." Second, the author's 22-page list of acts of Palestinian terrorism that went unchecked prior to 9-11, is alone worth the price of the book. While I do agree with one other reviewer who suggests that the author is obsessing on Palestinian terrorism (as opposed to Saudi or Pakistani or Egyptian-sponsored terrorism), he has a point and this list merits close attention. Third, although I may not agree with all of his recommendations for imposing internal security while sacrificing considerable civil liberties, this is as close as I have seen anyone get to a comprehensive practical list of things that need to be done, to include controlling the media so that terrorists are not rewarded with publicity.

Dillon, Martin, Robert Maxwell: Israel's Superspy: The Life and Murder of a Media Mogul

This book is *fascinating* and explosive, not least because of the very well documented coverage it provides of how Israel's intelligence service, the Mossad, used Robert Maxwell to penetrate not just the U.S. government, including the Department of Justice, the military, and the national laboratories, but many foreign governments including the Chinese, Canadians, Australians, and many others, with substantial penetration of their intelligence service databases, all through his sale of a software called PROMIS that had a back door enabling the Mossad to access everything it touched (in simplistic terms). Also shocking, at least to me, was the extensive detail in this book about how the Israeli intelligence service is able to mobilize Jews everywhere as "sayanim," volunteer helpers who carry out operational (that is to say, clandestine) support tasks to include spying on their government and business employers, stealing documents, operating safehouses, making pretext calls, and so on. I am a simple person: if you are a Jew and a US citizen, and you do this for the Israeli intelligence service, then you are a traitor, plain and simple. This practice is evidently world-wide, but especially strong in the US and the UK.

Emerson, Steven, American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us

There are really three stories in this book, which I urge every American--and every other citizen of the world--to read. First, and most importantly, the book documents the wide-spread and robust network of Islamic "charities" and other front organizations—the most important based in Texas where they have been ignored--that do fund-raising for terrorism overseas as well as terrorist recruiting and training in the US. The map at the end of the book showing over 50 terrorist nodes in over 30 US cities, is along worth the price of the book. *More than 20% of the addresses and phone numbers in a top terrorist's phone book, when captured, where in the US.* Second, the book provides insights into why the US Government is failing in the war on terrorism. The reasons for failure are balanced between policy failures--a pure unwillingness to confront Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran and other governments that nurture terrorists--and intelligence failures, including such mundane things as refusing to demand police record checks on individuals from countries known to be exporting terrorists, and poor relations (and a lack of unilateral clandestine penetrations) with key intelligence services such as the Sudanese, which knew about the "Day of Terror" well in advance but did not tell us...and if it did tell us, our Intelligence Community failed to notice and failed to communicate the warnings. The third story in this book is about sources and methods and mindsets, and the bottom line is this: an open mind can use open sources of information to such advantage, that it makes our closed source and closed mind bureaucracy look pitiful in comparison. The US taxpayer is not getting their money's worth from the US Government with respect to national security expenditures. **IO NOTE:** see Methods for duplicate listing with four PSYOP themes not shown here.

Harkavy, Robert, Warfare in the Third World

This book is most helpful in that it actually studies conflicts in the Third World, and ends up with documented conclusions or in some cases speculations about: 1) why subjective factors including culture sometimes allow the defeat of forces whose numbers, lethality, and wealth would normally be expected to be invincible; 2) how "absorption" through training and leadership are at least as important if not more important than the actual provision of arms; 3) how seapower and airpower play out differently in the Third World than in conventional battlegrounds; 4) what lessons might be drawn from the Third World regarding the design and acquisition of weapons technology, both in the

offense and in the defense; 5) the critical importance of economic, social, and cultural factors in determining the outcomes of otherwise high-tech wars; 6) the relative absence of decisive victories, making military power relatively meaningless unless it is accompanied by "peace in force" and the follow-on civil affairs, law enforcement, agricultural and other infrastructure, investments; and 7) "pain thresholds" as a critical factor.

Harris, Lee, Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage of History

The most important point that I drew out of this book was its legitimate and here-to-fore unarticulated criticism of intellectuals and liberals for having forgotten that their hard won liberties came at the cost of blood, and that utopian ideals are fantasies that distract one from the harsh truths of the real world. Others will focus on the author's more publicized point, that Al Qaeda is a ruthless enemy that hates us to the point of wanting to simply die while we die with it, and that is a useful point, but the two go together: we cannot be effective against our external enemy unless we also recognize our internal enemy, those mind-sets that prevent us from being effective in defending our values and our liberties.

Kaplan, David, Yakuza: Japan's Criminal Underworld, Expanded Edition

There are a number of fine points across the book that merit emphasis here, and one of the earliest is that of how the CIA and the Army G-2 deliberately nurtured Japanese criminal organizations during the occupation, because they were "anti-communist." There is an excellent section of the book that focuses on how the US government fostering of political corruption in Japan in turn led to US corporate corruption, to include the funding of separate US corporate foreign policies anti-thetical to those Congress was trying to foster in the days before Congress abdicated its responsibilities. [Major paragraphs available at Amazon.] Closing comment: the book documents the incompetence of the US approach to manning its Embassies, especially in the law enforcement arena, where individuals are not language qualified, have no idea of the culture or history, and rotate every two years just as they are finally getting wise. We need a "long haul" manning strategy, and in my view should start thinking in terms of 10-year assignments with every second person coming in at the 5-year mark for solid continuity of intelligence and counterintelligence against these clear and present threats to national security and prosperity.

Korem, Dan, *Rage of the Random Actor: Disarming Catastrophic Acts And Restoring Lives*

Suffice to say that armed with this book, communities and organizations will have all they need to know to achieve early warning of potentially threatening "random actors." This is not a book full of psycho-babble. If anything, it is solidly grounded in practical case studies going back twenty years, and I for one, as a 30-year veteran intelligence professional, including clandestine service with constant exposure to bad boys and girls, find the book credible, useful, and easy to understand. The bottom line, without seeking to simplify the book, is avoid de-personalization, prevent bullying, open up to individuals and empower them, and above all, be alert for any sense that they see teachers or other authority figures as "CONTROLLING" and rules as "INAPPLICABLE." The author's finding that terrorism is a rich kid's game, and that most US-based random actors will come from upper middle class families in small towns, are consistent with my own research and practical experience with revolutionaries. Sadly, the underlying theme across the book is that of societal collapse. The major institutions, from school to church to sports to social clubs are all degenerating and failing to provide the inclusiveness and alternatives to boredom and alienation that they once represented. The threat of "random actors" imposing catastrophic fatal acts on their communities is very real.

Kunstler, James Howard, *The Long Emergency: Surviving the End of the Oil Age, Climate Change, and Other Converging Catastrophes of the Twenty-first Century*

I consider the book, despite its run-on Op-Ed character, to be a tour de force that is very logically put forward. This is the first place that I have seen such a thorough denunciation of how cheap oil underlies everything else including suburbia and Wal-Mart. I am also quite impressed by the author's logical discourse on how communities have sacrificed their future coherence and sustainability for the sake of a few dollars savings on Wal-Mart products. I find the author's exploration of how cheap fuel led to wasted water, helping create cities and mega-agricultural endeavors that reduced our water at the same time that we consumed century's worth of unrenewable fossil fuel, quite alarming. I sum the book up on page 180 by writing in the bottom margin: "Fuel Drop + Climate Change + Disease + Water Drop = Great Depression."

Langewiesche, William, *The Outlaw Sea: A World of Freedom, Chaos, and Crime*

Two high points for came early on. The author does a superb job of describing the vast expanse of the ungovernable ocean, three quarters of the globes surface, carrying 40,000 wandering merchant ships on any given day, and completely beyond the reach of sovereign states. The author does a fine job of demonstrating how most regulations and documentation are a complete facade, to the point of being both authentic, and irrelevant. The author's second big point for me came early on as he explored the utility of the large ocean to both pirates and terrorists seeking to rest within its bosom, and I am quite convinced, based on this book, that one of the next several 9-11's will be a large merchant ship exploding toxically in a close in port situation--on page 43 he describes a French munitions ship colliding with a Norwegian freighter in Halifax. "Witnesses say that the sky erupted in a cubic mile of flame, and for the blink of an eye the harbor bottom went dry. More than 1,630 buildings were completely destroyed, another 12,000 were damaged, and more than 1,900 people died." There is no question but that the maritime industry is much more threatening to Western ports than is the aviation industry in the aftermath of 9-11, and we appear to be substituting paperwork instead of profound changes in how we track ships--instead of another secret satellite, for example, we should redirect funds to a maritime security satellite, and demand that ships have both transponders and an easy to understand chain of ownership. There is no question that we are caught in a trap: on the one hand, a major maritime disaster will make 9-11 look like a tea party; on the other the costs--in all forms--of actually securing the oceans is formidable.

Lewis, Bernard, *What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*

The essence of this book that captured my attention was not the impact of the West on the Middle East, but rather the divergent manner in which the West separated religion from business and government, while the Middle East generally did not. ... In my view, this book is most valuable for outlining the depths of the challenge of modernization in a deeply religious region, and rather than ending on a note of "on your own heads be it," I wonder if we might not better ask, "what do we need to do differently to find a middle road toward modernization, one that can be accepted within the strictures of Islam?"

Mauro, Ryan, Death to America: The Unreported Battle of Iraq

This book is, in effect if not in intent (I see the author as being unwitting of the pernicious effects of his limited circle of contacts), a propaganda tract. I would go so far as to say that a substantial number of sources that he relies on are part of a nuanced and sophisticated Israeli covert action propaganda operation, in deliberate and careful connivance with the worst of the neoconservatives (the top ones having been on Israeli's payroll years ago and perhaps still today). It fails on three levels: first, it attempts to document deep and sustained relations between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. The author's sources are generally well-known neo-cons and Jewish sources that have been discredited by, among others, CIA analyst Michael Scheur, of "Anonymous" fame, and CIA case officer Robert Bauer, who has actually been heavily engaged face to face with people this young man only knows indirectly. Second, it supports Chalabi, the Iranian agent of influence, and claims that Jordan is trying to discredit Chalabi. The book avoids telling us that Chalabi worked under CIA funding and was fired for being a liar and a thief of funds intended for the Iraqi democratic movement; and it fails to tell us that Chalabi was convicted in absentia by Jordan of stealing millions of dollars in a bank fraud scheme. Third, the author parrots the neo-con line on Iraq continuing to have active weapons of mass destruction capabilities, something every other adult on the planet has realized was not true.

McRae, Ambassador Robert Grant, Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace

This book, by an extraordinary duo including the man who may well be Canada's foremost authority in this arena, provides the first and as best I can tell only comprehensive discussion of why human security in every clime and place matters locally, that is, to the future of your children. It places special emphasis on the importance of multi-cultural (i.e. not bully boy unilateral "we are the light and might makes right) approaches and large investments (commensurate with what we waste now on B2 bombers and nuclear carriers) in peacekeeping and stabilization operations which provide a vastly greater return on investment than funds wasted lining the pockets of military-industrial complex managers. It is highly relevant to homeland defense given the now recognized connection between human insecurity overseas, and illegal immigration as well as direct attacks against homeland targets.

Naim, Moises, *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy*

This book is important in two very big ways: the first, the one that most are noticing, is that it documents very ably the fact that crime pays—the author has done a superb job of itemizing the global illegal trade industry in a manner that could be understood by anyone, and the bottom line is frightening in that illicit trade is perhaps \$2 trillion a year, while legal trade is between \$5 trillion and \$10 trillion. Off-the-books bartering and immoral invoicing within corporations are additional reducers of government tax revenue--import export tax fraud in the USA is known to be \$50 billion a year (\$25 rocket engines going out, \$10 pencils coming in). The second reason this book is important, the real value of this book, is in documenting the revenues lost to government. ... Moises Naim has, in brief, delivered the seminal work on one of the five factors that will determine how the human species does in its World War with itself and with bacteria. The other four factors are the end of cheap oil, the end of free water, the virulent re-emergence of infectious diseases accompanied by the mutation and migration of new diseases from animal hosts to humans; and the promising but by no means assured emergence of collective democratic intelligence, perhaps aided by real-life decision support games such as those produced by BreakAwayLtd.com.

Palmer, Ambassador Mark, *Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025*

This book is a damning indictment of fifty years of US White House and Congressional politics, where, in the name of anti-communism and cheap oil, America--regardless of which party has been in power, has been willing to consort with the most despotic, ruthless, murderous regimes in the history of mankind. Still alive today and still very much "friends" of the U.S. Government are dictators that think nothing of murdering millions. He distinguishes between Personalistic Dictatorships (20, now less Hussein in Iraq); Monarch Dictators (7, with Saudi Arabia being the first in class); Military Dictators (5, with US allies Sudan and Pakistan as 1 and 2 respectively); Communist Dictators (5); Dominant-Party Dictators (7); and lastly, Theocratic Dictators (1, Iran). Ambassador Palmer makes several important points with this book, and I summarize them here: 1) conventional wisdom of the past has been flawed--we should not have sacrificed our ideals for convenience; 2) dictatorships produce inordinate amounts of collateral damage that threatens the West, from genocide

and mass migrations to disease, famine, and crime; 3) there is a business case to be made for ending U.S. support for dictatorships, in that business can profit more from stable democratic regimes over the long-term; and lastly, 4) that the U.S. should sanction dictators, not their peoples, and we can begin by denying them and all their cronies visas for shopping expeditions in the US.

Pape, Robert, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism

This new work by Professor Pape stands out as startlingly original, thoughtful, useful, and directly relevant to the clear and present danger facing America: an epidemic of suicidal terrorism spawned by the "virtual colonialism" of the US in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and now Iraq as well as other countries. Documents origin of actual attackers from within our so-called allies, and predicts an epidemic of suicidal terrorism spreading across the world (e.g. South Asia).

Peters, Ralph, Beyond Baghdad: Postmodern War and Peace

His most important point, one that merits its own book, is that America has misplaced its priorities in attacking radical Islam through Iraq (and passivity toward Saudi Arabia's sponsorship of terrorism, a neglect that will cost vastly more than the Iraq misadventure), and that it is the Muslim "outlands" from Central Asia to Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and India (with the second largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia) where America would be elevating women, nurturing secular states, and spreading the gospel of peace and prosperity.

Poole, H. John, The Tiger's Way: A U.S. Private's Best Chance for Survival

The author examines, in a careful, objective manner, the many ways in which Asian and Middle Eastern and other "Third World" insurgent infantry are trained in the art of stealth and close quarters infiltration and ambush. The bottom line is as the author ends the book: [Our enemy] prepares its privates to loosely follow orders, outwit enemy technology, and take on many times their number. In contrast, the American military prepares its privates to strictly follow orders, master their own technology, and seek a 3 to 1 advantage."

Poole, H. John, Phantom Soldier: The Enemy's Answer to U.S. Firepower

His bottom line is clear: all of our expensive high-tech equipment is increasing the soldier's load (shades of SLA Marshall) at the same time that it is reducing the soldier's ability to see (one eye covered by a sensor), smell, move, and communicate. We are pursuing a very expensive top down command and control model of confrontational fire-power warfare that is rather easily bogged down by stealth adversaries patient enough to crawl for days and dig underground for months in advance. I am reminded of the "Tunnels of Ch Chi." The author is totally tuned in with what I think of as 5th Generation or "bottom up" warfare in which the small units do most of the sensing and thinking, and they are not simply pawns on a giant chessboard.

Poole, H. John, Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods

1) One third of the world is Muslim, and if we do not restore morality to our form of democratic capitalism, and they adopt asymmetric warfare techniques, we are toast. 2) Iran certainly, and China probably, are fostering global terror as part of their grand strategy--each with different objectives--to end America's status as a super-power. 3) Pakistan, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia continue to train and support terrorists, with North Korea, Yemen, Sudan and various other countries (e.g. Bangladesh) having diverse roles to play. 4) Hezbollah out of Iran, rather than Al Qaeda out of Saudi Arabia, is the major player in the Iraqi insurgency, and its methods (hostages, suicide bombings, disguised IEDs) are clearly visible across the Iraqi theater of operations and now beginning to appear elsewhere in the world. 5) We cannot win 4th generation asymmetric wars with firepower alone. Lots more—see the longer review at Amazon.

Rose, Gideon, How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War

Nowhere in this book, which is excellent and a must read, do we learn of the daunting water shortages that threaten to further destabilize China, Turkey and Egypt, Russia, and other less developed areas already producing plagues, refugees, and corruption. This book addresses terrorism as an annoyance, as something we can deal with if we simply adjust our corporate organization a tad. It does not go deeply into the much larger issues, and rather than suggesting that such readings are available elsewhere (they are not, at least in a single work), I will end by complementing the editors of this work, and

suggesting that they go to work immediately on a sequel—only this time, we need a sequel that highlights both the deep conditions of poverty, disease, conflict and ignorance that characterize the world within which we live, and the iconoclastic authorities—most of them not American and none of them "members of the club"—whose views will cause discomfort to those who still think they are in charge.

Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks

On balance this book is a very fine review of the actual background and motivations of over 150 members of four specific terrorist networks: the Central Staff around Osama bin Laden, the Core Arabs, the Maghred Arabs, and the Southeast Asians. In general the book and the original research by the author confirm what earlier scholars of revolution (Chalmers Johnson, Ted Gurr, Eckstein, among others) have documented in the past, to wit that most top-notch terrorists are middle-class, smart, educated beyond the norm, and grow into their motivation. They are *not* crazy and suicide is a rational choice for them, not an aberrant behavior. I found the author's observation that recruitment is a bottom-up self-selected process rather than a top-down "seek out and recruit" process, quite fascinating, especially when the author makes the point that these people are NOT brainwashed. This is about a conflict of ideas, of ideals, of perception, and of context, and America is clearly not able to field the "idea army" and is not able to be competitive with Bin Laden in the war for the hearts and minds of these hundreds of thousands of prospective terrorists.

Williams, Paul, Osama's Revenge: THE NEXT 9-11 : What the Media and the Government Haven't Told You

What this book does is piece together all of the English-language reports over the past ten years or so regarding the probabilities and specifics of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda's having acquired several forms or portable nuclear devices. Although some reviewers have slammed this book for being fictional, they do not know what they are talking about. The FACTS are that the Soviet general officer responsible for the 100 suitcase nuclear bombs designed for Spetznatz use, some pre-positioned in the USA, has said publicly, in writing, and on more than one occasion that 66 of those are unaccounted for. The book is a useful compilation of both mistakes by the US, and events taking place from 2002-2004, and it ends with full translated copies of the 23 Aug 96 Fatwa and the

related 23 Feb 98 World Islamic Statement. Within the book are some extracts from Al Qaeda training manuals, one portion of which make it clear that the "sleepers" now in the US are specifically forbidden to go to mosques or appear Islamic in any way.

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